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Why do non-state groups engage in armed conflict with each other? Most studies on
internal conflict focus on the dyadic interaction between the state and a rebel group,
providing less attention to inter-group fighting. In an attempt to contribute to the lim-
ited body of quantitative research on non-state violence, I argue that the opportunity
structures and security problems created by weak state institutions may help explain the
occurrence of violence between groups. Drawing on the argument that state capacity is
important for domestic peace, I claim that non-state violence is more likely when groups
are forced to provide for their own security within the state sphere. However, although
weak state capacity structures create opportunities for groups to engage in fighting, an
anarchical environment in itself might not explain inter-group violence. Thus, I argue
that the interplay between economic and political exclusion of groups and weak state
capacity further increases the risk of non-state conflict, creating both opportunities and
motivation to engage in conflict. Whereas the majority of quantitative studies that focus
on marginalization emphasize rebel groups in relation to the state, I argue that violence
to ameliorate uneven distribution is just as likely to be directed at non-state groups who
receive a larger share of economic and political welfare.
Utilizing data on Sub-Saharan Africa from 1989 to 2011, I conduct a quantitative analysis
studying the effect of weak state capacity on inter-group violence. The empirical analysis
provides support for the theoretical expectation that weak state capacity increases the
risk of inter-group violence, and that the combined presence of economic marginalization
and weak state capacity further increases this risk. However, I find no support for a com-
bined effect of weak state structures and political marginalization. The findings highlight
the importance of state capacity for internal peace, and lend support to the literature
emphasizing the relationship between state strength and conflict. Also, they illustrate
the advantages of a more uniform theoretical framework, focusing on a specific type of
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Why do non-state groups engage in violent conflict with each other? Inter-group violence
has been prevalent in countries such as D.R. Congo, Nigeria, Burundi, and Liberia, and
non-state violence can have equally damaging effects as other types of conflict. According
to Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz (2012a), more than 60 000 people lost their lives in Africa
between 1989 and 2008 in armed conflicts between non-state groups. Yet, most studies on
conflict have focused on armed conflicts with the state as one of the belligerents, paying
little attention to inter-group fighting (Fjelde and Nilsson 2012).
For the groups and communities affected by non-state conflict, the consequences of this
type of violence can be very similar to that of civil war, both in terms of loss of human lives
and property, displacement and war-related diseases (Fjelde and Østby 2012). However,
there is great variation in the occurrence of inter-group violence across African states.
While some areas have no armed conflicts between societal groups, other areas, such
as Darfur in Sudan and eastern D.R. Congo, have seen several instances of inter-group
violence. What factors can explain this variation? A limited amount of quantitative
studies have sought to answer this question. In an attempt to address this gap in the
literature, this thesis will seek to evaluate the role of weak state capacity in explaining
the risk of armed conflict between groups. Drawing on the argument that institutional
setup is critical to domestic peace, I argue that weak state capacity can increase the risk
of inter-group violence when groups within the state are forced to provide for their own
security. When central authority is weak, the groups cannot depend on the state for
protection, and must evaluate their position in relation to each other. When forced to be
self-reliant the groups must assess their relative strength, as other groups could become
potential rivals within the unincorporated state sphere.
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Somalia has experienced multiple non-state conflicts, and is a useful example within
a weak state capacity framework (Lewis 1994). With the outbreak of civil war and the
removal of Barre in 1991, there has been an increasing number of organized and armed
groups. With the emerging state anarchy, every major Somali group formed its own
militia movement; the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, Somali National Movement,
United Somali Congress and Somali Patriotic Movement. These movements became self-
governing, carving out spheres of influence in the periphery and engaging in conflict with
other groups. The armed faction of the group became the providers of security and was
often the political representative of the group at large. With the state unable to provide
for the people of Somalia, the group became the relevant political community and the
armed faction within this group provided protection for the group at large (Vinci 2006).
However, the dissolution of central authority does not in itself necessarily explain why
groups take up arms. Many states can be classified as weak without experiencing inter-
group fighting. Indeed, without a treatment of group differentiation, which generates this
anarchical environment, structural arguments do often not explain conflicts, they merely
redescribe them. The rise of a security threat between groups in a weak state is not
necessarily a sufficient cause of inter-group violence. Rather, it provides the necessary
conditions in which it can take place (Roe 1999). Therefore, I argue that state weak-
ness in combination with economic and political marginalization of groups could further
increase the risk of conflict between groups, and that this provides useful insights when
trying to explain inter-group violence. While accommodating groups that are relevant
for survival, the state is unable to provide for the population at large, leaving other
ethnic groups excluded. Disparities in the distribution of economic and political power
in a weak state caused by state capture of a specific ethnic group can facilitate violent
mobilization of excluded groups to alter distribution asymmetries. Uneven redistribution
are transformed into deprivation and security fears through group differentiation. When
groups lack welfare and must provide for their own security in a weak state, violent
attacks may be directed against rival groups who have a relatively larger share of enti-
tlements in an effort to change the status quo. Simply put, the anarchical environment
provides the opportunity to engage in conflict, and the economic and political exclusion
of groups provides the motivation. Whereas quantitative studies that focus on economic
marginalization and civil war emphasize rebel groups in relation to the state, I argue that
economic and political marginalization also can be associated with inter-group conflict.
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Violence to ameliorate any perceived injustice or threat is equally likely to be directed at
non-state groups who receive a larger share of economic and political benefits.
The case of Burundi is illustrative when it comes to the combined effect of state ne-
glect and marginalization on group violence. Throughout the post-colonial period, the
Burundi state has not been fully in control of its entire territory. Ethnicity has been the
central organizing principle, creating policies of differentiation and exclusion of specific
groups. Conflicts between groups reflected the contested claims for relevance, represen-
tation and security within the state sphere. The Burundi state, then, has not been able
to include the complex groupings in society as part of a broader non-ethnic political
community. Instead, groups in society are engaging in conflict to secure economic and
political privileges. According to Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2000, 387), the Burundian
bureaucracy became an instrument for profit for an ethnically biased elite, where the
army played an important role as an actor and guarantor of the mechanism of rent col-
lection and distribution within the elite. Thus, excluded groups are not only responsible
for their own security, but are also marginalized by the politicization of ethnicity. The
inter-group violence seen in Burundi can to a large extent be related to the predation by
the Tutsi elite, and exclusion by the Hutus. Indeed, inter-group conflicts between Hutus
and Tutsis erupted in 1997, 2000, 2003 and 2004.
Based on the above discussion I expect that state weakness will increase the risk of non-
state conflict. Furthermore, I expect that if political and economic inequality concur, this
should further increase the risk of non-state conflict. I investigate these propositions us-
ing large-N analysis, covering all Sub-Saharan countries from 1989 to 2011. The temporal
scope reflect limitations in data availability on non-state violence, and the geographical
limitation is a choice based on the relative similarity of countries a smaller sample pro-
vides, where Sub-Saharan Africa most readily reflects a weak state capacity framework.
Also, when focusing on violence between groups, self-conscious group-based structures
are important. Group-formation can have many origins, but ethnicity holds a particular
importance in organizing collective action, and this is especially the case in Sub-Saharan
Africa (Fjelde and Østby 2012; Bates 2008; Fearon 2006; Wimmer 2002).
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1.1 Core Concepts
This thesis contains several concepts that are somewhat abstract in nature. I will therefore
define their meaning preliminarily, so as to clarify how the concepts are understood and
used in my theoretical framework and analysis. The most important concepts used in
this thesis are inter-group violence1, weak state capacity, and economic and political
inequality.
1.1.1 Inter-group Violence
To arrive at a definition of non-state conflict that distinguishes it from other types of
violence, there are several criteria used. The most important aspect is the lack of govern-
mental involvement in conflict. I only focus on conflicts between two organized groups,
where the state is not one of the belligerents. The definition of inter-group violence used
in this thesis is taken from the UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and
Kreutz 2012a), where non-state violence is understood as a conflict between two formally
organized groups, neither of which is the government of a state, causing at least 25 annual
battle-related deaths. The emphasis on formally organized groups entails focusing on any
non-governmental group having an announced name and using armed force against an-
other similarly organized group, such as between the Niger Delta Defense Force and the
Niger Delta Vigilantes in Nigeria. Thus, I focus on groups that are organized to such
a degree that they are included in the state-based armed conflict category in the UCD-
P/PRIO Dataset.
I have chosen to only focus on formally organized groups to get a more unified frame-
work, and to avoid attempting to explain several types of conflicts that can be caused by
competing mechanisms. Thus, I do not look at violence between sporadically organized
groups or violence during elections. Communal or informally organized groups are not
included in the analysis. As I build on a logic where groups residing within a weak state
must provide for their own security, is seems more likely that these, or factions of these
groups, are permanently organized for combat. By adapting a more narrow focus on
the type of violence and organization, I am able to obtain a more coherent theoretical
framework, make the assumptions given my framework more clear, and facilitate the
interpretation in my analysis.
1I use the terms inter-group violence, armed conflict between groups and non-state violence inter-
changeably throughout the thesis.
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1.1.2 Weak State Capacity
Although important for the study of civil conflict, state capacity is an elusive concept.
Indeed, state capacity is a broad term that can entail aspects such as coherence of insti-
tutions, economic development, and extractive and repressive capabilities (see e.g. Hegre
et al. 2001; Gates et al. 2006; Hendrix 2010; Lichbach 1995; Tilly 1978). I have chosen
to focus on state capacity despite its multi-dimensionality, as the quality and capac-
ity of the state is likely to affect the opportunities for groups to exist and organize, and
to engage in conflict with each other, either because they are motivated or forced to do so.
Although definitions of state capacity based on military capacity and institutional co-
herence has proven important for the study of civil conflict, I focus on the state’s ability
to collect and respond to information and provide services for its population (ICRG nda).
The reason for this is twofold. First, institutional strength and quality of the bureau-
cracy is central for acquiring information, as weak states are more sensitive to large
changes in public services during governmental change. With a lack of administrative
functions, the knowledge of mobilization of groups and eruption of non-state violence is
thereby more difficult to hinder. Second, the definition focusing on bureaucratic quality
entails state capacity characterized by meritocratic recruitment, insulation from political
pressure and the ability to provide services to the population, also during governmental
change (DeRouen and Sobek 2004). Thus, the definition used here focuses on aspects
of state capacity concerning the incorporation of groups and provision of services in the
state sphere. Rather than institutional consistency or military capacity, I will therefore
use the definition of state capacity in which state strength is given by the amount of
bureaucratic quality and inclusion of the state.
1.1.3 Economic and Political Inequality
The study of political and economic inequality has provided a number of mechanisms for
how and why conflict between different groups emerge (see e.g. Gurr 1970; Hechter and
Levi 1979; Horowitz 1985). Although the motivational role of inequality has often been
dismissed in the research of conflict (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeﬄer
2004), the gap between quantitative and case study research when it comes to motiva-
tions as a cause for conflict is large, indicating that the complete dismissal of incentives
is uncalled for. When studying inter-group violence, I follow the definition of inequality
provided by Stewart (2008), based on ’horizontal inequalities’, which she defines as in-
equalities in economic, social or political dimensions between culturally defined groups.
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Thus, I focus on a group-based definition of inequality, incorporating unequal access to
political and economic distribution, rather than interpersonal inequality insensitive to
any group based structures or social cleavages in society, and the unequal access to po-
litical and economic gains such structures can create.
A group-based definition of inequality can more easily reflect the fact that many post-
independent African states were unable to be detached of powerful social interest groups,
and not able to provide social benefits to all citizens independent of their ethnic belong-
ing. In weak states where there was no specific majority, many politicians appealed to
the same ethnic group, and politics became more ethnically based. Politics turns into a
struggle over control of the state between various ethnic groups in weak states, where the
control of the state apparatus by one ethnic group comes at the expense of other groups
(Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011). Thus, to obtain benefits and goods ethnic
belonging is important, where excluded groups end up with less resources than included
groups. A group based definition of inequality incorporates how economic and politi-
cal exclusion can be turned into incentives to engage in conflict caused by the relative
differences between groups.
1.2 Main Findings
In my analysis I find support for my theoretical expectation that weak state capacity
leads to unincorporated groups, forcing them to be constantly organized and provide for
their own security. This lack of state protection increases the risk of inter-group violence
in a weak state. In addition, I find that the presence of not only weak state capacity but
also economic inequality further increases the risk of inter-group violence. This finding
supports my theoretical proposition that the combined presence of weak state structures
and economic inequality provides both opportunities and incentives for groups to engage
in non-state conflict. However, I find no evidence that the dual presence of weak state
capacity and political exclusion increases the risk of non-state violence. In fact, I find
that the larger the excluded population in a weak state, the lower the risk. This can
be related to the relative grievance between groups and the potential gains by political
inclusion. When it comes to the predictive power of the models, the in-sample predictions
indicate that the models are improved when interaction terms are included, and the out-
of-sample predictions show that the models predict conflict recurrences quite satisfactory,
whereas single events by country are poorly predicted. Also, the models tend to predict
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inter-group violence when there is a civil war present, indicating that the more narrow
theoretical focus on non-state violence has some limitations.
The relationship between non-state conflicts and state capacity is the most central as-
pect of this thesis, and provides contributions concerning two aspects; (1) I focus more
narrowly on a specific type of conflict, and examine the relationship between inter-group
violence and weak state capacity with the use of statistical analysis. (2) I focus on the
combined effect of economic and political inequality and weak state capacity, and how
this relates to inter-group violence.
1.3 Structure
This thesis contains eight chapters. In Chapter 2 I review the relevant literature on
inter-group violence, which provides some basis for the theoretical framework presented
in Chapter 3. First, I focus on the argument of how weak state capacity can increase the
risk of inter-group violence. Second, I focus on a combined effect of weak state capacity
and economic and political exclusion, and how this interaction can further increase the
risk of inter-group violence. In Chapter 4 I present my research design, focusing on logistic
and negative binomial regressions. Chapter 5 introduces the data, presenting operational-
izations and addressing methodological issues with the measurements used, discussing the
potential problems with omitted variable bias, simultaneity, multicollinearity and miss-
ing. Chapter 6 contains the analyses, presenting models focusing on the role of weak
state capacity, and models focusing on the combined effect of weak state capacity and
inequality. Before concluding, I present some robustness tests and additional diagnostics





It’s a complicated war.
— Finnegan (1992)
In the following I will present relevant literature on inter-group violence. I briefly address
some of the literature concerning violence between informal organized groups, such as vi-
olence occurring between communal and pastoral groups, before presenting quantitative
contributions on organized group violence and its link to the civil war literature. De-
spite the fact that the case study literature is equally important when investigating the
causes for inter-group violence, I have chosen to put main emphasis on the quantitative
contributions, as they most closely relate to a theoretical framework based on militarily
organized groups within a weak state sphere.
2.1 Informal Organized Groups
There exists a substantial qualitative literature on inter-group conflict. Although not di-
rectly applicable to the highly organized, armed and politically relevant groups I focus on
here, the literature is relevant for the study of non-state violence. Examples of conflicts
between more informal groups are violence between communal groups1, riots2, and land
issues between herders and farmers. According to Raleigh (2010, 71), much of the find-
ings in the case study literature on intra - and inter-group violence can be understood as
a way to access resources in areas with a hostile or sporadic government presence. Thus,
1According to Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz (2012b, 5), communal groups can understood as groups that
are not permanently organized for combat, but ”who at times organize themselves along said lines to
engage in fighting”.
2For contributions within the literature on riots, see e.g. Barron, Kaiser and Pradhan (2004); Varshney
(2002, 2001); Wilkinson (2004); Van Klinken (2007).
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these findings provide useful insights when trying to explain quantitatively the outbreak
of inter-group violence as a consequence of weak state capacity. For example, Obioha
(2008) studies violence in Northern Nigeria and note that the actors engaged in conflict
are often peasants and herdsmen, where the government becomes involved in the conflict
more to settle the dispute than to engage in it. Much of these group conflicts relate to
access to arable land and forced migration due to increasingly drought-prone areas (See
also Fiki and Lee 2004). More generally, Raleigh (2010) finds that marginalization of
groups and accumulating insecurity caused by climate change can cause group conflicts
due to both increasing poverty over time and distress migration.
Of the case studies that have addressed armed conflicts between organized groups, Turner
(2004) finds that inter-group conflicts in the Sahel region are related to changes in na-
tional policy and the corresponding weak local leadership. Conflict in this region is based
on relative and not absolute resource availability, erupting when groups attempt to take
control of these resources.3 Similarly, Bassett (1988) finds that violence between groups
in the Northern Ivory Coast erupted as a consequence of national food policies disrupting
local land-tenure agreements. Benjaminsen and Ba (2009) conclude that increased pas-
toral marginalization in Mali leads to more frequent land use conflicts between herders
and farmers. They argue that these conflicts are a result of national policies giving pri-
ority to agricultural development at the expense of pastoralism.
Although relating to overlapping mechanisms, these case studies presented here do not
focus on permanently armed groups. I therefore proceed to the literature based on large
N-studies that mostly focus on militarized rebel groups.
2.2 Quantitative Studies: The link to the Civil War
Literature
The quantitative literature on inter-group violence is not extensive, and non-state conflict
data was only recently introduced, facilitating the study of organized groups in conflict.
The most substantial civil war dataset; UCDP/PRIO (Gleditsch et al. 2002), only in-
cludes violence where the state is involved, and cases of non-state violence are thereby
excluded. Previous research on organized violence tends to focus on interaction with the
state, rather than on any interaction between armed non-state actors (see e.g. Fearon
3See also Turner et al. (2011).
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and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Sambanis 2004; Hegre et al. 2001). Hence,
for large N-studies the approach has been to emphasize a dyadic interaction between the
state and a rebel group, but empirical tests of this relationship have tended to disregard
the rebel organizations. While these contributions’ focus on state characteristics address
the issue of violence within a state, they do not address why the state necessarily is a par-
ticipant in the organized violence. Arguments concerning deprivation and threat mostly
consider when political violence will occur, and do not address whether the state itself is
a participant or not. As stated by Fjelde and Østby (2012): ”There is arguably a leap
in many of the existing accounts from the notion that grievances derive from inter-group
comparisons, but violent attempts to redress them are directed against the state, rather
than the group who is the target of resentment” (Fjelde and Østby 2012, 5).
The focus on the state in the literature is based on the observation that states con-
trol the allocation of resources. However, violence against other groups can be just as
likely as violence against the state, as group belonging and political power are often
closely aligned. In addition, Cunningham and Lemke (2011) find that the factors used
to explain civil war also can be suitable predictors for other forms of violence, such as
assassinations, riots and purges. Overlap in findings suggests that theories used to ex-
plain civil war onset represent more general mechanisms about the occurrence of violence
within states (Nyg˚ard and Weintraub 2011). As theories should be tested on a sample
that the theory logically applies, there is a need to narrow down theory and use it more
directly on a specific type of violence. This is especially relevant if theories on civil war
applies to violence in more general terms.
Within the literature on civil war, the non-state side has been categorized as a uni-
tary actor, and the literature has not taken into account the complexity of civil conflicts,
where there often are several active rebel groups (Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). Civil con-
flicts are complex phenomena that rarely consist merely of a military struggle between
the state and one rebel group. Kalyvas (2003, 475) states that "(...) civil wars are not
binary conflicts but complex and ambiguous processes that foster an apparently massive,
though variable, mix of identities and actions - to such a degree as to be defined by that
mix”. By treating the rebel side as a unitary actor, much of the dynamics in civil conflict
is lost, and the violence between non-state groups are thereby understudied.
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Civil wars are typically understood based on what is perceived to be their overarching
dimension: ideological, ethnic, or religious wars. With this unidimensional focus, local
dynamics, actors and smaller groupings tend to be dismissed. However, a group’s motives
are not necessarily driven by an overarching cause and may well be driven by more local
or even personal conflicts. Groups and local communities involved in the war can take
advantage of the prevailing situation to settle private and local conflicts out of govern-
ment reach, or are coerced to do so. Hence, the outbreak of civil war creates an additional
opportunity factor for groups, and the outbreak of civil war is in itself an indication of
state weakness (Hegre et al. 2001). Thus, civil wars can be understood as a condition
that provides an opportunity to address unresolved issues within a larger conflict. Civil
wars transform societies into anarchies with a breakdown of political order, and when
lawlessness is extended to the entire society, violence tends to be a predictable outcome
(Kalyvas 2006).
Nevertheless, there are exceptions from an unidimensional focus on civil war. Among
the existing studies that have moved beyond the simplifying assumption of the rebel
groups as unitary actors are studies that focus on internally divided movements and mul-
tiple rebel groups’ effect on duration and outcome. According to Cunningham (2011),
internally divided movements receive concessions from the state at a much higher rate
than unitary actors, and that the more divided movements are the more likely they are
to receive concessions. Concessions given by states are strategic acts as states can use
concessions to reveal information about preferences of the movement. In the same vein,
Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour (2012) focus on the neglected politics of factionalism,
and find that factions in more fragmented groups are much more likely to use violence in
their struggle against the state, and are more likely to attack one another and co-ethnics.
Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) find that violence between groups during civil war is a way
to secure material resources and political leverage that could help the group prevail in
its conflict against the state.45 Also, the literature on secessionism is relevant for inter-
group conflict. For example, Brancati (2006) notes that decentralization increases ethnic
conflict and secessionism indirectly by encouraging the growth of regional parties. These
parties reinforces ethnic and regional identities, introducing legislation that favors spe-
cific ethnic groups over others, mobilizing groups to engage in ethnic conflict (see also
4See also Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009), Nilsson (2008), Shirkey (2012) and Fjelde and
Østby (2012).
5In addition, there exists research on inter-group conflicts during civil war based on in-depth studies,
for example during the civil wars in Sri Lanka and Bosnia (see e.g. Christia 2008; Lilja and Hultman
2011).
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Banerjee 1984; Bhatnagar and Kumar 1998; Kumar 1986).
The complexity of the events and numerous actors involved in civil conflicts makes it
hard to account for what type of conflict emerges between what actors. I therefore
choose to focus on inter-group violence, a specific type of violence that does not include
the state, which provides a more consistent focus. The conventional literature on civil
conflict places its explanation either at the individual level or more generally at the na-
tional level, and says little about the sub-state actors such as organizations or groups.
Although there are several contributions on group violence, these are mainly focusing
on inter-group violence during civil war, or more in-depth studies with limited general-
izability. In the following, I will therefore focus on organized non-state violence both in
the absence and presence of civil war, and attempt to apply a more narrowly defined
theory based on a security problem between groups in a weak state. There is room for
expanding theories on non-state conflicts beyond a more general civil war framework, and





To address the social consequences of a weak state structure, I apply a theory on how
weak state institutions can cause security problems between groups, and how these risks
might be aggravated by economic and political exclusion. The political topography of
African states is seen within the context of ethnic communities, where groups can be
understood to be politically included or excluded. The degree of inclusion at the state
center is linked to the group’s political importance. I rely on a conceptual framework
that emphasize the different capabilities and entitlements of groups, and the actors within
the political realm are ethno-political groups which are constantly interacting with each
other (Raleigh 2010). Hence, this framework assumes the presence of political groups in
society. While this is not necessarily always the case, most scholars recognize some form
of social belonging or group membership as a given part within the social and political
sphere (Fjelde and Østby 2012; Horowitz 1985; Gurr 1993; Stewart 2008).
As a starting point, I follow the conceptualization of groups used by Tajfel and Turner
(1979, 40), where a group is understood as:
(...) a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the
same social category, share some emotional involvement in this common definition
of themselves, and achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of
their group and of their membership of it.
However, this definition encompasses a broader approach to group differentiation than
I would like to use. Here, the focus is on groups that are defined through aspects such
as ethnic or religious belonging, but also has a high degree of organization. The forma-
tion of groups can have many sources, such as ethnicity, religion, identity and livelihood.
However, ethnicity seems to be a particularly important resource in organizing political
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action, especially so in Sub-Saharan Africa (see e.g. Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009;
Posner 2004; Raleigh 2010). Ethnic cleavages are therefore often the dominant group
differentiation in electoral and party opposition, and important social and political units
within African states. In addition, I look only at highly organized and armed groups
that are permanent fighting organizations, and not groups in society in general. I assume
these organized and armed groups have a relation to looser groupings in society, based
on Tajfel and Turner (1979) definition of group differentiation. When looking at orga-
nized and armed groups, I make no assumption about the underlying preferences of the
majority of the population that the group is supposedly representing. Hence, the strong
engagement and commitment of a small minority of the organized group is often only a
sub-group of a larger ethnic or religious identity, which this organized group claims to
represent.
I first present different definitions and understandings of state capacity. Subsequently, I
present how weak state capacity can lead to non-state conflict, through lack of control
and incorporation of groups. Then, I will present how weak state capacity can cause eco-
nomic and political exclusion in society, through state capture by specific groups, before
illustrating theoretically how this can increase the risk of violence by facilitating mobi-
lization and creating a security problem between groups, providing both opportunities
and motivation for non-state conflict.
3.1 State Capacity
(...) the most important political distinction among countries concerns not their
form of government but their degree of government.
— Huntington (1968, 1)
State capacity’s effect on the likelihood of civil conflict has been much debated amongst
political scientists. Despite its importance for the study of inter- and intrastate conflict,
state capacity remains a concept lacking a precise definition. As stated by Hendrix (2010,
273): ”State capacity is a quality conspicuous both in its absence and presence but diffi-
cult to define.”1 State capacity is a multi-dimensional concept that encompasses not only
extractive abilities of a state but also economic development and quality of institutions.
1Given the sparse literature available on inter-group violence, I explicitly draw many of my theoretical
assumptions and empirical expectations from the civil war literature.
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Despite the variation of definitions of state capacity, previous research show that strong
states have a decreased risk of experiencing internal conflict (Sobek 2010). While research
based on the greed versus grievances debate focus on the willingness of actors to use vi-
olence to alter power relations, there has been less focus on state capacity. The quality
and capacity of state institutions are important for the likelihood of conflict, as it affects
the opportunities for groups to exist and organize, and to engage in violent conflict with
each other.
According to Hegre et al. (2001), states have the ability to absorb the demands of their
population in ways that can reduce the potential of political violence, or simply deter
resistance through their ability to use physical coercion. While consolidated democracies
have institutionalized channels through which subversive groups can be accommodated,
authoritarian states experience fewer civil conflicts because potential dissidents are less
likely to mobilize when they perceive the repressive capacity of the state to be high (Tilly
1978). Hegre et al. (2001) find that authoritarian states and institutionally consistent
democracies experience fewer internal conflicts than intermediate regimes. Semidemoc-
racies are weaker because the regime type possesses inherent contradictions as a result of
being open yet somewhat repressive. This is a combination that invites protest, rebellion
and other forms of violence. In the same vein, Gates et al. (2006) find that institution-
ally consistent regimes last longer than inconsistent ones. However, broad distinctions of
regime type may simplify institutional heterogeneity of both democratic and authoritar-
ian regimes. It is difficult to decide the institutional structure of an inconsistent regime,
other than it is not completely repressive or free, and to assess what the institutional
design of an inconsistent regime is (Rød 2012). In addition, although there is evidence
linking democracy and bureaucratic capacity, there is little evidence linking institutional
coherence to bureaucratic quality (Hendrix 2010).
State capacity can also be defined in relation to a state’s ability to use force. This
definition has its roots in the Weberian definition of state capacity: ”The state is a
human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of force
within a given territory”(Weber 1946, 212). The strength and size of the military can
be seen as the most important element in a state’s repressive capabilities, and how this
effects the onset and termination of civil conflict. Hence, a smaller and less organized
militant group should be less of a threat than a larger and more organized group (Hendrix
2010). Empirically, this implies more internal conflict when states are weak, since weak
17
states invite collective dissent (Lichbach 1995). Buhaug (2010) finds that larger militaries
are associated with lower risk of conflict onset and shorter war duration, while Fearon
and Laitin (2003) stress the importance of a state’s repressive capacity, and that the
prospects of civil conflict is dependent on the government’s military capabilities and the
reach of government institutions into rural areas. These areas, where dissident groups ex-
ert control, are essential for the group’s survival, as they can slowly gain strength through
acquiring food and labour from local populations.
However, definitions of state capacity based on military strength may not capture the
aspects that are most important for a group to take up arms. State weakness makes it
more costly to control an entire country’s territory. Yet, the government could trans-
fer an overwhelmingly number of forces to these peripheral areas, and assume control
(Holtermann 2012). Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue that if government forces knew who
the dissident were and how to find them, they would be easily destroyed, as such groups
are relatively weaker than the government in terms of both arms and soldiers. State
strength, then, should perhaps rather be measured in a state’s ability to collect and re-
spond to information, and provide services for the entire population, than the size of
military strength or regime consistency (Hendrix 2010).
The gains of a more bureaucratic-institutional definition is twofold. First, institutional
strength and quality of the bureaucracy is central for acquiring and responding to infor-
mation, as weak states are more sensitive to large changes and interruptions in services
during reorganization of government. With a lack of administrative functions and merito-
cratic expertise the knowledge of potential mobilization of groups can be more difficult to
obtain, and thereby also more difficult to hinder. Hence, the decision to engage in violent
conflict may be affected more by the bureaucratic quality of the government, than the size
of its military and regime characteristics. Second, the definition encompassing bureau-
cratic quality concerns the state’s ability or will to incorporate groups in the state sphere
and provide equal concessions to the entire population. Rather than regime consistency
or military strength, I will therefore use the definition of state capacity in which state
capacity is dependent on the amount of bureaucratic quality in the government, charac-
terized by regular and meritocratic recruitment, insulation from political pressure and the
ability to provide services to the population despite government changes (DeRouen and
Sobek 2004). Therefore, countries that do not have the strength and expertise to govern
without policies being largely altered during government change, is lacking independence
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from political pressure in society, and is largely driven by patrimonialism and lack day-to
day administrative functions, are here considered to be states with limited state capacity.
The main features of a weak state are limited reach of state institutions and lack of
security within its territory. The state, then, has only limited ability to incorporate all
the groups in society within the state sphere, and an increasingly anarchical environment
emerges for the excluded groups. The theory of a security dilemma in the presence of
anarchy was originally created with interstate relations in mind,2 but has in more recent
times been used on the intrastate level in an attempt to address the question of ethnic
conflict in weak states. Posen (1993) claims that security dilemma within states can oc-
cur when conditions are similar to those between states in the international arena. State
weakness can therefore be seen as a problem of ’emerging anarchy’ in the absence of a
central authority, and the various groups are forced to provide for their own security.
In the same vein, Kaufmann (1996) points out that if the government cannot effectively
control its territory so as to be able to protect its people, while organized groups can,
then these groups can acquire sufficient attributes of sovereignty to create a security
dilemma. Hence, Kaufmann’s approach is similar that of Posen’s, where the absence of
an effective central authority forces groups to take actions to defend themselves, which
again threatens the security of other groups.
With the lack of territorial control and information within the state apparatus, groups
can more easily organize themselves militarily and mobilize to engage in conflict. This is
especially the case if groups choose to engage in fighting with other groups, who do not
have the same amount of military strength and soldiers as the state. Starting a rebellion
against the state requires high organizational capacity and resources, which marginalized
and excluded groups are not likely to have. Indeed, groups with low military capacity and
political irrelevance are not likely to be able to campaign against the government to re-
dress uneven redistribution. Engaging in conflict against other groups, however, requires
less military capability and resources, suggesting that inter-group violence is a more likely
2The term ’security dilemma’ was first used by Herz (1951), and was said to occur when two parties,
neither wishing to harm the other, end up in a conflict (See also Butterfield 1951; Jervis 1978). The
reason for why such a ’tragedy’ could occur is uncertainty between the two parties, where the uncertainty
produces fear in both parties that the other would want to harm them. At the same time, they are
unaware that they themselves are creating feelings of insecurity in the other. This implies that both
parties could be secure if they could come to see the nature of the situation they are in. Uncertainty
concerning the others’ intentions is therefore a central aspect in the security dilemma. Worst-case
scenarios may often lead to a spiral between two or several actors. The more one actor increase arms
to provide for its own security, the more the other will have to increase the amount of arms so as to
maintain the same level of security (Roe 1999).
19
outcome when groups must be self-reliant. Weak state capacity creates a situation where
groups must provide for their own security, and thereby also opens up the opportunity
to engage in conflict. Hypothesis H1 summarizes this theoretical expectation:
H1: Weak state capacity increases the risk of inter-group violence.
However, an anarchical environment and the necessity (or opportunity) to provide for
ones own security is not necessarily enough to cause inter-group violence. It is possible to
reside within a weak state, and have an opportunity to engage in fighting, without taking
up arms. There is not a deterministic relationship between an anarchical state and inter-
group violence, since states with anarchical features do not necessarily see inter-group
violence. Rather, it is a precondition for violence between groups to emerge. Hence,
I hypothesize that two additional features within a weak state might help explain the
emergence of non state conflict, by incorporating specific incentives in addition to the
opportunity structures provided by a weak state; economic and political marginalization.
3.2 Economic and Political Exclusion in a Weak State
Ethnic contests for power serve mainly to perpetuate disproportional government
representation.
— Raleigh (2010, 74)
Political and economic inequality has been a central part of the literature on violent
conflict, and has provided a number of mechanisms for how and why ethnicity contributes
to conflict. Gurr (1970) focused on state-imposed disadvantages and discrimination of
groups, and presented the theory of relative deprivation, which argued that different types
of inequality increase the risk of internal conflict as a reaction to frustrations stemming
from unfulfilled aspirations.3 Some argue that ethnicity causes violence through emotions,
resentment of other groups than one’s own, or the protection of one’s group survival based
on fear (see e.g. Kaplan 1993; Petersen 2002; Posen 1993; Lake and Rothchild 1996).
According to Toft (2003), ethnic conflicts are more likely to occur when ethnic groups
are territorially concentrated in an area considered their homeland.
3See also Hechter and Levi (1979), Russett (1964), Davies (1962) and Horowitz (1985).
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The motivational role of inequality has often been dismissed in the research of conflict on
the basis that grievances are abstract phenomena (see e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003; Col-
lier and Hoeﬄer 2004). These contributions have focused more on opportunity structures
emerging for potential insurgents, while giving incentives a less prominent role (Buhaug
et al. 2011). These studies have found no link between inequality and conflict. Using
interpersonal income inequality, these studies have been criticized for using individual
level measures of income distribution, such as the Gini-coefficient, that are insensitive
to social cleavages and group structures. Stewart (2008) emphasizes the importance of
’horizontal inequalities’4, which she defines as inequalities in economic, social or politi-
cal dimensions between culturally defined groups. Based on case studies, she finds that
horizontal inequality is associated with armed conflict. Also more recent large-N studies
focus on how distributional asymmetries affect conflict behavior, and finds that countries
with a more unequal distribution of wealth and political benefits are more exposed to var-
ious forms of violence (see e.g. Buhaug, Cederman and Rød 2008; Cederman, Weidmann
and Gleditsch 2011; Hegre, Østby and Raleigh 2009; Østby 2008). These contributions,
among others, stress the need to focus on group-based measures of unequal access to
political and economic distribution, and find evidence for a link between group inequality
and conflict.
I follow the definition of horizontal inequalities (HI) provided by Stewart (2008) to theo-
rize group differentiation, focusing on the political and economic dimension of horizontal
inequalities. Although these two aspects can be claimed to be interrelated, I will treat
them as two separate components. It is emphasized that different types of deprivation can
exist simultaneously, and that one type of exclusion may be present whereas the other is
not (Raleigh 2010). Economic inequality is not simply and artifact of political inequality,
and vice versa (see e.g. Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011). I therefore choose to
include both marginalization aspects in my analysis.5
African political regimes tend to be dominated by the intensity of the competition that di-
vides their political actors, and competition between political entrepreneurs accounts for
much of the institutional instability in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bayart 2003). The amount
of inequality in many Sub-Saharan African states tend to be related to the structure
4As opposed to vertical inequalities, that measures inequality between individuals rather than groups.
5The definition provided by Stewart (2008) also include social and cultural inequalities. These aspects
are expected to be equally important for the study of civil conflict, but these mechanisms are outside
the scope and aim of the theoretical framework presented here.
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of states, where African governments do not have easy access or authority within the
entire country. The emergence of nation-states in post-colonial Africa provided changes
in the principles of political legitimacy, and group relations took on new dynamics when
interacting with the state. The elites of the nationalizing states were not able to include
and integrate the vast majority of the population into the planned community of the na-
tion. This was especially the case for states where institutions were limited and the civil
society weak, leaving the elites to rely on ethnic ties for support and legitimation (see
e.g. Wimmer 2002; Buhaug, Cederman and Rød 2008). Hence, the state was not strong
enough to be independent of powerful social interest groups and dominant elites, and was
unable to provide social benefits to all citizens independent of their ethnic belonging. In
weak states where there is no specific majority and no ethnic group that can be viewed
as the ”state’s people”, political leaders might appeal to members of the same ethnic or
regional group, so that ethnic distinctions become politicized.
The ethnicisation of the bureaucracy can occur through the formation of client groups,
and provides the opportunity to legitimize governmental power through benefits, which
again assures support from the receiving group (Migdal 1988). Ethnicity becomes a
tool for private patronage and public goods provision between the ruling elite and local
communities, where governments seek legitimacy by favoring co-ethnics in the distribu-
tion of goods (Fjelde and Østby 2012). Hence, the state is not a neutral agent, but is
rather captured to different degrees by representatives of a specific ethnic group (Ced-
erman, Wimmer and Min 2010). The charging of ethnic differences is connected with
the struggle for the resources of legal security, financial redistribution, political relevance
and economic infrastructure (Wimmer 1997), where political relations between groups is
based on uneven political representation and interests (Raleigh 2010). Thus, resources
provided by the ethnic elite that has control of the state apparatus do not seem to be
public benefits, but rather collective goods available to those who belong to the ethnic
group in power. As stated by Wimmer (1997, 631)6:
(...) the politicization of ethnicity is to be interpreted as a central aspect of
modern state-building. For only when ’people’ and state are mutually related within
the ideal of a legitimate order does the question arise for which ethnic group the
state has to act, who is regarded as its legitimate owner, and who is entitled to
have access to its services.
6For a full overview of Wimmer’s theory on the exclusion of non-members in society, see Wimmer
(2002).
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Politics becomes a struggle over control of the state between various ethnic groups, and
this is especially the case in weak states as it is more easily captured by a specific ethnic
elite and its constituencies (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010). It follows that to obtain
material benefits, ethnic belonging is crucial. Those who lose out in the struggle for state
power are less likely to obtain favorable concessions from the state, leaving the excluded
groups with less resources than the included groups. As different groups in society make
claims on behalf of their collective interests against the state or other groups, the state
also may make such claims in the name of the dominant ethnic group (Gurr and Moore
1997). Mobutu’s faction in Zaire, for example, is mainly made up of the Ngbandi from
the Equateur province, and the Kinois in D.R. Congo have a close relationship with those
in power, highlighting the privileged relationship some groups can enjoy with the central
authority (Bayart 2003).
Inequalities between groups are often large in Sub-Saharan African societies (Kanbur and
Venables 2005), where the state neglects more peripheral groups. When social identities
are politicized and the groups make social comparison through in-group and out-group
categories, large differences between groups might create antagonistic inter-group rela-
tions (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Buhaug et al. 2009). The self-identification within the
group can provide motivation and incentive to engage in conflict. Groups that are non-
privileged in the distribution of goods share both a common deprivation and a common
identity that facilitate collective action to assert groups interests (see e.g. Wimmer 2002;
Fjelde and Østby 2012; Gurr 1993). Thus, opposing group interests when attempting to
obtain scarce resources promote competition and facilitates cooperation within the group,
and inter-group competition can enhance intragroup morale, cooperation and cohesive-
ness. Particularly unequal distribution of universally sought goods such as equality and
rights will have a potential to create feelings of anger and resentment (Kalyvas 2006).
This suggests that group variation matters for the motivation for conflict not just in
terms of the local conditions, but that the relative size of differences may also have in-
fluence. Because ethnic status is given at birth and therefore cannot be changed, the
struggle for group prestige in ethnically heterogeneous societies may ameliorate collective
action problems as soon as processes of uneven development foster rivalry between groups.
Ethnonationalist motivation may also be facilitated by historical experiences. Com-
petition over relevance creates historical patterns of perception and definition of the
’other’. According to Smith (1992), the polarization of group belonging can easily be
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transformed into motivation for conflict if the members feel politically threatened. The
members, then, reconstruct a new set of ideas from their common history and revive them
through their reinterpretations (Smith 1995). The emergence of group motivation may
be especially easy if the group has past violent experiences with another group, where
a discourse based on encounters with a rival group is created, either through glorifying
own achievements or characterizing the rival group with negative attributes. Hence, in
the words of Tajfel and Turner (1979, 33); "(...) the real conflicts of group interests not
only create antagonistic inter-group relations but also heighten identification with, and
positive attachment to, the in-group.” Exclusion along ethnic lines can lead to political
mobilization of counter-elites, where conflict erupts because of demands of inclusion at
the center of power, for example the ANC in South Africa, or the creation of a separate
state or self-determination in which the ethnic group would be dominant, for example in
the Angolan exclave of Cabinda (Buhaug et al. 2011).
The existing literature provides strong implications for how uneven distribution and an-
archical features within the state can lead to a polarization of group belonging. However,
just as there are many weak states with lacking security that have not seen any non-state
violence, there are many aggrieved groups within countries that do not choose to engage
in conflict. ”It is a profound and repeated finding that the mere facts of poverty and in-
equality or even increases in these conditions do not lead to political and ethnic violence”
(Goldstone 2002, 8). For mobilization to occur, there must be opportunities available for
the aggrieved groups to do so, and it is therefore important to identify structures that
make it both possible and likely for groups to take up arms. And it is exactly here that
the combination of limited state security and the state capture of a specific group be-
comes relevant. As a weak state is more likely to be controlled by a specific ethnic group,
and cannot provide economic and political security for the remaining ethnic groups, the
excluded groups are more inclined to engage in conflict. State weakness in combination
with economic and political marginalization of groups could cause security problems by
creating both opportunities and incentives to engage in conflict, as inequality in economic
and political relevance can facilitate violent mobilization to alter resource asymmetries
when uneven redistribution are transformed into fear of survival and a sense of depriva-
tion through group comparison.
Violence between groups can be seen as a product of self-governing (Raleigh 2010), where
the political exclusion of groups exacerbates conflict over political and economic resources
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when inclusion is a function of group belonging. Inter-group violence is a way of address-
ing imbalanced access to relevance critical for group survival within a weak state sphere
which is controlled by a different ethnic group. When weaker groups must provide for
their own security in a weak state, violent attacks may be directed against rival groups
who have a relatively larger share of entitlements in an effort to change the status quo.
Indeed, when the distribution of power is limited to a specific group in society and the
non-privileged groups are excluded from political competition of power, the subordination
of the excluded group is permanently fixed. Change can be brought about only through
the means of force (Horowitz 1985). Thus, unequal distribution of resources are likely to
intensify group violence between privileged and non-priveleged groups.
However, it is not necessarily only the weaker group who decides to take up arms. The
lack of reach of state institutions may also provide opportunity structures for stronger
groups to attack a weaker, so as to take control of an even larger share of resources.
Stronger groups can have incentives to exploit such divisions to engage in conflict, by
portraying weaker groups as a threat to their economic and political privileges (Fjelde
and Østby 2012). Previous studies have found that social inequalities can shape na-
tionalism beyond the basis of marginalization, where more aﬄuent groups seek toward
separatism. Gourevitch (1979), for example, noted that groups in economically richer
areas felt undermined by poorer regions, seeking independence for ones own group.
In practice, many Sub-Saharan African governments do not have effective sovereignty
across their full territories. This lack of capacity affects the ability (or will) of states to
provide basic services, and the geographical control of the government is quite varied,
creating spaces of non-governance that are unincorporated. Economic and political ex-
clusion creates high variation in government services, where political representation and
economic accommodation is lower for marginalized groups (Peet and Watts 1996; Coast
2002). Thus, the question of economic and political survival and relevance becomes im-
portant in an anarchical state, and the emergence of a security problem between groups
may manifest itself in two ways: First, the anarchical structure provides an opportunity
for a stronger group to attack a weaker to secure an even larger share of wealth and
political relevance, and second, a weaker group attacks a stronger group because of secu-
rity fears and deprivation. Hence, the groups deliberately take up arms in the anarchical
state because of an uneven distribution of economic and political privileges, and unin-
tentionality cannot be assumed. The security dilemma emerging within an anarchy is a
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spiral model where intentions on both parts are benign, and neither side wishes to harm
the other.7 However, I assume that groups deliberately take up arms to change the sta-
tus quo within the anarchical structure, where one group attempts to make its situation
better by arming itself to deter another group. Also, the security dilemma sees state
participation as completely absent, whereas I focus on the consequences when the central
authority is weak and politicized. I therefore see the relationship between groups with
different amounts of economic entitlements as a security problem, rather than a security
dilemma, where groups are intentionally aggressive. This security problem emerges when
the groups included in the legitimate base of support of the government are accommo-
dated, whereas excluded groups in the periphery are not (Raleigh 2010). The exclusion
of groups within a weak state sphere creates both opportunities and incentives to alter
the status quo, making non-state conflict more likely. The hypotheses summarize these
theoretical expectations:
H1a: Economic marginalization in a weak state further increases the risk of inter-group
violence.
H1b: Political marginalization in a weak state further increases the risk of inter-group
violence.
Given that the state is such a significant actor for the allocation of power and resources,
existing literature has focused on conflicts where the state is involved. However, because
group belonging and political power is so closely linked in many Sub-Saharan states, the
feeling of deprivation and fear of group survival is likely to be directed at the members of
the group that occupies the state. When the state is functioning in defense of particular
group interests, attacking the group that is receiving privileges from the government is
also an attack on the state as such (Fjelde and Østby 2012). Hence, inter-group violence
7Both Kaufmann and Posen’s argument seems to indicate that group identities, historical record and
rhetoric are equally important for threats between groups as by anarchy itself. Although I do agree
that conflict between groups may be driven by some additional factor than an anarchical environment,
I do not view these factors necessarily as creating a security dilemma. As stated by Tang (2011), three
aspects of the security dilemma are essential: anarchy, lack of malign intention on both sides, and some
accumulation of power. As a consequence, Posen’s use of the former Yugoslavia as case is contradictory
to the security dilemma, as he claims there were plenty of signals of malign intent (Posen 1993, 37).
Therefore, it is not given whether the situation is best described as a security dilemma, or as a security
problem. Kaufmann’s use of the concept is also at odds with the definition provided by Butterfield (1951),
as he claims that elite-led violence will eventually create a security dilemma. Kaufmann’s structural
security dilemma, then, has occurred after the outbreak of violence, and he disregards the unintentional
origin of the security dilemma.
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is a result of a struggle over the control of economic and political resources where groups
must provide for their own well-being and security.
3.3 Summary
The most central question in this thesis is why do non-state groups engage in conflict
with each other? In an attempt to answer this question I rely on a weak state capacity
framework, where the lack of state incorporation of the entire population forces excluded
groups to provide for their own security. The lack of territorial control and ability to
gather information creates opportunity structures for groups to exist and organize mil-
itarily, and to engage in conflict with each other. Based on these expectations, I argue
that weak state capacity increases the risk of inter-group violence.
Although weak state capacity can be seen as a necessary condition for inter-group vi-
olence, it is not an exhaustive explanation. Indeed, a state can be categorized as weak
without experiencing inter-group violence. Therefore, I argue that opportunity structures
created by a weak state in combination with incentives based on group inequality can
further increase the risk of inter-group violence. As a weak state is more likely to be con-
trolled by a specific ethnic group with a limited ability to equally incorporate all groups
in society, the groups excluded from political and economic benefits are more inclined
to engage in conflict. Thus, state weakness in combination with economic and political
inequality increases the risk for inter-group violence by creating both opportunities and
motivation to engage in conflict. Inequality between groups can facilitate violent mobi-
lization to change uneven redistribution as excluded groups receive a relatively smaller
share of public goods than included groups, and must provide for their own security





Essentially, all models are wrong, but some are useful.
— Box and Draper (1987, 424)
In this chapter I present a research design that allows for a quantitative assessment of
whether a weak state increases the probability of inter-group violence. First, I will briefly
present why I explore the relationship between weak state and inter-group violence using
a quantitative approach. Second, I will present the estimation techniques used in the
regression analyses, logistic regression and negative binomial regression, before presenting
the statistical model.
4.1 Why Quantitative Analysis?
Scientific research is supposed to test assumptions and draw causal conclusions on the
basis of empirical information (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). As the styles of quanti-
tative and qualitative research is very different, there are gains and drawbacks inherent
in both methods. Whereas the literature on the violence including the state is vast,
the literature on inter-group violence is dominated by research focusing on individual
cases (see e.g. Christia 2008; Duquet 2009; Lilja and Hultman 2011; Barron, Kaiser and
Pradhan 2004; Magdalena 1977). The most central reason for choosing a quantitative
design in this thesis is that I am seeking to explain a more general pattern of inter-group
violence over time and space, and how weak state institutions and group inequality is
related to this type of violence. In case studies the generalizability is somewhat limited,
and a statistical analysis allows for more structured and coherent approach, incorporat-
ing multiple cases. Quantitative research also has limitations such as confirmation bias,
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lack of direct application to specific situations, and imposing too simple logic on diverse
events. Although being aware of limitations of the quantitative research design, I choose
a quantitative approach to answer my hypotheses more systematically, in an attempt to
contribute to the relatively limited quantitative tradition of inter-group violence research.
4.2 The Models
When investigating the relationship between weak state capacity and inter-group violence,
there are several ways to conduct the analysis. The data at hand holds information both
on discrete outcomes, and the number of non-state conflicts per country year. Thus,
the analysis can be conceptualized using a dependent variable measuring both a discrete
outcome, and the number of non-state conflict events. Therefore, I will in the following
present the two estimation techniques that I have chosen for my analysis; logistic and
negative binomial regression.1 I choose two estimation models to assess consistency in the
findings, but also because they answer slightly different questions. Whereas the logistic
approach indicates whether there occurred a non-state conflict event or not, the negative
binomial also gives information about how many conflicts occurred. The logit models
report the probability of experiencing inter-group violence, whereas the count models
report the probability of distribution of counts.
4.2.1 Logistic Regression
The logit model is developed in terms of the regression of a nonlinear model relating
the x’s to the probability of an event, here inter-group violence. Measuring a discrete
outcome implies that when the conflict reaches a certain intensity threshold, the observed
variable is 1, 0 otherwise. A logit model can be derived by transforming Pr(y = 1|x) into
a function that ranges from −∞ to ∞ (Long 1997). The probability is first transformed
into odds:
Pr(y = 1|x)
Pr(y = 0|x) =
Pr(y = 1|x)
1− Pr(y = 1|x) (4.1)
The odds indicate how often something happens, for example how often y = 1, and range
from 0 when Pr(y = 1|x) = 0 to ∞ when Pr(y = 1|x) = 1. The logit, or log of the odds,
ranges from −∞ to ∞. Hence, the model is linear in the logit:





1− Pr(y = 1|x)
]
= χβ (4.2)
The logit models are symmetric. At point Pr(y = 1|x) = 0.7 on the probability curve,
increasing χ by any given amount δ changes the probability by the same amount as if χ is
decreased by δ. However, a unit change in logit does not give an intuitive understanding
of what this change means. A transformation of the β’s in the logit model indicates a
factor change in the odds for an event occurring:
Ω(χ) = χβ (4.3)
As the interpretation of odds is more intuitive, I will report all my results in odds ratios.
The interpretation is that an odds ratio greater than 1 increases the chances of an out-
come happening relative to the previous value of variable χ, while an odds ratio below 1
decreases the chances (ibid).
4.2.2 Negative Binomial Model
The UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset provides information on how many conflict there
are within a country in a given year. The logit estimation model presented above is only
able to give us information on whether there was a non-state conflict in a given year or
not, and not how many. Hence, although there were 4 inter-group conflicts in Sudan in
1997, this is only coded as one event in the logistic regression. To be able to account for
the number of conflict events in a country in a specific year, I also include a count model
in my analysis.
Counting how many times something has happened is quite common in the social sciences.
Count variables are often treated as continuous in quantitative analysis and linear regres-
sion is applied. However, the preponderance of zeros, the low values, and the clearly
discrete nature of the dependent variable suggests that the usage of linear regression
models for count outcomes can lead to inconsistent and biased estimates (Greene 2003).
Figure 4.1 shows the frequency of counts of non-state violence. It is apparent here that
the normal distribution assumption in OLS is not met, as the values clearly are skewed
to the right, displaying that low values are far more frequent than higher values. Thus,
the use of OLS is not viewed as suitable for my analysis.
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2012a)
The Poisson regression is the most basic regression method for count data. With a Pois-
son the probability of a count is determined by the Poisson distribution, where the mean
of the distribution is a function of the independent variables - the conditional mean of
the results is equal to the variance. The classical Poisson regression model for count
data is often of limited use because empirical count datasets typically exhibit overdis-
persion, indicating that a Poisson distribution is not met (Zeileis, Kleiber and Jackman
2007). Poisson regression can be tested with a poisson goodness-of-fit. A large value for
chi-square in the goodness-of-fit indicates that the poisson model is inappropriate. In a
poisson regression model with controls the value is 1117.372, and is significant (Prb >
chi2(949) = 0.0001), indicating that the Poisson model is inappropriate.
The problem of overdispersion can be addressed by extending the basic model by al-
lowing the variance to exceed the mean in a negative binominal model. The mean µ is
replaced with the random variable µ˜:
µ˜ = exp(xiβ + εi) (4.4)
ε is a random error that is assumed to be uncorrelated with x. Thus, the variation in
µ˜ is due to both variation in x among observations but also unobserved heterogeneity
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introduced by ε (Long 1997).
The negative binomial distribution is a probability distribution of the number of tri-
als before an event occurs. For example, for my analysis, the occurrence of a non-state
conflict event is 1, whereas all non-events are zero. Hence, the amount of zeros needed to
obtain, say, four non-state conflict events will be negative binomial. However, the nega-
tive binominal is not always well suited for modeling excess zeros. Figure 4.1 shows that
zero counts make up the majority of the data, representing 93 percent alone, indicating
that a negative binomial could lead to underprediction of zeros. As conflict events are
rare in general, and especially when only looking at a specific type of violence, it is im-
portant to take zero counts into account. Zero-augmented models can address this issue
by explicitly modeling the production of zero counts. Zero modified models allow for the
possibility of some units never obtaining a count, meaning never experiencing an inter-
group conflict, by increasing the conditional variance and the probability of zero counts.
However, although zero inflation is useful when estimating models with excessive zeros,
the limited amount of observations in my analysis and the number of variables included
have the potential of introducing instability when estimating zero inflated models (Staub
and Winkelmann 2010). Therefore, I have chosen not to use this estimation technique
for my main analysis, as zero inflated model is often not well suited in small samples
(Hall and Shen 2010). I will therefore focus on negative binomial regression in my main
analysis. As a robustness test, I will also estimate a zero inflated model and a rare event
logistic model to see if the results are consistent, or driven by the estimation technique
used.
4.2.3 Regression Models
To be able to determine whether there is an effect of weak state capacity on inter-group
violence, both alone and in combination with economic and political inequality, I will run
several regression analyses. For the logistic and negative binomial regression with control
variables I run four regression models:
Y(Inter-group Violence) = β0 + β1(Weak State) + β2(Economic Inequality)
+ β3ln(Largest Excluded Group + β4(Civil War) + β5ln(Population)
+ β6ln(Infant mortality rate) + β7(Number of groups) + β8(Peace years) + ε (4.5)
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Y(Inter-group Violence) = β0 + β1(Weak State) + β2(Economic Inequality)
+ β3ln(Excluded Population) + β4(Civil War) + β5ln(Population)
+ β6ln(Infant mortality rate) + β7(Number of groups) + β8(Peace years) + ε (4.6)
Y(Inter-group Violence) = β0 + β1(Weak State) + β2(Poorest group) + β3(Richest group)
+ β4ln(Largest Excluded Group) + β5(Civil War) + β6ln(Population)
+ β7ln(Infant mortality rate) + β8(Number of groups) + β8(Peace years) + ε (4.7)
Y(Inter-group Violence) = β0 + β1(Weak State) + β2(Poorest group) + β3(Richest group)
+ β4ln(Excluded Population) + β5(Civil War) + β6ln(Population)
+ β7ln(Infant mortality rate) + β8(Number of groups) + β8(Peace years) + ε (4.8)
4.3 Summary
To test my theoretical assumptions concerning inter-group violence, I have chosen a
quantitative design to enable generalizability over time and space, and to apply a more
systematic approach to how weak state institutions and group inequality is related to
non-state violence. When investigating the relationship between weak state capacity and
inter-group violence I will use both logistic and negative binomial regression, and report
all results in odds ratios. I use the two estimation models to assess the consistency in
the findings, applying a dichotomous indicator to evaluate the likelihood of inter-group
violence, and a count indicator to make use of the frequency of conflicts within a country
year. In the next section I present the indicators chosen for my analysis.
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Chapter 5
Data and Unit of Analysis
In this chapter I focus on the data used in the regression analyses. First, I will make
the case for limiting the study to Sub-Saharan Africa, and why I use country years as
the unit of analysis. Second, operationalizations of the main concepts will be presented
and discussed, with an emphasis on non-state violence, weak state, and economic and
political marginalization. I also present the control variables, which are drawn from
the more general civil war literature. These control variables will be included in all
models when assessing the performance of weak state capacity, and economic and political
marginalization. Third, I discuss methodological challenges with a main focus on missing
data.
5.1 Regional and Temporal Scope
The observations included in the regression models are limited to Sub-Saharan Africa, as
this region is most closely applicable to the weak state framework put forth in the thesis,
and the geographical area is a context that unites a relatively similar group of countries.
By doing this, I avoid regressing a global sample on a regional theory, providing the global
mean effect of non-state violence. A global analysis is relevant to the entire world, but it
is perhaps not feasible to compare all the countries included in the sample. For example,
in the sample there are non-state violent events in Canada between motorcycle clubs. Al-
though these are clearly cases of inter-group violence, it is questionable to compare this
type of group mechanisms with conflicts between ethnic groups in Sub-Saharan Africa,
as it is arguably related to different dynamics than weak state capacity. Rather, I seek to
perform a theoretically informed sub-global analysis of relatively similar countries where
violence can be explained by overlapping mechanisms. Also, when focusing on violence
35
between groups, group-based structures in society are important. As group belonging
based on ethnicity holds a particular importance in organizing collective action in Sub-
Saharan Africa, it seems reasonable to focus on this region in my analysis concerning
conflicts between groups (Fjelde and Østby 2012; Bates 2008).
The analysis is based on country years, and the main observation of interest is whether an
instance of inter-group violence occurred that year between groups who are permanently
organized for combat. The country years in the dataset go from January 1st to December
31st from 1989 until 2011, and a non-state conflict enters the dataset if it reaches the
25 battle-death threshold in one calendar year. There are potential weaknesses when the
unit of analysis is at the country level, as I seek to explain mechanisms that more readily
relate to local conflict dynamics of non-state violence. It would be optimal to have more
local data to base the analysis on. Unfortunately, accurate information regarding the
location, political influence and wealth of the non-state groups who engage in fighting is
currently unavailable. The models in the analysis are therefore based on country-level
characteristics, as a more disaggregated analysis is not possible to conduct. This can lead
to a conceptual problem, since local features and characteristics may vary considerably
within countries. Conflict is most often a localized phenomenon, that does not include the
entire country, but normally takes place in particular regions in the periphery (Buhaug
and Lujala 2005; Buhaug et al. 2009). However, despite the fact that I cannot say whether
it is a wealthy group that attacks a poorer group, or vice versa, I can confirm or revoke
that the presence of economic and political inequality within a weak state increases the
likelihood of violence between groups. In addition, country years is the most used unit of
analysis in the civil war literature, and as the focus of this thesis is the effect of limited
state capacity, it is important to take country-level dynamics into account.
5.2 Operationalizing Concepts
A central objective when operationalizing concepts is to ensure that the indicators chosen
reflect the concept one attempts to capture (Adcock and Collier 2001). Operationalizing
the theoretical concepts presented in this thesis is challenging due to the elusiveness of
indicators such as state capacity, bureaucratic quality and inequality. I therefore present
and discuss advantages and drawbacks with the measurements used, and the degree to
which they reflect the theoretical constructs.
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5.2.1 Dependent Variable: Non-State Violence
It is difficult to arrive at an operational definition of civil conflict without adopting some
ad hoc way of distinguishing it from other types of violence, and there are several ways to
measure organized non-state conflict. The first issue is where to set the death threshold
for inter-group violence. Within the civil war literature, Small and Singer (1982) distin-
guished war from other types of violence by the requirement that state participation and
violence should be sustained and that the conflict exceeds a threshold of more than a
1000 deaths, based on an annual-death criterion. This death threshold might be helpful
as civil war is distinguished from other forms of violence given that it causes large-scale
destruction. However, a strict application of the threshold can lead to exclusion of several
cases that satisfy all other characteristics of civil war (Sambanis 2004).
The Uppsala dataset on armed conflict has two thresholds, where a 1000 battle-related
deaths in a year is coded as a major war, whereas 25 battle-related deaths is coded as
a minor war. This lower threshold is viewed as the most reasonable threshold in this
analysis on inter-group violence for several reasons. First of all, with a higher threshold
of a 1000 deaths, several conflicts that can be said to be typical cases of non-state violence
are excluded. In fact, with a threshold of a 1000 deaths, only five conflict years would be
included; Liberia in 1996, Somalia in 1992, and Sudan in 1991, 1992 and 1993. Hence,
such a threshold would exclude well-known incidents of inter-group conflict. Also, there
is a statistical reason for why a lower threshold would be more useful. With a quanti-
tative approach, there is not enough non-state conflicts to conduct statistical analyses
for the relatively short time period from 1989 to 2011, which my sample is limited to.
Lowering the threshold for conflict inclusion will amount to more conflicts and therefore
more flexibility (Gleditsch et al. 2002).
A more general issue with all conflict coding is the use of a numerical threshold of deaths
to identify conflicts, as it is difficult to handle the problem of unreliable reporting and
incomplete data. This is perhaps especially an issue in Sub-Saharan Africa, where data
is generally more difficult to collect. An unbalanced data collection over time is likely
to introduce a bias in the data. Being aware of this issue, the UCDP Non-state Conflict
Dataset is the most thorough and extensive dataset available on inter-group violence.
The lack of complete and unbiased information is rare in social inquiry, and important
topics are worth studying even as only limited information is available (King, Keohane
and Verba 1994). Figure 5.1 shows the number of fatalities for the entire period from 1989
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Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012a)
to 2011, where there is a peak in 1992 mainly due to large conflicts in Sudan, Somalia
and Liberia. The graph shows that the number of fatalities was highest during the 90s,
before steadily declining. Since 2000, the number has been below 2000, compared to the
peak of 4500 in 1992, and just below 3000 in 1996.
The second issue with an operational definition is to separate non-state conflict from
other types of violence, such as intra - and interstate conflicts. The exclusion of govern-
ment involvement is essential here. The whole concept of organized group violence is that
the state is not involved. However, it is important to note that an organized group can
be involved in a non-state conflict with another group, and be part of a conflict against
the state at the same time. Hence, there can be ongoing non-state conflicts during a
civil war. In fact, this is often the case. We see examples of this in countries such as
Burundi, Nigeria and Mali. Related to this issue is the degree of organization required
for the parties to be distinguished as actors in a non-state conflict, and not other forms of
violence. I have here chosen to only focus on formally organized groups. This means that
informally organized groups and communal groups are excluded from the analysis. There
are three main reasons for the choice to only analyze formally organized groups. First,
as I apply theoretical assumptions from the civil war literature about the relationship
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between groups and the consequences of weak state capacity, it seems more reasonable
for my theoretical framework to focus on groups that resemble (and in fact sometimes
are) rebel groups in their form of organization and level of activity, without fighting the
state. Second, to focus on a high level of organization is more consistent with the idea
of only looking on the specific type of violence that reflects the theoretical aim put forth
in the thesis. Third, when attempting to explain why violence occurs when ethnicity is
politicized in a weak state, the continuity of group activity is important. In the context
of a civil war, the group is given, the rebels already exist to challenge the state. However,
outside the context of a civil war, the groups themselves are part of the outcome that
needs to be explained. As I try to do this by applying a scenario where a security threat
exists between groups, it seems more plausible to look at organized groups as the weak
state forces the groups to provide for their own protection, and are therefore likely to be
permanently organized for combat.
Violence between more informally organized groups, typically related to elections and
political parties, is also relevant for the study of non-state conflict. However, these in-
formal groups are not permanently organized for combat, and only occasionally use their
looser organizational structures for such purposes. Examples of inter-group violence be-
tween more loosely organized groups are Christians and Muslims in Nigeria, and between
the Kikuyu and Maasai in Kenya (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012b). More informal
groups tend to share a common identification along ethnic or religious lines, but this
type of violence is more related to communal conflicts, and is not directly reflecting the
theoretical framework presented here. To be included in the analysis, the group must
have a high enough level of organization so as to be included in the state-based armed
conflict category provided by the UCDP/PRIO Dataset to be included in the analysis
(Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012a). Thus, instead of estimating models on overly di-
verse observations that include several types of violence and level of organization, I try
to keep the models as coherent as possible, focusing only on groups who are permanently
armed and organized. This will make the assumptions about the theoretical framework
and models more clear, and facilitate the interpretation of the results. Table 5.1 shows
a random sample of some of the conflicts in the dataset. The sample shows the conflict
ID, the name of the groups involved in conflict, year and number of fatalities. It is clear
from the table that the conflicts included in the dataset represent a wide variety of armed
groups, organized on the basis of factors such as ethnicity, separatism, rebel activities
and political affiliation.
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Table 5.1: Sample of Inter-group Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa: 1989-2011
ID Side A Side B Statename Year Deaths
393 Defense of Democracy Liberation of the Hutu Burundi 1997 224
291 Habar Gidir clan Marehan subclan Somalia 1995 31
22 Arrow Boys Lord’s Resistance Army Uganda 2003 71
209 ANC ’Green’ faction ANC ’Red’ faction South Africa 1993 30
10 Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca Al-Shabaab Somalia 2010 202
246 Naparama Renamo Mozambique 1991 63
243 Islamic Front Azawad Azawad Movement Mali 1994 30
123 Niger Delta Force Niger Delta Vigilantes Nigeria 2004 63
240 National Patriotic Front ULIMO Liberia 1991 313
121 Moorland Defence Sabaot Defence Kenya 2008 32
363 Al-Shabaab Ogaden NLF Ethiopia 2007 40
135 Mayi Mayi Rally for Democracy DR Congo 2002 375
329 SPLM/A South Sudan Defence Force Sudan 1993 2732
303 Rahanweyn Army Somali National Alliance Somalia 1997 41
451 Patriots for Justice Democratic Forces C. A. Republic 2011 60
183 Hunde Hutu DR Congo 1996 119
118 MDFC, Dim faction MDFC, Sadio faction Senegal 2006 124
92 Janjaweed SPLM/A Sudan 2005 30
25 Bangadi Militia Lord’s Resistance Army DR Congo 2008 27
Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012a)
The non-state conflict dataset records conflicts between formally or informally organized
groups. If a group uses violence against civilians who are not organized, this would
be recorded in the one-sided violence category of the UCDP dataset. Hence, organized
groups are not coded as participants in non-state conflicts if the levels of organization
differ. Violence by groups against civilians of a different ethnicity or identity is seen as
one-sided violence, even if the group’s ethnic brethren are simultaneously involved in a
non-state conflict with the rivaling group (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012b). For exam-
ple, even if the Naparama is involved in a conflict with Renamo in Mozambique, and are
at the same time killing unarmed civilians from the other group, the violence against the
civilians caused by Renamo is considered as one-sided violence, and is not included in
the analysis.
It should also be noted that inter-group violence is not necessarily only between dif-
ferent ethnic or religious groups, but also split factions from a originally unified group.
This is especially the case during civil war, where the groups are organized as rebels.
One example of this is during the civil war in Liberia in 1999, where group violence
broke out between ULIMO Alhaji Kromah faction and the faction of Roosevelt Johnson,
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and in Somalia in 1992 between USC/SNA and the faction of Osman Atto (Sundberg,
Eck and Kreutz 2012a). Perhaps the most frequent inter-group violence events in Sub-
Saharan Africa between factions has occurred in Sudan. The master cleavage in the
second Sudanese civil war from 1989 to 2005 was between the Sudanese People’s Libera-
tion Movement/Army and the government. However, additional rebel groups announced
their arrival, such as Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA), the Justice and Equality Move-
ment (JEM) and Southern Sudan Defense Force (SSDF). These groups, perhaps with the
exception of JEM, was marked by divisions at the top and constantly shifting allegiances
lower down, and military command and control was disrupted as rebel groups such as the
SLA split along ethnic lines. The SLA was never more than a looser alliance between two
tribal components, between the factions of Abdel Wahid and Minni Minawi, and fighting
between them erupted as Minni Minawi sought to gain control of the entire rebel group
to be better positioned when facing government forces (Flint 2007). Hence, in addition
to fighting with other groups during the civil war, such as the Janjaweed and the Lord
Resistance Army (LRA), conflicts between factions within the same group also emerged.
The definition of inter-group violence is derived from the UCDP Non-State Conflict
Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012a). Inter-group violence can be understood
as a conflict between two organized groups, neither of which is the government of a state,
that results in at least 25 annual battle-related deaths per year. I focus on formally orga-
nized groups, which includes any non-governmental group of people having an announced
name for their group (as well as military factions) and using armed force against another
similarly organized group, such as between Al-Shabaab and the Ogaden National Liber-
ation Front (ONLF) in Ethiopia.
For the logistic regressions, the dependent variable Inter-Group Violence takes the value
1 if there is a non-state conflict event in a country year, 0 otherwise. In order to deal
with the problem of multiple inter-group conflicts in a country year, I code one case of
inter-group violence if there were multiple cases in a country year. This implies that
the number of conflicts recorded are reduced, as the focus is aggregated from group to
country level. For example, in 1995 there were five inter-group conflicts in Somalia, but
these are collapsed into one observation in the logistic regressions. This makes the results
somewhat conservative. For the count models, Inter-group Violence is a count dependent
variable, measuring the sum of inter-group conflicts in a country year. The logistic de-
pendent variable includes 69 conflict events, the count dependent variable includes 125.
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As the count measure includes more variation and has a higher number of conflicts than
the binary dependent variable, the main focus in the analysis will be on the count models.
5.2.2 Main Independent Variable: Weak State
The literature on how best to define African states is vast, and the words to describe
them equally so; quasi-states, patrimonial states, ’Big Man’ states, failed states, fragile
states, dysfunctional states, and postcolonial states, to name a few (see e.g. Clapham
1998, 1996; Bates 2008; Migdal 1988; Herbst 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; Kitschelt
and Wilkinson 2007; Reno 1995). With these overlapping terms and definitions, it can be
difficult to capture the essence of the type of state I would like to focus on in the thesis,
and which I have based my theoretical implications on; the lack of welfare and security
for the entire population, and the state capture of an specific ethnic group. The choice
of indicator used for measurement of state capacity can often affect the results of a sta-
tistical analysis (Sobek 2010), and it is therefore important to find a satisfactory indicator.
To best be able to define a weak state, it is perhaps more fruitful to first describe what
a weak state is not. A strong or well-functioning state is here understood as a bureau-
cratic organization with a rational character and impersonal authority structure, efficient
administration on the basis of rules, well-functioning infrastructure and welfare, non-
violable and legitimate state sovereignty, and the monopoly over means of force. A weak
state, then, is a state not fulfilling these criteria, and can be defined as having persistent
difficulties with revenue collection, questionable legitimacy within its boundaries, lack
of administrative capacity, and limited national cohesion (see e.g. Jackson 1990; Herbst
2000; Young 1994; Mamdani 1996).
There are several ways of measuring state capacity, but the usual operationalizations
are based on military capacity, bureaucratic or administrative capacity, and institutional
coherence. Military capacity is often operationalized as military personnel per capita1,
where larger militaries are associated with lower likelihood of conflict. Fearon and Laitin
(2003) proxy state capacity with GDP per capita, which they hold as a measure for
military and administrative capacity of the state. Others use (in)coherence of political
institutions as a proxy for state capacity, where known measures are the polity scale and
SIP (see e.g. Gates et al. 2006; Hegre et al. 2001). Although having inherent qualities,
1See e.g. Wayman, Singer and Goertz (1983); Jones, Bremer and Singer (1996); DeRouen and Sobek
(2004).
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these measures are not considered to capture the essence of state capacity sought after
in this thesis. The focus here is the state’s ability to manage and include the entire
population, and to have information and provide service equally for all members. Hence,
the focus is not on degree of a specific regime type, or the ability to deploy large number
of troops, but the extent of bureaucratic quality, and the ability to accommodate needs
and be representative for all groups in society.
The main concern is the degree to which measures proxy the theoretical construct, and
allows one to discriminate between competing causal mechanisms (Hendrix 2010). To
best proxy weak state capacity, I use a measure for state capacity based on bureaucratic
quality, taken from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG ndb). The variable is
measured on a 0− 4 scale and uses expert assessments on the quality of a country’s bu-
reaucracy. High scores are given to countries where the bureaucracy has the strength and
expertise to govern without drastic changes in government services. In stronger states the
bureaucracy tends to be autonomous from political pressure and to have an established
mechanism for recruitment. Countries that lack a strong bureaucracy receive low points
because a change in government tends to be severe in terms of policy formulation and
administrative capabilities (ICRG nda). The bureaucratic quality indicator is based on
three conditions.
The first condition is regular, meritocratic recruitment and advancement processes. The
usage of formal institutions in Burundi is a useful example where this criteria is not met,
where state offices are being captured by a small elite that provides jobs and services
to co-ethnics. The politicization of identities has become central in Burundi, where the
political leaders currently in power provide representation and secure recruitment of co-
ethnics (Daley 2006).
The second is insulation from political pressure. This entails being able to put funds
and government revenues where the bureaucratic administration sees fit. Nigeria can
provide an example where this is not the case, where public funds are channeled to spe-
cific groups in society. The bureaucracy functions predominantly through clientelism,
where benefits are measured in cash values and services provided by the state in return
for support. Revenues are thereby distributed to groups that are relevant for political
survival, and the bureaucracy becomes a politicizing instead of a neutralizing agent (Ifeka
2001).
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The last condition is the ability to provide services and expertise to govern without dras-
tic changes in policy. Here Zambia provides an interesting case when it comes to the
relationship between political change and patronage. Since independence, the country
has had three constitutions with changes from one-party to multi-party state several
times. Constitutional change has resulted in political crises because of policy alteration,
where groups compete over state power to manage patronage relations to preferred groups
(Szeftel 2000). A closer look at the 1053 country years in the analysis show that the bu-
reaucratic quality measure has a mean for all the Sub-Saharan countries at 1.31, where
South Africa in the early 1990s is the only country receiving a 4 point score2, indicating
a low average of bureaucratic quality for the continent in general.3
It is important to note here that I only focus on state strength, and do not distinguish
between regime types. Most of the literature on civil conflict has focused on the form
of government and not the degree of government (Sobek 2010). While not denying that
the type of government can be important when explaining conflict, it is the degree of
government’s effect on the risk of a violent event that is of interest here. Hence, in the
definition one country can be autocratic and another democratic, and both be considered
weak. However, although several states can have low scores on some of the indicators,
they are not necessarily weak. I have therefore recoded the measure so that intermediate
regimes will not be included in the measure of weak state capacity. This is perhaps even
more relevant as several Sub-Saharan countries do not attain high values on the bureau-
cratic quality measure in general, making it more difficult to separate between the weak
and the intermediary countries. Therefore, all countries obtaining a score below 1 on the
bureaucratic quality scale is considered weak, leaving countries like Liberia, Somalia and
Sierra Leone categorized as weak states, wheres countries like Botswana, South Africa
and Mauritius are categorized as strong, which is according to the expected separation
of these countries. A dichotomy of state capacity is an easily traceable and clear way of
separating weak states from intermediate and strong. A weak state, then, is any state
not fulfilling any of the bureaucratic quality criteria; there is a lack of meritocratic re-
cruitment, a high degree of political pressure, and the lack of ability to provide public
2That South Africa during apartheid was characterized as a state bureaucracy led by meritocratic
recruitment and advancement processes does not provide face validity, and the score seems to be more
related to potential risks of investment, than the quality and capacity of state. However, I choose to use
the measure despite this limitation, given the indicator’s strength as a proxy for state capacity in more
general terms.
3The world average for the bureaucratic quality measure is 2.13.
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services for their citizens.
Using bureaucratic quality as a proxy for state weakness have both empirical and theo-
retical advantages. First of all, when it comes to face validity, it most closely captures
the components of the theoretical construct of bureaucratic capacity such as meritoc-
racy, policy continuation and providing public goods. Second, it is a satisfying measure
from the perspective of construct validity, as it is, in the words of Hendrix (2010, 283),
"(...)difficult to imagine a theoretical link between bureaucratic quality and civil con-
flict that does not operate through the state capacity causal channel”. Third, the coding
is based on the political stability of countries where risk points are given by experts who
asses the country’s current situation. This entails that the coders have thorough and
comprehensive knowledge about the country at hand, where political information are
converted into risk points on the basis of a predictable pattern of evaluation. Fourth,
the measure is consistent both between countries and over time, as points are assigned
by expert editors on the basis of pre-set questions for each risk component (ICRG nda).
This contributes to the prevention of measurement errors, and makes comparison be-
tween countries more well-founded. Fifth, bureaucratic quality is highly collinear with
other operationalizations of state capacity, such as institutional coherence and economic
development, indicating that the measure is overlapping with other well-known measures
of state capacity (Hegre and Nyg˚ard 2012).
There are also noteworthy limitations with the bureaucratic quality measure presented
here.4 The fact that bureaucratic quality is based on expert assessments create challenges
as it is a subjective measure. This has two implications. First, the expert must process,
analyze and interpret a country’s given situation, and is therefore not based on objec-
tive measures such as GDP per capita or infant mortality rate (Henisz 2000). Second,
the expert can only perceive or report a problem or change in quality when it becomes
public knowledge, and the score obtained by countries can sometimes lag the events it
is supposed to predict (Linder and Santiso 2002). Hence, it can be questioned whether
the bureaucratic quality indicator sometimes functions as a lagging indicator rather than
a leading indicator of conflict. However, with the use of cross-sectional time-series this
potential problem should not overly influence the results, as the indicator is picking up
these political trends over time.
4I will return to the problem of endogeneity in section 5.3.
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One related challenge with this point, however, is that changes in bureaucracy relevant
to this indicator are not necessarily identified. A change in bureaucratic functioning can
be blurred by lack of information or access to state agencies, and potential rumors or
exaggerated facts leaked by the opposition to alter the distribution of power. Also, it
seems intuitively reasonable to assume that the country experts and survey respondents
perceptions are affected by more recent events, and the subjective manner in which scores
are given may overstate the potential risk.
In many Sub-Saharan African countries the political institutions are best defined within
a grey area between dictatorship and democracy. There are several versions between
these two end-points, where a mixture of authoritarian and liberal institutions determine
a state’s strength (Hegre et al. 2001). With these multiple types of regimes at hand a
more narrow 5 point scale may not be able to pick up the diversity that the continent
represents. Therefore, it is perhaps fruitful to extend the risk rating to include more
categories, so as to be able to capture the mixture of hybrid regimes that have emerged
in Sub-Saharan Africa since independence. Although this is especially relevant for a more
limited scale, I hope to be able to create a sharper distinction and more readily identify
the weakest types of regimes by focusing on countries that have received a score below 1.
Being aware of these potential drawbacks and challenges with the state capacity measure
chosen for this thesis, I find bureaucratic quality as the most suitable indicator for the
analysis given my theoretical framework. However, it is important to be aware of these
limitations in my analysis.
The variable Weak State is a dummy variable coded 1 if bureaucratic quality is below
1, 0 otherwise. This measure will be used to assess hypothesis H1, whether weak state
capacity increases the risk of inter-group violence. The variable is limited to the years
from 1989 to 2010 in Sub-Saharan Africa in the original dataset, and has 671 observa-
tions from 46 countries. As I wish to conduct the analysis on the years which correspond
with my dependent variable, from 1989 to 2011, the timeseries must be extended. To
be able to increase the number of observation I use multiple imputation as presented by
Honaker and King (2010), described in more detail in section 5.3.4. The observations
are extended both in time and across space in an attempt to maximize the coverage.
Although not a perfect solution, removing the 11 countries without coverage and not
extending the timeseries to 2011 leads to a loss of 10 (14.5 percent) conflict onsets. As
the sample as a starting point only has 69 conflict events, a removal of this magnitude
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would limit the analysis. The countries without coverage on the state capacity measure
in the sample seems to be random, as countries usually lacking data, such as Somalia
and D.R. Congo, are included. The countries with completely missing include, amongst
others, Benin, Comoros, Mauritius, and the Central African Republic, which indicates
that the missingness does not readily introduce a bias, considering the variation of these
countries. An overview of the countries in question is provided in Appendix B, table B.1.
5.2.3 Independent Variables: Economic and Political Inequality
Many attempts have been made to measure economic inequality’s effect on civil conflict,
relying both on statistical and qualitative methods. The statistical contributions have a
mixed record when it comes to empirical evidence, lacking conclusive findings. In fact,
virtually all possible causal mechanisms have been presented; negative, positive, curvi-
linear and none (Lichbach 1989; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011). In addition,
there is a major gap between the recent non-findings in statistical contributions, whereas
case studies repeatedly point at economic inequality as an explanation for civil conflict.
It therefore seems that the results of statistical analyses are to a large degree dependent
on the choice of measurement.
Contemporary statistical studies have found a limited effect of economic and political
inequality on conflict onset (see e.g. Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003).
Fearon and Laitin (2003) find that the factors that explain which countries experience
civil war are not their ethnic or religious characteristics, but conditions that favors in-
surgency. More important than exclusion and ethnic identity are material incentives and
organizational opportunities to start a rebellion against the state. In the same vein, Col-
lier and Hoeﬄer (2004) find that conflicts occur because they are feasible, rather than
a consequence of motivated actors who are marginalized. Others find that ethnic het-
erogeneity has a link to internal conflicts, as separatist wars, ethnic cleansing, or ethnic
nepotism breeding conflict (see e.g. Vanhanen 1999; Gellner 1991; Sambanis 2001). How-
ever, the degree to which some of the measures used to assess the relationship between
conflict and inequality are hitting the operationalized target can be questioned.
First of all, these studies have often used economic inequality indicators such as the
Gini coefficient, which measures the income distribution among individuals, arguing that
ethnic grievances are too common to explain the rare event of civil conflict. These stud-
ies have largely dismissed the role of economic inequality. However, other scholars argue
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that vertical measures such as the Gini coefficient is a highly aggregated proxy that do
not capture the structural inequality between groups, and their relation to the state (see
e.g. Østby 2008; Buhaug et al. 2011). In addition, the Gini measure has limited cover-
age, especially when it comes to Sub-Saharan countries. The data is also constructed
from different sources, making the information more difficult to compare, and contain
observations based on expenditure and income, on net and gross income, and per capita
surveys. These different data sources may affect the coherence of the inequality measure.
For example, because of income redistribution, the observations based on gross income
should indicate more inequality than those based on net income (Houle 2009).
Second, most quantitative tests of whether political exclusion of groups leads to con-
flict, whether belonging to the greed and opportunity school or diversity breeding conflict
school, rely on the same type of ethnic heterogeneity measurement (Wimmer, Cederman
and Min 2009). However, demographic measures such as linguistic or ethnic fraction-
alization indexes can be problematic when modeling exclusion of groups. First, not all
ethnic groups are relevant for politics. Second, demographic measures describe the degree
of ethnic diversity in a country, which is not necessarily related to the constellation of
power at the state center (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010). Hence, the demographic
measures tend to be reflecting ethnic diversity that is not necessarily related to the dy-
namics of ethnic politics. Several in-depth studies on ethnic conflict show that cases
where the state is not an ethnically neutral agent, but actively excluding specific groups,
help explain the onset of internal conflict. Hence, the individual-level measures can be
said to miss their theoretical target (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010; Cederman, Wei-
dmann and Gleditsch 2011). In the same vein, Sambanis (2005) argues that wars should
be measured according to group-based inequality, rather than by interpersonal inequal-
ity. As this thesis seeks to capture the economic inequality between groups, and their
degree of inclusion at the state centre, the Gini coefficient and ethnic heterogeneity based
measures are not viewed as satisfactory.
The Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset builds on the work in the relative deprivation
tradition, and has long been the most prominent measure for discrimination and exclu-
sion of groups (Gurr 1993). This dataset focus on the relationship between ethnicity and
conflict on the group level, rather than on the state level. Gurr (1993) find that ethnic
minorities are more likely to rebel when there is widespread communal grievance. How-
ever, this data only focus on minorities, holding the state as a neutral agent, excluding
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the dynamics of ethnic power struggles at the center. In addition, the MAR data ignores
groups in power from systematic consideration, which can reduce the comparative abili-
ties of the data and make it more challenging to capture the effects of political exclusion
over time. Shifts in power constellations may change the political status of a specific
group, a political dynamic that can be central when trying to explain conflicts between
groups. A group could go from being excluded in one period to being included in the
next, and it is therefore important to treat access to power as a variable in change, rather
than as a constant (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010).
To better capture the systematic economic inequality between groups, I use a group-
based measure of inequality presented by Stewart (2002). This measure differs from
more individually or vertically based measures, as it focuses on horizontal inequalities
(HI) between groups. To answer H1a, that economic inequality in a weak state further
increases the risk of inter-group violence, I apply a measure from Cederman, Weidmann
and Gleditsch (2011), lineq, where the variable defines inequality as the square of the
logarithmized ratio between the GDP per capita of the ethnic group, and the average
GDP per capita of all groups in the country:
lineq = [log(g/G)] (5.1)
This measure captures deviations from the country average and is zero for groups at
the country average. I also use two asymmetric variables of economic inequality that








if g > G, 0 otherwise (5.3)
These two measures guarantees that deviations from the country mean always are positive
numbers greater than one. This means that a group that is twice as wealthy as the average
has low ratio = 0, and high ratio = 2, for example. The measure is based on the G-Econ
data (Nordhaus 2006), which is one of the few broadly available cross-national data on
variation in wealth within countries. The database covers Sub-Saharan Africa up to 2005,
but the specific methodologies differ and some countries are lacking due to limited data
availability, and I will therefore use multiple imputation.
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To be able to analyze the economic data on the country level, I have constructed three
measures based on lineq, low ratio and high ratio. Economic Inequality is the maximum
value that lineq has in country x in year x, and Poorest Group and Richest Group contains
the maximum value that low ratio and high ratio has in country x in year x, respectively.
This will provide information about how poor/wealthy the poorest/wealthiest group is
compared to the average. While I am able to capture the discrepancies between the
richest and poorest group to the average, I am not able to measure whether it is the
poorest or richest groups who engage in conflict. I am, however, able to say something
about the level of inequality between groups, and how this might affect group violence.
Hence, the inequality measures used as proxies cannot distinguish between the groups.
Being aware of the limitations I choose to use the measure, as it is the best available data
on economic distribution between groups within countries. Moreover, to be able to say
something more specific on how wealthy the groups are in relation to each other provides
the analysis with more information than simply using average per capita income for a
country. More general national income measures will be dominated by more populated
areas, and mask internal variations of group wealth that could be relevant for group con-
flicts. Indeed, at the country level that my analysis is based on, the likelihood of conflict
should depend on the level of poverty and wealth of the most extreme groups, rather
than on national average income of population weighted GDP per capita (Buhaug et al.
2011). The economic measures have a scope limited to a single year, 1990, leaving the
level of economic inequality to be constant. Although not ideal, the relative inequality is
often characterized as consistent over time, as opposed to absolute wealth. In addition, I
am not interested in the long-run change in economic inequality, but the effects of having
a certain level of economic inequality over time, and the measure should therefore be
satisfactory.
To answer hypothesis H1b, whether political inequality in a weak state further increases
the risk of non-state conflict, I include two political exclusion variables, taken from the
Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR) (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010), which draws
on a institutionalist approach to ethnic politics. This measure is chosen in an attempt to
capture how ethnicity relates to the state, the role of the state as a politicized agent in
society, and the capture of central authority to different degrees by representatives from
a particular ethnic group. This data records all politically relevant ethnic groups in a
country, and their degree of access to state power. The EPR dataset defines ethnicity as
a subjectively experienced sense of commonality, based on a belief in common ancestry
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and shared culture (Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009). These ethnic categories included
in the data may be hierarchically nested and comprise of multiple levels, where not all
groups are politically relevant at a given time. An ethnic group is seen as politically
relevant if "(...) at least one significant political actor claims to represent the interests
of that group in the national political arena, or if members of an ethnic category are
systematically and intentionally discriminated against in the domain of public politics”
(Wimmer, Cederman and Min 2009, 325). All politically relevant groups are categorized
according to (1) whether those who claimed to represent its interest held full control of
the executive branch with no participation by members of any other group, (2) whether
they divided power with other groups through power-sharing, or (3) whether they were
completely excluded from the decision making process at the state center (Cederman,
Wimmer and Min 2010). As this thesis focuses on the exclusion of ethnic groups, I will
only use the third category of political relevance. I will use an exclusion variable based
on the sum of the population of excluded groups in the country. To be able to get a
more normalized measure that gives information about the relative amount of group ex-
clusion, I have constructed a variable, ln(Excluded Population), which is the excluded
population as a fraction of the total population, and ln(Largest Excluded Group), which
the size of the largest excluded group in the country, as a fraction of the total population.
Both political exclusion measures are log-transformed with the expectation of a declining
marginal effect of exclusion on non-state conflict risk.
The EPR dataset includes all politically relevant ethnic groups and their degree of power
at the state center, and this has several gains. The EPR data takes into account that not
all ethnic groups are necessarily relevant for state politics, which is a more precise ap-
proach than conventional demographic measures that captures only the degree of ethnic
diversity in a country. Also, the EPR data focuses on included and majority groups in
addition to excluded groups, and how the inclusion and exclusion of groups change over
time, and is thereby able to capture the dynamics of ethnic politics at the state center.
The EPR data covers the years from 1989 to 2009, and lacks four Sub-Saharan coun-
tries; Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Comoros and Mauritius, and I will use multiple
imputation to handle this issue.
5.2.4 Making the Case for Interactions
If it is true that a weak state creates anarchical structures between groups, this should
increase the likelihood of inter-group violence. For my theoretical framework, also the
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additional effects of economic and political inequality within a weak state are essential.
Hence, it is important to not only look at weak state per se, but also the effect of the state’s
role in the exclusion of groups. It could perhaps be claimed that Sub-Saharan Africa is in
itself an interaction term, keeping in mind the relatively large amount of weak states on
the continent. However, as several countries, such as South Africa, Namibia, Botswana,
Ghana and Kenya, have recieved scores above 3 on bureaucratic quality indicator, I do
not consider this a problem. Sandbrook (1986) warns about assuming too high a degree
of uniformity in Africa, and claims that there "(...) is indeed variation in the degree of
state capacity”(Sandbrook 1986, 327). It is important to note, however, that the concept
of ”strong” can be relative in the African context.
The criticism of including interaction terms in multiplicative regression models have been,
amongst other factors, increased difficulty with interpretation, large standard errors, and
results with less substantive meaning. However, a model that includes interaction terms
provides coefficients that give a more detailed description of the relationship between the
dependent variable and the independent variables than without. An interactive model
enables an assessment of the possibility that relationships between variables change with
changes in other variables (see e.g. Friedrich 1982; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005).
This is especially relevant for my analysis, as the whole idea of weak state capacity’s
effect on inter-group violence is dependent on some third aspect, here economic and
political inequality.
5.2.5 Control Variables
When it comes to my control variables, I seek to balance two considerations. First, I at-
tempt to avoid overspecifying my models by the inclusion of irrelevant variables, following
what Achen (2002, 424) warns about in much contemporary statistical modeling5;
Even at the most quantitative end of the profession, much contemporary empir-
ical work has little long-term scientific value. ’Theoretical models’ are too often
long lists of independent variables from social psychology, sociology, or just casual
empiricism, tossed helter-skelter into canned linear regression packages.
Second, I seek to reduce the risk of excluding important explanatory factors in my anal-
ysis. Thus, I have tried to avoid a model specification including variables with no partial
effect on y and omitted variable bias (Wooldridge 2009). The control variables chosen
5See also Schrodt (2010), Achen (2005) and Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010).
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have previously demonstrated predictive power in the civil conflict literature, and I in-
clude controls for civil war, infant mortality rate, population, politically relevant groups
and peace years. I run several robustness checks to make sure that the results in the
models presented are robust and not driven by the choice of indicators.
Civil War
Non-state violence during peace, and non-state violence during civil war belongs to two
different contexts that both induce and hinder violence in different ways. The security
threat between groups in a weak state is perhaps more apparent in the context of civil war,
but through different mechanisms, as the government is also involved in the conflict. I
follow Kalyvas (2006), and view civil war as a complicated and interactive phenomenon,
where there are additional conflicts during civil war than that between the state and
a rebel group. Indeed, national-level discourse have often little in common with sub-
national conflicts, where conflicts on the ground tend to be related to local issues rather
than the master cleavage that drives the civil war on the national level. In other words,
"(...) the fusion and interaction between dynamics at the center and the periphery is
fundamental rather than incidental to civil war, a matter of essence rather than noise”
(Kalyvas 2006, 365). Thus, the outbreak of violence at the national level between a gov-
ernment and one or several rebel groups can also influence the risk of inter-group violence
at the local level, and it is important to account for whether civil war affect the likelihood
of violence between groups.
The civil war data included in this thesis is taken from the widely used UCDP/PRIO
Armed Conflict Dataset, which includes both major and minor conflicts (Gleditsch et al.
2002). An armed conflict is defined as an incompatibility that concerns government or
territory or both, where the use of force between two warring parties results in at least
25 battle-related deaths. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of
state. Minor conflict records conflicts that reaches at least 25 battle-related deaths in a
year, while major conflicts are those who pass the 1000 annual deaths threshold. While
the original dataset separates between minor and major conflict, I have constructed a new
variable for my analysis. The variable Civil War, taken from Hegre et al. (forthcoming),
combines minor and major war. Hence, the variable takes on the value 1 if there was a
civil war, either minor or major, in a given country in a given year, 0 otherwise. I have
chosen to combine the two as I am most interested in the presence or absence, and not the
quantity, of violence in a country. Also, as with inter-group violence, a lower threshold
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results in more conflicts in the data, making the statistical analysis more well-founded
and robust. The civil war variable has full coverage of all Sub-Saharan African countries
from 1989 to 2011.
Infant Mortality Rate
The most common proxy for economic development is income level. It is a robust measure
within the literature of civil conflict, where lower level of GDP per capita affects the risk
of conflict onset and duration, through factors such as recruitment costs and feasibility
(Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom 2004), infrastructure (Fearon
and Laitin 2003), and asset specificity (Boix 2008). However, infant mortality rate (IMR)
has been promoted as an alternative measure of level of development, capturing a broader
set of developmental factors than the standard measure of income levels such as GDP per
capita. Several studies have reported a strong effect of infant mortality on conflict (see e.g.
Esty et al. 1998; Urdal 2005; Abouharb and Kimball 2007). I include the variable ln(Infant
Mortality Rate), which is the natural logarithm of infant mortality rate. The measure has
been log-transformed following an expectation of a declining marginal effect on conflict
risk with increasing infant mortality. Infant mortality is defined as the probability of
dying between birth and exact age 1, expressed as the number of infant deaths per 1000
live births. The variable is taken from Hegre et al. (forthcoming), and has complete
coverage of all Sub-Saharan African in the sample.
Population
While many explanatory factors in the civil war literature are not robust or replicable
across analyses, population size is a variable proven to be robust in different statistical
studies studies, where larger populations are associated with increased conflict risk in the
civil conflict literature (see e.g. Raleigh and Hegre 2009; Gleditsch, Hegre and Strand
2009; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Fjelde 2010). The variable ln(Population) is taken from
the World Population Prospects 2006 constructed by the United Nations Population
Divisions (United Nations 2007). The data provides estimates on demographic indicators
for all Sub-Saharan countries from 1989 to 2011. Total population is defined as the actual
size of the population in thousands as of July 1st of the given year. This measure has also
been log-transformed, with the expectation of a declining effect of increasing population
size on conflict risk. This measure has complete coverage of all Sub-Saharan countries
included in the analysis from 1989 to 2011.
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Number of Groups
Following Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011), I have included a variable to
control for the number of groups in a country. Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch
(2011) assume that the number of groups has a negative impact on conflict probability,
as governments facing many ethnic groups fear domino effects and will therefore be less
willing to make concessions to a single group. Although this negative relationship may
be useful when studying civil war, it is not directly transferable to inter-group violence.
In fact, I expect the exact opposite than Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011),
that an increase in number of excluded groups in a country also increase the risk of
inter-group violence. This is simply based on the assumption that more excluded groups
also leads to an increase in the number of potential conflict dyads between groups. The
variable Relevant groups is a count variable indicating the total number of politically
relevant groups in a country, as defined by EPR (Cederman, Wimmer and Min 2010).
The variable is taken from the GROWup data (GROWup nd), and has the same coverage
as ln(Largest Excluded Group) and ln(Excluded Population).
Peace Years
When using cross-section time-series it is important to account for interdependence among
the observations. The logistic regression model assumes that observations are indepen-
dent of each other, meaning that the risk of inter-group violence in D.R. Congo next
year is taken to be independent of an inter-group conflict this year. However, this is
an inappropriate assumption, and ignoring interdependence may lead to biased results.
The incorrect assumption of temporal independence leads to both inaccurate statistical
analyses and loss of information in the data (Beck, Katz and Tucker 1998; Beck and
Gleditsch 2003). One option to account for time dependence is to include a series of
dummy variables to the model specification. These variables mark the number of years
since the previous occurrence of an event (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Kt−t0 can
be understood as baseline hazards, giving the probability of a failure in each time interval
when all the explanatory variables are zero. However, to be able to create a smoother
baseline hazard rate that changes relatively slowly over time, I choose to include natu-
ral cubic splines instead of temporal dummies (Carter and Signorino 2010), that avoids
hazard rates jumping around from year to year. Natural cubic splines make it possible
to specify points in t where the relationship with y changes, usually referred to as knots.
These knots determines the location where the dependent variable and t can change sig-
nificantly. I include the variable peace years with three cubic splines, and use a similar
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logic in the selection of knots as Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998), but with the inclusion of
an additional knot, placing knots at t = 1, 3, 7, 15 years in peace.6
Green, Kim and Yoon (2001) stress the need to account for unobserved differences be-
tween units that change over units but not over time (Green, Kim and Yoon 2001).
Although fixed effects control for omitted variables, there are two reasons why I have
not chosen to apply this method in my analysis. First, using fixed effects to address
time-dependence can have harmful affects when using a binary dependent variable, as
many countries in the dataset will always have the value zero, and hence having no im-
pact on the parameter estimates, causing misleading results when assessing the impact
of important independent variables (Beck and Katz 2001). Without variation on the de-
pendent variable, fixed effects models do not contribute to the explanation as change in
the dependent variable is a necessary precondition to be able to draw inferences in a fixed
effects regression. Second, Sub-Saharan countries can be claimed to be quite similar, at
least compared to European or Latin American countries, leaving the sample with little
variation over units.
5.3 Methodological Challenges
I focus on four methodological challenges which may produce false inferences concerning
the relationship between inter-group violence and weak state, and economic and political
exclusion. In the following I present the features of omitted variable bias, simultane-
ity, multicollinearity and missing data in an attempt to best handle these issues in my
analysis.
5.3.1 Omitted Variable Bias
As already mentioned in section 5.2.5, the amount of control variables chosen for the mod-
els are limited to avoid overspecification. Yet, more restricted models have an increased
risk of excluding variables that both affect inter-group violence and the main independent
variables included in the analysis, making biased results more likely (Greene 2003, 148).
For example, the results could be distorted if the length of peace years are not taken into
account in the models, as a recent conflict may affect the likelihood of groups resorting
6The number of knots were chosen after several regression analyses, where changes in both number
and placement of the knots had very limited impact on the results. I chose an additional knot after 15
years as it seems intuitively reasonable to assume that the hazard rate to some extent flattens out after
15 consecutive years without conflict.
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to violence, especially if the groups previously have engaged in fighting with each other.
A recent conflict will most likely also affect the capacity of any government, making the
bureaucracy and infrastructure weaker than before conflict onset. Hence, previous con-
flicts may affect both the strength of a state and the probability of inter-group violence.
To try to account for potential omitted variable bias, I run several robustness checks with
alternative measures for state capacity, and also include other control variables.
5.3.2 Reverse Causality
Simultaneity refers to the possibility that not only x has an impact on y, but at the
same time y has an impact on x. Thus, the causal impact is uncertain when both x
and y is simultaneously determined, and it is difficult to specify which of them is having
an effect on the other (Verbeek 2008, 138). Hence, inter-group violence may well cause
state weakness, and vice versa. The best solution to deal with simultaneity is according to
Hendrix (2010) to either choose which variables to include based on theoretical rather than
empirical reasons, or to use instrumental variables analysis. However, good instrumental
variables are difficult to find, and another potential solution to reduce the threat of
reversed causality is to use lagged variables. Therefore, I lag all my independent variables
in the analysis. Also, I expect some of the simultaneity problem to be ameliorated with
the usage of peace years in the models, as the time variable accounts for some of the
effect violence has on state capacity.
5.3.3 Multicollinearity
A high correlation between two variables can introduce biased results in the analysis. A
multicollinearity problem emerges when there is high correlation between two or more
explanatory variables in the model. This indicates that the two explanatory factors have
a tendency to be present at the same time. Hence, if one of the explanatory factors is
present, so will the other, and vice versa. This implies that it can be difficult to decide the
relative effect of the two variables. Multicollinearity can introduce statistical problems,
for example that small changes in the data produce wide swings in the estimates, or
that the coefficients have very high standard errors and low significance levels (Greene
2003, 56). Collinearity is usually not a problem below 0.8, but above this threshold the
standard error would become increasingly large.
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Table 5.2: Cross-Correlation Table for Interactions
Variables Weak State Economic Inequality Weak State * Ec. inequality
Weak State 1.000
Economic Inequality -0.123 1.000
Weak State * Ec. Inequality 0.480 0.173 1.000
Variables Weak state Poorest group Weak State * Poorest
Weak State 1.000
Poorest -0.091 1.000
Weak * Poorest 0.973 0.007 1.000
Variables Weak state Richest group Weak State * Richest
Weak State 1.000
Richest group -0.108 1.000
Weak State * Richest 0.946 -0.008 1.000
Variables Weak state Largest Excl. Group Weak State * Largest Excl. Group
Weak State 1.000
Largest Excl. Group 0.034 1.000
Weak * Largest Excl. Group -0.896 0.213 1.000
Variables Weak state Excl. Population Weak State * Excl. Population
Weak State 1.000
Excl. Population 0.011 1.000
Weak * Excl. Population -0.835 0.276 1.000
Source: ICRG (ndb), Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011), (Hegre et al. forthcoming)
Table 5.2 shows the bivariate correlation between the independent variables included in
the interaction terms in the analysis. The instances where the variables have a higher
correlation than 0.8 are in bold, which are all the interaction terms included in the mod-
els. That the variables have a high degree of correlation between them is perhaps not
surprising, as the interaction terms are functions of the original variables. However, this
will lead to an increase in the standard errors, and can make the relationships in the
analysis non-significant.7 I have chosen to include the interaction terms despite high cor-
relation, as not including the interaction terms would following my theoretical framework
lead to omitted variable bias, which is arguably a more severe bias than multicollinearity.
Nonetheless, the variables containing high correlation should be interpreted with caution.
5.3.4 Missing and Multiple Imputation
Missing data is common in the literature on armed conflict, and this thesis is no exep-
tion. Factors considered to be of importance when explaining conflict incidence, such as
demographic and socio-economic indicators, are in many countries scarce or non-existent.
Some of the variables I use in the analysis contain missing from the original datasets8,
and missing data is a central challenge for my analysis. Two of the three main explana-
tory variables, weak state and economic inequality, have completely missing on countries
7None of the control variables have a higher correlation than 0.5.
8See Appendix B for missingness map.
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like the Central African Republic, Burundi and Somalia, accounting for 25 inter-group
conflict outbreaks alone. Hence, it is important to find the most satisfactory approach
to handle missing data.
The most common way of dealing with missing data in quantitative studies is to carry out
”listwise deletion”. This method entails limiting the analysis to those units which have
complete data coverage, and deleting everyone else (Little and Rubin 2002). When the
data is missing completely at random (MCAR), the only consequence of listwise deletion
is loss of efficiency, indicating that the probability of type 2 errors increases. This proce-
dure does not add any new information to the units, but reduces the models predictive
ability. There are two relevant problems with this method. First, the assumption of
MCAR is often not met in quantitative studies, i.e. that the missingness depends only
on the missing value generating mechanism, and not on the dependent variable. Hence,
whether a country was in conflict or not would not give any indication about the prob-
ability of an observation being missing, which is often not the case. In fact, it is often
the countries that have missing that sees the most conflict outbreaks in the first place
(Høyland and Nyg˚ard 2012). King et al. (2001) show that using listwise deletion under
the most optimistic assumptions causes the estimates to be about a standard error farther
from the truth. Second, I seek to obtain an as complete dataset as possible, and deleting
units which have missing observation would obstruct the usage of all information avail-
able. As the dataset contains several units with one or more missing observations, I would
lose much valuable information by deleting an entire country at time t. Data may well
be missing at random (MAR), which entails that the probability of an observation being
missing depends and can therefore be explained by other non-missing values. However,
listwise deletion would still give biased results if the missing sample is not representative
of the full sample (Høyland and Nyg˚ard 2012).
Linear imputation techniques are also common tools for handling missing data. Lin-
ear interpolation entails filling in missing data between observed time points from time
t to time t+1 linearly. Filling in missing points for one year if you have data for 2003
and 2005, for example, is not problematic. However, when the time periods between the
observed data points increase, the linear imputation becomes increasingly problematic as
the uncertainty of the true value increases. With economic inequality measures included
in the analysis, for example, there is no information from 2005 to 2011, making the linear
imputation more difficult to complete accurately. Also, the analysis includes countries
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that have complete missing on certain variables, making the linear imputation techniques
less suitable. Clearly imputed values are not known, and since they are imputed they
are not observed meaningfully either (Høyland and Nyg˚ard 2012). Hence, unless one is
able to fill in the holes with the true values of the data that are missing, the statistical
analysis assumes that the data have more observations than are actually observed, which
leads to exaggerated certainty in the results, and biased confidence intervals and standard
errors (Honaker and King 2010). Of course, imputed values are by definition guesses, but
under single imputation techniques they are not treated as such, but as data points with
the same precision as observed values without any associated uncertainty. Uncertainty
concerning the missing data is hard to take into account under single imputation, which
leads to under-coverage. Multiple imputation techniques, however, explicitly take impu-
tational uncertainty into account (Høyland and Nyg˚ard 2012).
Normal imputation models assume that missing values are linear functions of other ob-
served variables, that observations are independent conditional on the remaining observed
units, and that all the observations are not organized hierarchically. These assumptions
do not work well for panel data, as there is a tendency for variables to move smoothly over
time, to jump sharply between units like countries, and to jump less between countries
that are adjacent (Honaker and King 2010). Time-series often differs across countries,
and it is important to take this into account. Multiple imputation handles missing by
filling in the holes in the data using a predictive model that includes all available in-
formation in the observed data together with any prior knowledge. Multiple completed
datasets are created where the observed data remains the same, but the missing data
are filled in with imputations. The expected value for any missing observation is the
mean of the imputed values across these different datasets, and the uncertainty in the
model is represented by the variation across the multiple imputations for each missing
value. Hence, this removes the under-coverage and overconfidence that results from a
single analysis, by incorporating the variation across the estimates from each completed
dataset into the standard errors (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2011).9 Although not a
flawless approach, the estimates are presented with uncertainty when using multiple im-
putation, represented in the variation between the different imputations for the missing
9Despite the advantages of using multiple imputation, there will be uncertainty in the data given the
amount of missing in my sample. Also, imputation of missing data can fail when a discrete variable
has missing values. Multiple imputation techniques often rely on continuous distributional assumptions,
and this can produce illogical imputations and spuriously low standard errors (Cranmer and Gill 2012).
However, I view the use of multiple imputation as a more suitable option than alternatives such as
listwise deletion and linear interpolation. Also, given that I do not have missing on any of my dummy
variables in my analysis, I do not consider this point a direct challenge.
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values. This uncertainty will be modeled in my analysis by running regressions on all the
imputed datasets.
To perform multiple imputation I use Amelia II, which is a general-purpose approach
to data with missing values. As we are only able to observe Dobs, and not the entirety
of D, Amelia makes an assumption in multiple imputation that the data is MAR. This
assumptions means that the pattern of missingness only depends on the observed data
Dobs, and not on the unobserved data Dmis, which is a less strict assumption than MCAR
applied by listwise deletion. Multiple imputation has to assume that the missing obser-
vations are MAR, as the model conditions on the observed data when drawing values
for the missing cells (Høyland and Nyg˚ard 2012). After multiple imputation, I run the
analyses on the imputed datasets, and the coefficients and standard errors of the results
are combined over the D estimations. By combining the results I am able to create an
inference that validly reflects the sampling variability caused by the missing values. Thus,
uncertainty about the correct model is apparent by the variation in the results across the
models (Little and Rubin 2002). Another option is to average the values for the variables
in the different imputed dataset. I have chosen not to do so, as this would simply cre-
ate a single imputed dataset with the uncertainty of the different imputations lost, not
reflecting sampling variability.
In my imputation model I allow all ordinals to be treated as continuous variables, as
recommended by Honaker and King (2010). This indicates that the bureaucratic qual-
ity measure taking on integers from 0 to 4, is allowed to take on values in between the
integers in the imputed dataset. This simply means that a country obtaining a score
of 1.26, for example, has a lower bureaucratic quality than a country obtaining a score
of 1.27. By treating ordinals as continuous more uncertainty is included in the model,
and the non-integer provides more information about the underlying distribution than
would be the case if I forced the imputation to be integers. To account for the fact that
trends over time are likely to differ between units, I include a third order polynomial of
time to let trends vary between cross-sections. I also include lags and leads to account
for autocorrelation. Both past and future values of a variable are likely to be correlated
with the current value, and an inclusion of both leads and lags should therefore improve
the model. I have also included logical bounds for minimum and maximum values on the
main variables, and thereby avoiding that bureaucratic quality, for example, has values
below 0 and above 4, which is the given range of this variable. As my data contains a
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high degree of missing, I include a ridge prior to speed up the convergence by increasing
numerical stability by shrinking the covariances among the variables, without changing
the overall mean or variance (ibid). The goal is to reduce variance to increase efficiency
without introducing bias in the data, and I hope to achieve this by setting the ridge prior
at .001 percent. Such a small prior is able to achieve efficiency gains, and is at the same
time unlikely to introduce a bias. I have imputed ten datasets in total.
When using multiple imputation to handle missing data, it is important to check the
distribution of the imputed values (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2011). It is often held
that the quality of multiple imputation and its underlying assumptions cannot be tested
from observed data. However, imputations that have unexpected distributions or are far
from the observed data may indicate that the imputation model did not perform well.
Thus, the distribution of the completed data as a whole can be checked to see whether
they are plausible in the context of the topic being studied. I have therefore run impu-
tation diagnostics to test the imputation model’s fit.
First, although it is impossible to test the MAR assumption given the model since the
information to perform such a test is by definition unavailable, there can be indirect
evidence of problems relating to the missing data assumptions. A way to do this is
to compare the empirical distribution of the observed and imputed data by using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, as recommended by Abayomi, Gelman and Levy (2008).
When applied to the main independent variables in my analysis, there is evidence for
statistically significant differences between the observed and imputed data. However, the
distribution of missing can differ from the observed data, and still be missing at random
(ibid). Figure B.2 in Appendix B shows a kernel density plot, and is in a sense a visual
representation of the KS test. It can be seen that the difference between observed and
imputed values are more divergent at higher density levels. The total consequence of
this for the analysis is difficult to assess, but a skewed sample towards the mean and
right, may underestimate the effects of inequality in the analysis. The two bottom panels
have quite different distribution than the observed values, which can be a consequence of
economic inequality being missing at different rates.
Second, I make use of overimputation.10 Figure B.3 runs this procedure through all
10Overimputation involves treating each of the observed values as if they had been missing. It is then
possible to graphically inspect whether my observed data tends to fall within the range where it would
have been imputed had it been missing.
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the observed values for weak state and poorest group. It is not a perfect imputation
model, especially for the higher levels of weak state. However, as the majority of impu-
tation falls within the range of the observed value, I consider the test for overimputation
as satisfactory.
Third, I inspect the imputed variables visually in scatterpots.11 After imputation I check
whether the prediction and imputation seems reasonable in comparison to other countries
with similar values on variables such as GDP, governance, population and infant mortality
rate. The scatterplots in figure B.4 show that the imputed values are to a large degree in
line with the trend in the observed data, although with a higher level of uncertainty. This
uncertainty simply reflects the true uncertainty of the imputation. Despite the fact that
the KS test showed significantly different trends of the imputed and observed values in the
data, the Kernel density plot, overimputation and scatterplots give me reason to believe
that the imputation model is sufficiently accurate to base my analysis on. Nonetheless,
it is important to be aware of potential weaknesses when making inferences, as the data
with completely missing is based on prediction, and not on previously observed values.
5.4 Summary: The Dataset
I construct a dataset consisting of 1053 observations, with 69 inter-group conflict events
from 1989 to 2011. The time period is according to the data available on non-state
conflicts, and I have limited the independent and control variables to all begin in 1989.
The data covers 46 Sub-Saharan countries.12 All variables in the analysis are lagged
to reduce the risk of reversed causality. I include robust standard error to account for
heteroskedasticity by reporting more restricted standard errors (Long and Freese 2006).
Also, I cluster by country to account for correlation between the error terms for consec-
utive observations for the same unit of analysis, also known as autocorrelation or serial
correlation. Clustered standard errors accounts for the assumption in the model that all
the observations are independent of each other.
11For countries with completely missing on a variable, I have chosen a hybrid between a ”hot deck”
approach and predicting values, mainly because the amount of transparency and overview of the data
at hand seems more present, than with simply imputing where there is no correlation to draw on from
previous or consecutive years. When predicting values for missing observations, I set the missing inde-
pendent variable as dependent variable, and include variables in the model that can help explain, for
example, economic inequality, and predict values for economic inequality in countries with completely
missing.
12See table A.2 in Appendix A for an overview of countries included in the analysis.
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The data on inter-group violence is provided by Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz (2012a), as
part of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). The data on state capacity is taken
from ICRG (nda), while the political and economic exclusion measures are EPR data
derived from Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011) and Cederman, Wimmer and
Min (2010). The data on civil war, population and infant mortality rate is taken from
Hegre et al. (forthcoming). Descriptive statistics for the non-imputed dataset can be
found in Appendix A, table A.1.
Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics: Imputed data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Inter-group Violence, logit 0.065 0.247 0 1 1053
Inter-group Violence, count 0.119 0.536 0 5 1053
Weak State 0.205 0.404 0 1 1053
Economic Inequality 0.237 0.417 0 2.445 1053
Poorest Group 1.231 0.304 0.673 2.434 1053
Richest Group 1.365 0.653 0.865 4.776 1053
Civil War 0.212 0.408 0 1 1053
ln(Largest excluded group) -2.151 1.329 -8.502 -0.092 1053
ln(Excluded population) -1.818 1.369 -8.502 -0.084 1053
ln(Population) 8.777 1.377 5.810 11.994 1053
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 4.457 0.440 2.557 5.232 1053
Relevant Groups 4.649 3.387 0 16 1053
Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012a),




The theoretical expectations in this thesis is that being a weak state increases the risk of
inter-group violence, and that this risk is further increased by the presence of economic
and political marginalization. The objective of the analyses in this chapter is to assess
this potential relationship, and to examine whether the level of state capacity is important
when trying to explain inter-group violence. I start off by presenting some descriptive
statistics, to take a closer look at the tendencies in the data. Second, I present my
multivariate regression analyses, where I begin with a logit and count model with control
variables, before presenting interaction terms for economic and political inequality. Lastly,
I assess the performance of the models.1
6.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 6.1 shows the frequency of non-state conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa between
1989 and 2011. The graph shows that inter-group conflicts were more frequent during
the 1990s, followed by a peak in 2003, whereafter the number of conflicts was reduced.
The peak in 2003 is based on 11 inter-group conflicts in 5 different countries; 5 conflicts
in D. R. Congo, 1 in Uganda, Burundi and Sudan, and 3 in Somalia. The period 1989
to 1991 has relatively few non-state conflicts, whereas the number fluctuates after 1994.
The fluctuation in the number of conflicts can perhaps be due to organizational charac-
teristics, where rebel groups have a more continuous mobilized base of support, whereas
organized groups solely focused on attacking other groups may have a more volatile sup-
port base and access to funding (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012a).
1A baseline model can be found in Appendix C, table C.1.
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Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012a)
Table 6.1 provides some preliminary evidence for H1, that states with weak state capacity
experience more inter-group violence than strong states. Of all the inter-group conflicts
in Sub-Saharan Africa between 1989 and 2011, 61 percent were in weak states, whereas
39 percent were in stronger. This supports what previously have been stated by scholars
such as Lichbach (1995), Herbst (2000) and Fjelde and de Soysa (2009), where weak
states tend to lack the ability to accommodate grievances and hinder collective dissent.
Table 6.1: Inter-group Conflicts by Regime Strength
State Capacity Inter-group Violence N
Weak State Capacity 42 227
Strong State Capacity 27 826
Total 69 1053
Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and
Kreutz 2012a), Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011)
Table 6.2 shows the number of conflicts for countries with economic exclusion above and
below the mean. 1.27 is the mean value of economic exclusion for the whole sample.
The table shows that the majority of inter-group conflicts have occurred in countries
where the amount of economic exclusion is above the mean, compared to countries below
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this threshold. This provides some preliminary evidence that the the degree of economic
inequality is relevant for non-state conflict.
Table 6.2: Inter-group Conflicts by Amount of Economic Exclusion
Size of ec. exclusion Inter-group Conflicts Mean Std. Dev N
< 1.27 28 1.086 0.153 646
> 1.27 41 1.553 0.316 407
Total 69 1.267 0.307 1053
Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012a), Cederman,
Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011)
Table 6.3 shows the frequency of inter-group violence according to the size of the largest
excluded group, below and above the mean. In contrast to table 6.2, there is no clear
tendency of more inter-group violence when the size of the excluded group is large.2
There is an approximately equal share of inter-group violence in both cases, displaying
no preliminary trends for political exclusion and non-state conflict.
Table 6.3: Inter-group Conflicts by Size of Largest Excluded Group
Status Inter-group Conflicts Mean Std. Dev N
< .15 36 0.023 0.039 639
> .15 33 0.359 0.189 414
Total 69 0.212 0.408 1053
Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz
2012a), Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011)
Table 6.4 shows the frequency of inter-group conflicts within countries in the sample. The
first column shows that 1 ongoing conflict within a country is the most frequent number
both in weak and strong states, with 22 and 18 conflict events. For 2, 3, 4 and 5 ongoing
conflicts in a country year, the amount is higher throughout for weak state capacity. The
three country years that saw five ongoing conflicts was D.R Congo in 2003, and Somalia
in 1995 and 1999. The interesting case of 4 ongoing conflicts in a strong state was in
Sudan in 1997, during the civil war. Thus, the preliminary evidence shows some support
for hypothesis H1 and H1a, but the picture is less clear when it comes to the effect of
political exclusion in hypothesis H1b.
2The tendency is the same with the measure for amount of excluded population.
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Table 6.4: Conflict Events within States
N Conflicts Weak State Strong State N
1 22 18 40
2 9 6 15
3 4 2 6
4 4 1 5
5 3 0 3
Total 88 37 69
Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck
and Kreutz 2012a)
6.2 Multivariate Regression Results
I begin by evaluating my first hypothesis in models 1 to 8, H1, that suggests a relationship
between weak state capacity and the occurrence of inter-group violence. Second, I present
the results in models 9 to 12 evaluating H1a, whether economic inequality in a weak state
increases the risk of non-state violence. Third, I present the results from model 13 to 16
to assess H1b, whether political inequality in a weak state increases the risk of inter-group
violence. All models include control variables for size of population, infant mortality rate,
number of groups and peace years. The analysis is based on a time-series cross-sectional
dataset of 47 countries from 1989 to 2011.3 All the independent variables are lagged with
one year.
6.2.1 Weak State Capacity
Table 6.5 reports the results from eight multinomial regressions. Models termed logit are
based on logistic regression, while models termed count are based on negative binomial
regression. The results in the table suggests that states with limited capacity are more
likely to experience inter-group violence, and provides support for H1. In all models the
odds ratio for weak state are above 1 and significant at the 0.01 level. The degree of
capacity in a given state thus has explanatory power when it comes to the variation in
non-state conflicts between units.
According to the theoretical framework, weak states lack territorial control and infor-
mation within the state apparatus, and groups therefore end up providing for their own
3See Appendix A, table A.2 for an overview of the countries included in the analysis. I follow the
same threshold as Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch (2011), including countries with a population
above 500.000 in the analysis.
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Table 6.5: Logistic and Count Regressions: Estimated odds and incidence odds of inter-
group violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Logit Count Logit Count Logit Count Logit Count
Weak State 4.024∗∗ 3.297∗∗ 4.491∗∗ 3.767∗∗ 4.288∗∗ 3.786∗∗ 4.820∗∗ 4.361∗∗∗
(2.095) (1.360) (2.353) (1.528) (2.164) (1.571) (2.503) (1.816)
Economic Inequality 2.239+ 2.530∗ 2.319+ 2.659∗
(1.088) (1.107) (1.166) (1.226)
Poorest Group 9.790∗∗ 8.597∗∗∗ 9.282∗∗ 8.303∗∗∗
(7.286) (4.346) (6.968) (4.457)
Richest Group 1.195 1.278 1.239 1.339
(0.337) (0.361) (0.367) (0.394)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.544 0.593+ 0.554 0.575+
(0.217) (0.173) (0.209) (0.174)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.799 0.854 0.828 0.843
(0.194) (0.146) (0.193) (0.143)
Civil War 5.924∗∗∗ 3.373∗∗ 5.393∗∗∗ 3.226∗∗ 4.366∗∗∗ 2.254∗ 3.942∗∗∗ 2.163∗
(2.490) (1.283) (2.219) (1.161) (1.777) (0.852) (1.585) (0.769)
ln(Population) 1.355+ 1.365∗ 1.321 1.332+ 1.426+ 1.466∗ 1.363+ 1.401∗
(0.234) (0.214) (0.232) (0.211) (0.264) (0.222) (0.243) (0.211)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 1.944 2.376 1.676 2.092 5.711 8.684∗∗ 4.816 7.350∗∗
(1.806) (1.387) (1.424) (1.207) (6.297) (6.062) (4.911) (5.100)
Relevant Groups 1.085 1.054 1.077 1.042 1.020 1.011 1.016 1.003
(0.102) (0.055) (0.100) (0.056) (0.101) (0.053) (0.093) (0.052)
Peace Years 0.866∗ 0.857∗ 0.856∗ 0.846∗∗ 0.844∗ 0.841∗∗ 0.833∗∗ 0.830∗∗
(0.056) (0.052) (0.057) (0.052) (0.058) (0.048) (0.059) (0.048)
Spline 1 0.456∗∗ 0.512∗∗∗ 0.461∗∗ 0.515∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗ 0.580∗∗ 0.519∗∗ 0.583∗∗
(0.124) (0.100) (0.123) (0.103) (0.122) (0.101) (0.121) (0.105)
Spline 2 241.024∗ 81.864∗∗ 213.413∗ 77.304∗∗ 125.535∗ 40.268∗ 112.070∗ 38.087∗
(599.004) (131.197) (518.279) (125.751) (284.419) (62.508) (248.233) (59.906)
Spline 3 0.000∗ 0.001∗ 0.000∗ 0.002∗ 0.001+ 0.004∗ 0.001+ 0.005∗
(0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.013)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
AIC 293.903 454.663 296.580 457.566 282.977 436.758 285.886 440.433
LL 0 -245.631 -331.929 -245.631 -331.929 -245.631 -331.929 -245.631 -331.929
LL -134.951 -214.331 -136.290 -215.783 -128.487 -204.379 -129.943 -206.217
Exponentiated coefficients; Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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security. This lack of cohesion also implies that groups can more easily organize them-
selves militarily and mobilize to engage in conflict. This is the case especially if groups
choose to engage in fighting with other groups, who have less military strength than the
state. Engaging in conflict against other groups, then, is both a forced result of a security
threat between groups within the anarchical state structure, but also an opportunity for
groups to engage in fighting, suggesting that inter-group violence is a more likely when
groups must be self-reliant. The results presented in table 6.5 are in line with this argu-
ment.
It is important to remember that odds and incidence odds do not tell us the marginal
effect of change in the x variable on y. We can only interpret the direction and the
significance of the coefficients, and not the substantive significance or size of the relation-
ship. The nonlinearity of generalized linear models means that the relationship between
a change in the value of an independent variable and the change in the probability of a
count cannot be directly discerned from the variables’ coefficient. This magnitude de-
pends on the size of change in the independent variable, the variable’s starting values,
and the values of all other independent variables (Zelner 2009). As it can prove difficult
to interpret the substantial meaning of odds ratios and incidence odds, CLARIFY can
provide quantities of substantial interest in a reader-friendly manner, including reason-
able measures of uncertainty attached to those estimates (King, Tomz and Wittenberg
2000).4 With the independent variables at their means in model 6, the probability of
inter-group violence is 3 percent in a weak state, while it is 1 percent in a strong.
To show the simulation of H1 graphically, I present the probability of inter-group vio-
lence in figure 6.2 and 6.3. The figures show box plots of the simulated probabilities of
inter-group violence in a weak and strong state for dichotomous and count dependent
variables. The range of the vertical scales show the minimum and maximum value of the
observations, and the boxes are the 25th and the 75th percentile. The line in the middle
of the box is the median, and the whiskers represent the lowest and highest value of the
lower and upper quartile. The data that is not between these whiskers, here presented
as dots, are extreme values. The graph illustrates that the probability of inter-group
4CLARIFY uses simulation to compute quantities of interest and account for uncertainty. To capture
uncertainty, CLARIFY draws a given number of parameters from the sampling distribution. I have set
the simulation algorithm to 10000, producing 10000 predicted values and thereby approaching the entire
probability distribution of y. From these simulations I am able to present average predicted values of my
dependent variable and its corresponding uncertainty. Thus, I apply CLARIFY in an attempt to make
the results more informative and transparent.
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Figure 6.2: Model 5, Logistic Regression: Box plot of simulated probability of inter-group




































 Strong state capacity  Weak state capacity
violence is higher in weaker states than in strong. The extreme values predicted for inter-
group violence in a strong state is below the average probability of inter-group violence
in a weak state. In addition, the predicted probabilities for non-state violence are less
spread out than for weaker states, which range from 1 to 19 percent in figure 6.2, and 3
to 12 percent in figure 6.3. As the boxes in both figures do not overlap, the two scenarios
are significantly different from each other.
The results from table 6.5 also show that the measures for economic inequality and poor-
est group are significant and has explanatory power. This is perhaps not surprising, given
the distribution non-state conflict events in countries with high economic inequality, pre-
sented in section 6.1. Indeed, with sufficient strength and equipment of a group, it can
challenge other groups based on economic marginalization even with some degree of gov-
ernmental strength. The variables for political exclusion are insignificant in all models,
except for size of the largest excluded group in model two and six, which is significant
only at the 10 percent level. The variable is also not in the expected direction, indicat-
ing that the incidence odds of inter-group violence decreases at higher levels of political
exclusion.
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Figure 6.3: Model 6, Negative Binomial Regression: Box plot of simulated probability of
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When it comes to the control variables, civil war is significant and positive in all models
in table 6.5. Moreover, with the presence of civil war, the simulated probability of inter-
group violence in model 6 is 2 and 6 percent in a strong and weak state, respectively.
Thus, the presence of civil war severely increases the risk of non-state violence. In line
with Kalyvas (2006), this increased risk of inter-group violence during civil war can be
related to alternative group motivations than the overarching cause at the national level.
Thus, groups involved in the war can take advantage of the prevailing situation, or are
forced to do so, to settle local conflicts out of government reach. Under circumstances
where the state had more information and capacity, these conflicts could be regulated and
not necessarily result in violent conflict between groups. However, when the government
has limited strength, it is more difficult to handle more local issues between groups. Civil
wars can be understood as a condition that opens for a variety of grievances to be realized
within the space of a larger conflict, and this is especially so for the use of violence in a
weak state (Kalyvas 2006). Of the total of 69 non-state conflict events between 1989 and
2011, 68 percent took place during a civil war, indicating that the amount of non-state
conflicts in war time and peace are substantially different. Peace years is significant and
in the expected negative direction, demonstrating that longer peace spells reduce the
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risk of inter-group violence. Thus, there are reasons to believe that previous events of
inter-group violence increase the risk of conflict recurrence.
6.2.2 Weak State in Combination with Economic and Political
Inequality
As the negative binomial regressions inhabits more variation on the dependent variable
than the logistic regressions, I apply the interaction terms only in the negative binomial
models. Table 6.6 assess hypotheses H1a and H1b, which concern whether the combined
effect of weak state capacity and economic and political inequality increases the risk of
inter-group violence.5 The table presents models 9 to 12 where the symmetric and asym-
metric measures for economic inequality are interacted with weak state capacity. Models
13 to 16 include the interaction terms for the two political exclusion measures combined
with weak state. As the models 9 to 16 all include interaction terms, the models cannot
be interpreted as the unconditional or average effect of a independent variable on the
dependent variable. This is because multiplicative interaction models make the effect of
the independent variable x on the dependent variable y depend on a third variable z, in
my case the variables for economic inequality and political inequality (Brambor, Clark
and Golder 2005). In model 9, for example, the coefficient of weak state only capture
the effect of weak state when economic inequality is zero. Similarly, the coefficient for
economic inequality only captures the effect of economic inequality when weak state is
zero, meaning when the state is strong. Before presenting more intuitive plots of this
conditional relationship between economic and political inequality and weak state capac-
ity, I briefly comment on the results in table 6.6.
The inclusion of interaction terms in the regression models provides insights into the com-
bined effect of weak state capacity and economic inequality on inter-group violence. The
conjunction of weak state capacity and economic inequality contributes to an insignificant
effect of weak state capacity. When all indicators for economic inequality is zero, state
incapacity explains little of the variation of inter-group violence. Thus, this indicates
that for the models not including interaction terms, weak state is to some extent driven
by the effect of economic inequality.
5I have chosen to not include all interaction terms in the same model, to avoid including too many
variables in the regressions, as I have results based on only 46 countries and 1053 observations. Models
with all the interaction terms for both economic and political exclusion are included in Appendix C,
table C.2, and the results are consistent.
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Table 6.6: Count Regressions with Interactions: Estimated incidence odds of inter-group
violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989-2011
Economic Inequality Political Inequality
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Weak State 1.624 1.891 3.562 5.053 0.116∗ 1.086 0.273 1.599
(0.700) (0.762) (4.338) (6.268) (0.111) (0.283) (0.244) (0.485)
Economic Inequality 1.490 1.553 2.392+ 2.371+
(0.556) (0.605) (1.080) (1.151)
Weak State * Ec. Inequality 9.661∗∗ 9.517∗∗
(6.757) (7.082)
Poorest Group 9.740∗∗∗ 10.303∗∗∗ 6.183∗∗∗ 5.497∗∗
(5.911) (6.589) (3.328) (3.072)
Weak State * Poorest 0.197∗ 0.159∗
(0.161) (0.134)
Richest Group 0.909 0.929 1.245 1.268
(0.238) (0.254) (0.365) (0.387)
Weak State * Richest 4.840∗∗ 5.154∗∗
(2.544) (2.838)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.559+ 0.648 1.849 1.433
(0.181) (0.192) (0.723) (0.549)
Weak State * Largest Excl. Group 0.098∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.069) (0.104)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.808 0.921 1.918+ 1.558+
(0.149) (0.161) (0.653) (0.409)
Weak State * Excl. Population 0.245∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗
(0.090) (0.104)
Civil War 3.171∗∗ 3.062∗∗ 2.222∗ 2.116∗ 2.656∗∗ 2.404∗∗ 2.016∗ 1.889+
(1.280) (1.169) (0.888) (0.805) (0.943) (0.799) (0.718) (0.632)
ln(Population) 1.240+ 1.210 1.311 1.245 1.372∗ 1.364∗ 1.529∗ 1.507∗
(0.155) (0.156) (0.219) (0.207) (0.200) (0.204) (0.260) (0.262)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 3.496∗ 3.000+ 8.388∗∗ 7.235∗∗ 2.212 2.380 7.312∗∗ 7.005∗∗
(2.138) (1.789) (5.574) (4.711) (1.335) (1.462) (5.531) (5.113)
Relevant Groups 1.104∗ 1.095+ 1.035 1.022 1.128∗ 1.098+ 1.069 1.047
(0.052) (0.055) (0.049) (0.048) (0.058) (0.054) (0.057) (0.056)
Peace Years 0.847∗∗ 0.838∗∗ 0.825∗∗ 0.814∗∗ 0.871∗ 0.856∗∗ 0.858∗∗ 0.843∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.047)
Spline 1 0.542∗∗ 0.544∗∗ 0.635∗∗ 0.643∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗ 0.613∗∗
(0.113) (0.116) (0.106) (0.109) (0.090) (0.092) (0.092) (0.094)
Spline 2 39.696+ 37.393+ 12.826 10.725 36.173∗ 31.517∗ 26.134∗ 22.913∗
(76.389) (73.536) (22.012) (18.865) (52.068) (46.824) (37.269) (33.642)
Spline 3 0.005 0.006 0.032 0.045 0.005∗ 0.007∗ 0.009+ 0.011+
(0.017) (0.019) (0.095) (0.135) (0.013) (0.018) (0.021) (0.028)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
AIC 447.439 450.837 431.891 434.245 431.433 434.847 423.154 428.051
LL 0 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929
LL -209.720 -211.419 -199.945 -201.123 -201.716 -203.424 -196.577 -199.025
Exponentiated coefficients; Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 74
The incidence odds ratio for weak state*economic inequality is in the expected positive
direction and significant at the 1 percent level in both model 9 and 10. Both weak state
and economic inequality is insignificant when the other variable is zero. This is in line
with the argument provided by Fjelde and Østby (2012), who find that socio-economic
inequality increases the risk of armed conflict between groups. Thus, when groups must
provide for their own well-being, and there are large discrepancies between the amount of
resources that the groups control, the risk of inter-group violence increases. The results
therefore seem consistent with the theoretical expectations that the combined effect of
weak state structures and economic inequality is influential in shaping the risk of violence
through its impact on both incentives and opportunities for mobilization.
Poorest group is significant at the 0.1 percent level in model 11 and 12, demonstrat-
ing that how poor the poorest group in a country is has strong explanatory power for
inter-group violence, even when the state is strong.6 Despite being engaged in civil war,
Sudan has been characterized as a stronger state than for example Somalia and D.R.
Congo. Still, there has been several instances of inter-group violence.7 Darfurians dissat-
isfied with Islamist leaders distributed the Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth
in Sudan in 2000, which describes where political and economic power in Sudan lies and
has lain since independence; in the hands of a small elite from the three tribes north
of Karthoum: the Shaygiyya, Ja’aliyiin and Dangala (Flint 2007). The same group es-
tablished the JEM, and took up arms in Darfur shortly after (de Waal 2007). Many
leading figures in the country’s armed conflicts have claimed to be fighting to remedy the
exploitation of the peripheries by the center and their ethnic kins.8
The asymmetric measure for richest group interacted with weak state capacity is sig-
nificant at the 1 percent level and in the expected direction in model 11 and 12. Thus,
how rich the richest group in a country is helps explain the variation of inter-group con-
flicts. de Soysa (2002) highlights how valuable resources can be a ”honey pot” and attract
violent efforts to gain control over resources of wealth. This risk can be especially large
6As the interaction term for weak state*poorest group is insignificant in the model where all interaction
terms are included, I do not present these results in the interaction plots. Although the incidence odds
ratios for poorest group is below one, the marginal effect is still positive, only less so than when the state
is strong.
7A crude dichotomization of state capacity does not capture the different levels of state strength, as
Sudan surely is not viewed as a strong state within a global context. However, within the Sub-Saharan
African context, this categorization seems more justifiable.
8Among this group of revolutionaries are Ahmed Diraige, Taisir Ahmed, Malik Agar and Sharif Harir.
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in developing countries, fueling further dissatisfaction. In the same vein, Buhaug et al.
(2011) find that local income matters more than national income, and that pockets of
relative wealth within poor countries are more likely to see conflict outbreaks. Although
higher income in general means lower conflict risk, an area with substantially higher GDP
than other areas have a higher risk to engage in conflict. As group and territory or area
tends to be closely linked in many Sub-Saharan African countries (Toft 2003), these re-
sults can be said to relate to overlapping mechanisms. In more substantive terms, with all
variables set to their mean and the interaction terms for economic inequality set to 0.5 in
model 9, the simulated probability for inter-group violence is 7 percent in a weak state and
2 percent in a strong. Similarly, with the interaction terms for poorest and richest group
set to 2 in model 11, the simulated probability of inter-group violence is 11 percent in a
weak state and 4 percent in a strong. The simulated probability was 3 percent in model 6,
indicating that the combined effect of weak state capacity and economic inequality further
increases the risk of inter-group violence with 4 and 9 percent for the inequality measures.
When it comes to the control variables, the indicator for civil war is positive and signif-
icant also here. With the presence of civil war and inequality set to 2 in model 11, the
simulated probability of non-state conflict is 7 in a strong state, and 19 in a weak. More-
over, with all variables set to their mean, infant mortality rate set to its maximum value
and inequality set to 2 in model 12, the simulated probability for inter-group violence
is 16 percent in a strong state, while it is 27 (!) percent in a weak. This indicates that
poorer countries have a higher risk of inter-group conflicts in general. Thus, models 9 to
13 in table 6.6 confirm hypothesis H1a, that the combined effect of weak state capacity
and economic inequality increases the risk of inter-group violence.
In table 6.6, models 13 to 16 show the results for the negative binomial regressions to
assess hypothesis H1b, that the combined effect of weak state capacity and political ex-
clusion increase the risk of inter-group violence. The two measures for political exclusion,
largest excluded group and excluded population, are interacted with weak state capacity.
The interaction between weak state capacity and largest excluded group is significant at
the 0.1 percent level in model 13, and at the 1 percent level in model 15, but not in the
expected direction. In other words, the combined effect of political exclusion and weak
state decreases the risk of inter-group violence, and the simulated probability for inter-
group violence in model 15 is lower for weak states, at 0.4 percent, while it is 1 percent in
strong states. In model 15 and 16 the incidence odds for inter-group violence in a strong
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state is positive, but only significant at the ten percent level. This finding is directly
opposite of the expectations presented in my theoretical framework. However, it is in
line with preliminary evidence presented in Section 6.1. Where there was a clear pattern
with economic inequality, where inequalities above the mean provided some preliminary
evidence for more inter-group violence, no such pattern revealed itself when it came to
political exclusion.
A closer look at the data shows that countries such as D.R. Congo, Somalia and Uganda
have low scores on political exclusion, whereas countries that have not experienced large-
scale inter-group violence such as Angola, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Togo have high scores
on both political exclusion measures. Take for example Angola, a country characterized
as a strong state where around 40 percent of the population was politically excluded in
2009. Despite the relatively large amount of exclusion, there have been no instances of
inter-group violence, but a long lasting civil war. Thus, the politically excluded groups
who engage in fighting, do not necessarily attack other groups, but choose to target the
state to address political asymmetries. This can be relevant for the perception that po-
litical exclusion is more salient in a strong state, where the group potentially have more
to gain by inclusion, and thereby more aggrieved by exclusion. Also, the positive rela-
tionship between political exclusion and strong state capacity in model 14 and 16 can be
related to excessive state strength. If the groups seek to change political asymmetries,
it requires less organizational capabilities and equipment to attack representatives of the
group occupying the state, than attacking the state as such. However, these results are
only significant at the ten percent level, leaving the confidence in the findings more ten-
tative.
A related point is that a high degree of state weakness can make it of limited value
for excluded groups to try to be politically included, and groups may even choose to
be outside the state structure. Examples of this are separatist movements who seek to
establish an independent state, for example in Cote dIvoire and Somalia. Hence, the neg-
ative effect of political exclusion on inter-group violence in weak states may reflect the
relative grievance that groups have in relation to other groups. If a majority of the differ-
ent groups are unincorporated within the state, these are perhaps more concerned with
grievances related to economic well-being, rather than any political presentation within
a weak state structure. When large segments of the population are unincorporated, the
relative grievance for one politically unincorporated group is low, and the potential gains
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for increased political representation equally so. Economic differences between groups,
on the other hand, are more visible through material well-being, access to land and re-
sources, and may be more important than political inclusion and more easily addressed
at the local level, without engaging the state. However, in a state where most groups
are included within the state sphere, whereas one group is not, for example the Hutus in
Burundi in the 1990s, the relative grievance is much higher. Instead of being one of many,
you are the only or one of few groups who are politically excluded. Thus, the incentive
to engage in fighting with other groups is higher. The limited value of political inclusion
in weak states and the low relative grievance when large segments of the population are
excluded can perhaps help explain why there is a signicantly negative effect of political
exclusion on inter-group violence in a weak state.
As the interpretation of several included interaction terms in one model can make the
interpretation intricate, I present the marginal effect of the interaction terms in a plot.
Following Brambor, Clark and Golder (2005), interactions can only be interpreted mean-
ingfully when accounting for the combined effects of the interacted variables. Thus, I
will consider the interaction by presenting the marginal effect of economic and political
inequality at different levels of state capacity; strong and weak. The uncertainty in these
estimates is also included, and the marginal effects are presented in figure 6.4. The figure
shows the estimated incidence odds for richest group, economic inequality, excluded pop-
ulation and largest excluded group at different levels of state capacity. The interaction
plots are based on model 9, 11, 15 and 16.
Figure 6.4 shows the estimated incidence odds associated with political and economic
inequality changes with the level of state capacity, and that the effect is statistically dif-
ferent for strong and weak states. For economic inequality, being in a weak state increases
the incidence odds for non-state violence when state capacity is weak, and the effect is
statistically significant. However, being in a weak state with the presence of political
inequality significantly decreases the incidence ratio when state capacity is weak.9
Some of the odds ratios in the models are relatively high, perhaps especially for weak
states and poorest group, that have ratios ranging from 3.297 to 4.820, and 8.303 to
9.790, respectively, in table 6.5. These high estimates are most likely due to the small
sample, where a limited amount of countries are driving the results. For example, of the
9For a basic coefficient plot for the interaction terms in table 6.6, see Appendix C, figure C.2.
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Figure 6.4: Interactions: Estimated incidence odds for inter-group violence in Sub-
Saharan Africa with the presence of economic and political inequality in weak and strong














































































69 conflict events per country year, 30 of them were in Somalia and D. R. Congo. Hence,
the values on the independent variables for these countries have a substantial impact on
the results. However, that inter-group conflicts reoccur in the same countries is expected,
and the inclusion of peace years is an attempt to account for this. It would be preferable
with more diversity in the data, but there are few options for correcting this limitation.
In chapter 7 I will use alternative specifications to see whether the results are affected
and how robust the findings are.
6.2.3 Scenarios
The use of CLARFY provides several advantages when trying to present the results in
a more meaningful manner (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). Although the use of
CLARIFY can give more substance to the results, to assume that both strong and weak
states have the same mean values on variables such as infant mortality rate and years
since last conflict seems unlikely. Indeed, the mean infant mortality rate in strong states
is 4.35, while it is 4.85 in weak. Similarly, the average value for peace years is 9 in strong
states, while it is 6 in weak, indicating more frequent conflict relapses in states with lim-
ited capacity. Also, there is great variation in values on the different indicators included
in the analysis, making it difficult to say something more specific about a given scenario.
Table 6.7: Overview of the eight scenarios used for simulation
Value N State Capacity From To Civil War Peace Years
Economic 1 Liberia Weak Low High 0 9
Inequality 2 South Africa Strong Low High 0 9
3 Burundi Weak Low High 1 1
4 Nigeria Strong Low High 1 4
Political 5 Somalia Weak Low High 0 0
Exclusion 6 Senegal Strong Low High 0 5
7 D.R. Congo Weak Low High 0 0
8 Ethiopia Strong Low High 0 3
To get a better overview of the probability weak and strong states have for inter-group
violence, I construct several scenarios. First, I present the mean values for weak and
strong states in a simulation plot, where I change the level of economic inequality and
political exclusion, to investigate the effect inequality has on non-state conflict events.
By changing the level of economic and political inequality, while keeping the other vari-
ables constant, I am able to isolate the effect of inequality on non-state violence. The
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Figure 6.5: Simulated probability of inter-group violence in Sub-Saharan Africa over
increasing levels of economic and political inequality in weak and strong states, based on
model 9 and 13, 1989-2011.
























































scenario for averaged values for weak and strong states is illustrated in figure 6.5. Sec-
ond, I have chosen eight countries to illustrate the effect of different levels of inequality
on non-state violence given specific state characteristics; South Africa, Liberia, Burundi,
Nigeria, Senegal, Somalia, D.R. Congo and Ethiopia. I have chosen these eight countries
as they inhabit different values on my main independent variables weak state capacity,
economic inequality and political exclusion. I have also taken into account the presence
of civil war and time since last non-state conflict, to illustrate some of the variation in
non-state conflict risk. In each simulation plot I have compared the simulated probability
of inter-group violence of a strong and weak state, with the corresponding values of the
other independent variables in a given year. The scenarios for the eight Sub-Saharan
African countries are presented in figure 6.6.
Figure 6.5 shows the effect of increasing levels of economic and political inequality on
the probability of inter-group violence in weak and strong states, and the correspond-
ing uncertainty. The simulation is based on averaged values for the two levels of state
capacity. As already illustrated with the use of CLARIFY, the simulated probability of
inter-group violence increases with higher levels of economic inequality, shown in the plot
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to the left. With no economic inequality the simulated probability of inter-group violence
is 9 percent, while it is 1 percent in stronger states. The risk increases rapidly for weak
states, where the simulated probability for non-state violence is above 50 percent after
the level of economic inequality passes 1. The probability for strong states, however, is
almost constant, with confidence intervals increasing somewhat at higher levels of eco-
nomic inequality. When it comes to political exclusion in the plot to the right, the effect
is directly opposite, showing that higher levels of political exclusion leads to decreasing
probability of a non-state conflict event. The effect becomes insignificant, however, at
higher levels of political exclusion, where the confidence intervals overlaps with strong
state capacity.
The upper-left panel in figure 6.6 shows the simulated probability of inter-group vio-
lence in Liberia and South Africa in 2005. As seen in table 6.7, the two countries have
the same values for peace years and civil war. The main difference between the coun-
tries for the variables included in the regression analysis is state capacity, where Liberia
is considered weak, and the infant mortality rate, where Liberia had 1086 more child
deaths than South Africa in 2005, which is quite substantial. We can see that although
having the same duration of peace spells, South Africa has a flat line of simulated proba-
bility with increasing confidence intervals at larger values of economic exclusion, showing
similar tendencies as strong state capacity in figure 6.5. Liberia, on the other hand, has
a significantly higher simulated probability for inter-group violence. Liberia had a long
record of political stability before the civil war broke out in 1989, which caused large-
scale violence and a great variance in types of political violence during the war. Most
contributions from the case study literature sees the violence in Liberia as a consequence
of security concerns, while economic motivations were of less importance (see e.g. Pugel
2007; Bø˚as and Hatløy 2008). However, the simulation of economic inequality in Liberia
indicates that larger levels of economic inequality increase the risk of inter-group violence
in a weak state. Thus, it is not necessarily a trade-off between security concerns due
to governmental weakness and economic motivations for conflict. The presence of both
weak state capacity and economic inequality can increase the risk of inter-goup violence,
also after the civil war ended. This is in line with Hegre, Østby and Raleigh (2009), who
find that the Liberian government had very limited control outside the capital during the
1990s, meaning that groups were able to target potential locations more freely, and that
both aggrieved and greedy groups had an incentive to target more wealthy regions where
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hostilities would pay off.10
The upper-right panel shows the probability of non-state violence in Burundi and Nigeria
in 2008. Burundi is here representing weak state capacity, although both Burundi and
Nigeria experienced civil war in 2008. The presence of civil war increases the probability
of inter-group violence in both cases. Whereas the probability started at 3 percent in
Liberia, the probability starts at 40 percent with the presence of civil war in Burundi.
Thus, the probability of a non-state conflict event is higher than a non-event in Burundi in
2008, with the presence of both civil war and economic inequality above 1. The probability
for non-state violence is higher also in Nigeria with the presence of civil war, although at
a lower level and marginal effect than weak state capacity. The confidence intervals are
also quite large, reflecting the large amount of uncertainty for the simulated probability.
The high risk of inter-group violence despite Nigeria’s categorization as a stronger state
can perhaps be best understood as a consequence of the dynamics, the interplay and
consequences of high stake rentier politics in the reproduction and persistence of the oil
conflict in Nigeria and its corresponding security issues. In the words of Omeje (2006, 2):
The perfusion of violent conflicts of varying intensities in many oil exporting economies
of the south, coupled with the increasing inability of beleaguered states to provide
security (...), suggest that the questions of who provides security or who should
provide security, for whom security is provided, in what issue areas, under what
conditions and using what methods, are recurrent problems (...).
Thus, the risk of inter-group violence is relatively high in Nigeria despite a higher level of
state capacity than Burundi, as the conflict has severe consequences both on the national
and sub-regional level. The persistent conflict on the national level creates a deteriorating
cycle of conflicts which also effects the probability of non-state violence at the local level.
The bottom-left panel in figure 6.6 shows the simulated probability of non-state conflict
over political exclusion in Senegal and Somalia in 2010, where Somalia had a non-state
conflict event the year before, and Senegal had a peace spell of five years. In the dataset,
Somalia is coded as having no excluded groups, as the country is a clan-based society,
and no politically relevant ethnic groups apply. Thus, it is interesting to see whether the
introduction of political exclusion increase the risk of inter-group violence. The results
from the panel indicate that this is not the case, showing the same tendencies as the right
10See also Bø˚as (2005).
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Figure 6.6: Simulated probability of inter-group violence in Sub-Saharan Africa over
increasing levels of economic and political inequality in eight scenarios, based on model
9, 10, 13 and 14, 1989-2011.

















































































































hand panel in figure 6.5. Thus, although with frequent incidence of non-state violence
and a high infant mortality rate, the introduction of political exclusion decreases the risk
of inter-group violence. The predicted probability is highest when there are no excluded
groups. The effect becomes insignificant at higher levels of political exclusion, with confi-
dence intervals overlapping with Senegal at -1.5. For Senegal, representing stronger state
capacity, the predicted probability of inter-group violence increases somewhat at higher
levels of political exclusion. This can be related to politically excluded groups choosing
to target other groups in stronger states, because the state is too strong to be challenged.
Also, as already mentioned, it could be that there is much more to gain by political
incorporation in a strong state, whereas there is less incentive to be included in a weaker
state structure.
The bottom-right panel in figure 6.6 shows the same tendencies as the bottom-left panel
for political exclusion in D.R. Congo and Ethiopia. As with Somalia, D.R. Congo has
had several instances of inter-group violence, but the predicted probability of non-state
violence decreases as political exclusion increases. In contrast to the bottom-left panel,
the confidence intervals of D.R. Congo and Ethiopia do not overlap at the highest levels
of political exclusion. The probability for inter-group violence barely increases at higher
levels of political exclusion in Ethiopia, indicating a minimal higher risk of inter-group vi-
olence in 2011. In D.R. Congo, however, when political exclusion is at its minimum level,
the predicted probability is just above 60 percent in 2011, decreasing continuously to 20
percent at the highest level of political exclusion. The negative effect of increased polit-
ical exclusion in weak states such as D.R. Congo can be related to so-called ’non-state’
politics, where the disruption of state capacity has not led to a fundamental political
transformation. The excluded groups have not sought to be included in the extremely
weak formal state structures, as there is not much to gain by inclusion. Instead, in areas
such as in North Kivu, there has been a reconfiguration of political power at the lo-
cal level. Indeed, the armed group named Rassemblement Congolais pour la De´mocratie
(RCD) is increasingly resembling a state bureaucracy, and Tull (2003, 435) provides many
examples of this:
The movement has made important efforts to display the formal attributes of a
state administration. For example, it has transformed Kinshasas decentralized
government units into its own ministries (de´partements). It also celebrates national
holidays, displays its own flag and letter-heads, undertakes formal promotions of
its administrative and political staff, regulates travel, customs or markets, receives
and sends diplomatic missions and so on. In short, the RCD vigorously displays
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the state symbols and trademarks in the manner of any other state.
Thus, instead of fighting other groups to get incorporated in the state structure, RCD
simply created a state within the state. Political exclusion was therefore not an incentive
to engage in inter-group fighting. The picture was somewhat different, however, when it
came to economic aspects. The central government made use of the traditional leaders
in the postcolonial era to extend authority in peripheral areas in return for benefits.
Although the local chiefs benefited from state-sponsored clientelism, it also undermined
their legitimacy from within, as they used their control over land to distribute portions
to party state officials. The patron-client relationship between chiefs and the locals
therefore eroded, as the land as a social resource became a private asset. This change
lead to increasing economic exclusion of large parts of the population, and ethnic conflicts
between local groups erupted in the early 1990s (ibid). Thus, the example in D.R. Congo
might help explain how political exclusion can have negative effects on group violence,
whereas economic exclusion has a positive effect.
6.2.4 Model Performance
In the multivariate regression analysis, both estimation techniques provided significant
results. However, when making inferences it is also important to account for the models’
predictive power. To test the predictive performance of state capacity on inter-group
violence, I first estimate a ROC curve for the logistic regressions based on in-sample
predictions. Second, I address the log-likelihood and AIC for the nested and non-nested
models to assess model performance, and third, perform out-of-sample predictions for the
negative binomial models.
Following Ward, Greenhill and Bakke (2010), I include a ROC plot for the logistic re-
gressions, and out-of-sample predictions for the negative binomial models. A ROC plot
illustrates the relationship between false positives (defined as the number of incorrectly
predicted events of non-state violence divided by the total number of cases where inter-
group violence did not occur) and the rate of true positives (defined as the number of
correctly predicted conflict events divided on the total number of cases where inter-group
violence did occur). In an ideal case, then, a perfectly predictive model will identify all ac-
tual cases of inter-group violence and never generate false positives. The predictive power
of a model can be assessed by the size of the area between the x-axis and the ROC curve,
called the AUC, where better models have curves that cover more than a minimum of
0.5, where the predictive power is no better than chance, to 1.0, where the model predicts
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Figure 6.7: ROC-curve: Model 1, 3, 5 and 7. The plot is based on averaged values for
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perfectly. Figure 6.7 shows the ROC curve for model 1, 3, 5 and 7, where the AUC for
all four models is above 0.9, indicating a satisfying predictive power of the logistic models.
To assess in-sample predictive capability I have included log likelihood and Akaike’s In-
formation Criterion (AIC) in all the models.11 It is clear from the estimations in the
analysis that the inclusion of control variables in table 6.5 improves the AIC relative to
the baseline models in Appendix C. Also, the AIC is lower in table 6.6 than in table 6.5,
indicating that the inclusion of the interaction terms for economic and political inequality
improves the predictive power of the models for the negative binomial regression. When
it comes to log likelihood, the trend is the same for all tables, where the last model in-
cluded has the lowest log likelihood, showing that the asymmetric economic measures for
inequality improves the models, and that this is also relevant for the models addressing
political exclusion in models 13 to 16.
11The AIC is an approach to model selection based on non-nested hypothesis tests (Greene 2003).
The test is useful when assessing the within-sample fit for prediction of the dependent variable. A
common statistical test is R2, which measures proportion of the sample variation in yi that is explained
by variation in xi. However, the R
2 does not punish the inclusion of many variables, which can lead
to inaccurate estimations, as the inclusion of additional variables would always improve the model.
Therefore, to account for both goodness-of-fit and the number of variables included in the model, I apply
log likelihood for the nested models, and AIC for the non-nested.
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Testing models for performance not only in sample but also outside of sample is im-
portant to see whether the models perform well beyond the data used for the analysis.
As model 11 and 12 for economic inequality and model 15 and 16 for political inequality
have the lowest AIC scores and lowest log likelihood when comparing the full models in
table 6.6, I use these models for the out-of sample predictions. Since I do not have any
other data source outside the sample used in my analysis, I split my dataset in two equal
parts. Then, I estimate model 11, 12, 15 and 16 on one half of the data, and test the
predictive power on the other half. I do this procedure five times for the avergaed ten
imputed datasets, to make sure that the predictions are not biased of particular features
of the data. The highest predicted probability for model 11 and 12 is 36 and 33 percent,
and for model 15 and 16 it is 31 and 36 percent. As the events in the data are rare, the
low probability level is not unexpected.
To give a more complete picture of the models’ predictive performance I create three
thresholds for probabilities, on the 10, 20 and 30 percent level, and am thereby able to
say how well the model predicts on different probability levels. When choosing how to
split the dataset, I could also have used a division based on time, for example estimat-
ing with a division before and after 1999. Also, it is possible to divide the dataset in
several parts. However, as I already have relatively few observations in general, and few
conflict events in particular, I have chosen to divide them in two equal parts. Also, I
have dismissed temporal separation because inter-group violence events tend to occur in
the same country during short time periods. Thus, when an inter-group conflict occurs,
other conflicts between groups also break out. An example of this is DR Congo, which
saw multiple inter-group conflict events from 1996 to 2004. Thus, a divide of complete
country years should make the out-of-sample prediction more restricted than a temporal
divide, as the predictions in the models cannot make as much use of conflict relapses.
The results listed in table 6.8 are averaged values of the five out-of-sample predictions for
the ten imputed datasets of inter-group violence events, compared with observed events.
”False positives” reports how many times the model predicted an inter-group conflict
event when no such event occurred, while ”true positives” report the number of accu-
rately predicted non-state conflicts of all observed events. ”Negatives” report the number
of correctly predicted non-events in the models, of all observed non-events. The results
show that the percentage of correctly classified negatives are higher over all thresholds in
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Table 6.8: Out-of-Sample Predictions: Model 11, 12, 15 and 16
% False Positives % True Positives % Negatives
Modell 11
Predicted prob > .1 11.92 64.25 94.83
Predicted prob > .2 6.56 62.33 94.68
Predicted prob > .3 4.28 50.66 94.06
Model 12
Predicted prob > .1 11.37 66.94 98.20
Predicted prob > .2 7.14 56.75 97.32
Predicted prob > .3 5.12 32.13 96.39
Model 15
Predicted prob > .1 8.01 72.85 95.32
Predicted prob > .2 5.58 54.91 93.89
Predicted prob > .3 3.80 47.05 93.54
Model 16
Predicted prob > .1 11.57 67.57 97.20
Predicted prob > .2 8.87 54.53 96.32
Predicted prob > .3 6.06 36.61 94.91
model 12, while the number of false positives is highest in model 11. The amount of true
positives is highest in model 15, but the model predicts worst at the 30 percent threshold.
Among the non-state conflict events that the models predicted poorly at the ten per-
cent level are Comoros in 1997, Uganda in 2002, Senegal in 2005 and Kenya in 2007.
The aspect all these non-state conflict events have in common is only occurring once be-
tween 1989 and 2011, making it harder for the models to predict them accurately. Thus,
for countries that have had multiple non-state events, such as Somalia, Sudan and D.R.
Congo, the models’ predictive capability is quite satisfactory, as the models anticipate
an increased risk of conflict recurrence. However, when peace spells are long, the models
are not able to pick up unexpected events. In addition, all these countries are consid-
ered as strong states, and the concept of non-state violence within a weak state capacity
framework is therefore absent. At the other end, Angola is predicted to have non-state
conflicts from 1989 to 2002, when there was none. This can be due to the ongoing civil war
in the same period, increasing the predicted probability for violence in general. Hence,
the out-of-sample predictions show that the models predict conflict quite satisfactory in
countries that have had multiple events, whereas single events within countries are poorly
predicted. Also, the models tend to predict inter-group violence when there is a civil war
present, indicating that the more narrow theoretical focus on non-state violence has some
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weaknesses. Despite some variation, the results are quite similar for all models, and there
is no apparent model that predicts more accurately on all thresholds. Generally, the
results show that the models have predictive power out of sample, and the predictive
capabilities of the four models are quite even.
6.3 Summary
With the use of both preliminary evidence from the descriptive statistics and multivari-
ate regression analyses I have assessed the relationship between inter-group violence and
weak state capacity. There are three distinctive patterns that emerge from the results.
First, the results lend support to hypothesis H1, that weak state capacity increases the
risk of inter-group violence. This finding is in line with the theoretical implications pre-
sented in chapter 3.1, where weak state capacity forces groups to provide for their own
safety. This implies that the groups can more easily organize themselves militarily and
engage in conflict with each other.
Second, I find that the combined presence of weak state capacity and economic inequality
further increases the risk of inter-group violence, providing support for hypothesis H1a.
The presence of weak state capacity is a necessary condition for inter-group violence to
take place, but an anarchical environment in itself might not be a sufficient explanation
for inter-group violence. Hence, I have argued that the combination of limited state se-
curity and the state capture of a specific group can be relevant when trying to explain
inter-group violence. As a weak state tends to be controlled by a single ethnic group,
and is not able or willing to provide economic and political security for the remaining
ethnic groups, they are more likely to engage in conflict. State weakness in combination
with economic and political marginalization of groups could create security fears between
groups, as inequality in the distribution of economic and political goods can facilitate
violent mobilization through group comparison to change the status quo. When weaker
groups must provide for their own security in a weak state, violent attacks may be directed
against rival groups who receive larger shares of collective goods. Thus, the combined
effect of weak state capacity and economic inequality provides groups with both oppor-
tunities and incentives to engage in non-state conflict.
Third, the results lend no support to the proposition that the conjunction of weak state
capacity and political exclusion increases the risk of inter-group violence. In fact, the
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results show a negative relationship, indicating that the larger share of the population
being excluded, the lower the risk of inter-group violence in a weak state. Thus, the
results falsify my last hypothesis, H1b. This negative effect can be related to the relative
grievance of groups and the potential gains of state inclusion. If a larger share of groups
are excluded from a state with weak capacity, the negative effect of political exclusion can
be related to two mechanisms. First, if the majority of the groups are unincorporated,
the relative grievance for one excluded group is low. The economic differences between
groups, however, are important given any type of state, and also more easily addressed at
the local level. Second, if a state is weak to such a degree that it is unable to provide for
the majority of its population, the potential gains for political representation is limited.
However, if the state is able to provide for most groups within the state, and only a few
groups are excluded from political relevance, the relative grievance is higher. Also, when
the state is stronger the potential gains from political inclusion are more present, and the
degree of state capacity can make it more difficult to challenge the state, indicating that
conflicts between groups are more likely.
When assessing model performance, the ROC-plot for the logistic regression was sat-
isfactory, showing AUC’s above .9 in all models. Also, the inclusion of the interaction
terms improved the AIC and log likelihood in all models in table 6.6, indicating that the
interaction terms for economic and political inequality improve the predictive power of the
models. Also, when conducting out-of-sample predictions the results were quite similar
for the four models chosen, although single non-state conflict events were not predicted
satisfactory. This is due to the lack of continuity in the observations, as countries that
have experienced several non-state conflicts are predicted more accurately. This indi-
cates that the models recognize conflict recurrences successfully, or conflict traps (Collier





Model Robustness and Diagnostics
To enable an assessment of whether the results presented in the main models are con-
sistent and accurate, it is important to account for non-independence, influential obser-
vations, possible omitted variables, and alternative operationalizations and estimation
methods. I therefore perform model robustness tests and diagnostics to assess whether
certain model specifications or aspects of the research design are having an effect on the
results. The models presented in the analysis provides evidence of an effect of weak state
capacity, both by itself and in combination with marginalization, on the risk of a non-
state conflict event. Still, it is important to conduct alternative model specifications to
detect and account for any errors in the models I have chosen.
7.1 Non-Independent Observations
The negative binomial estimation used in section 6.2 is based on a simple stochastic pro-
cess, where the outcome is the number of occurrences per unit of time. Thus, how many 0
counts are needed to obtain a 1. A critical assumption of this Poisson distribution is that
the events are independent. Thus, when inter-group violence occurs, this does not affect
the probability of the event occurring in the future (Long 1997). However, observations in
the data share similarities that could violate the assumption of independent observations,
leading to incorrect standard errors. For example, when inter-group violence occurs in
a country, it tends to reoccur in subsequent years. Hence, it may well be that groups
choose to engage in conflict with each other because of previous conflicts or because of
other inter-group violence events occurring in the same year. For example, the conflict
between the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) and National Pa-
triotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) in 1990 may have affected the outbreak of the subsequent
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non-state conflict in 1991 between NPFL and ULIMO in 1991. This implies that there
may well be time dependence in the data, and not necessarily spatial dependence.
To account for alternative forms of dependence, I have estimated the models in sec-
tion 6.2 with standard errors clustered on year. However, there is also a possibility for
other types of dependency, such of that between dyads, or between regions within coun-
tries. It seems reasonable to assume that the choice of one group to engage in fighting
with another affects its likelihood of engaging in yet an additional conflict, or that war
prone regions are more likely to see non-state conflicts. However, given the nature of
my data I am not able to to account for these possible dependencies. Therefore, I have
tried to account for potential forms of non-independence by using unclustered sandwich
robust standard errors, as robust standard errors can correct for possible violations of
the assumptions in the model (ibid). This is an advantage when it is difficult to identify
the type of clustering in the data. Thus, to account for non-independent observations
beyond clustering on country, I run model 5 to 8 and 11, 12, 15 and 16 with standard
errors clustered on year, and unclustered robust sandwich standard errors.1
Table D.1 assesses the robustness of H1, while table D.2 assesses the robustness of H1a
and H1b in Appendix D. The results show that the results remain consistent over alterna-
tive clustering options. All the significant results remain significant when I cluster on year
and use only the robust standard error specification. Also the AIC and log-likelihood re-
main similar, indicating that the results do not show a high degree of dependence, spatial,
temporal or other.
7.2 Residuals and Influence
An important assessment of the model fit of a regression model is to examine the residuals
and potential outliers. Residuals can be understood as the difference between a model’s
predicted and observed outcome for all observations. Cases that are poorly predicted lies
far from the regression line, and are known as outliers. When these observations have a
large effect on the estimated parameters, they are said to be influential (Long and Freese
2006). To take a closer look at the residuals is especially important for my analysis, as
a handful of countries have experienced the majority of instances of non-state conflicts.
If some of these observations are poorly predicted, it can have an impact on the results.
1As several specification options are place consuming, I present the different clustering options on
estimations with lowest AIC and log likelihood.
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Thus, I investigate the residuals in my analysis for both logistic and negative binomial
regression.2
When deciding on the threshold for what characterizes as a large residual, there is no
given rule. Indeed, Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) claim that it is impossible to provide
any absolute standard, as the assessment of what is too large must be based on the
particular set of data being analyzed. Given my residual plot from the logistic regres-
sions using Cook’s distance (Pregibon 1981), it seems reasonable to categorize residuals
above 1 as influential cases, which leaves me with 6 outliers (Menard 2010).3 Thus, the
model has not predicted a non-state conflict event satisfactory in these instances. These
observations were in South Africa in 1992, Comoros in 1997, Uganda in 2002, Burundi
1996, and D.R. Congo in 1995 and 1996. In addition to another non-state conflict event
between two taxi organizations in 1995, South Africa has not seen additional inter-group
conflict events. Equally, Comoros and Uganda have only had one non-state conflict event
in the sample. Thus, states who have had limited continuity in non-state violence have
been predicted less accurately, which is not surprising given the unexpected occurrence
of these events. Burundi had the first non-state conflict event in 1996, which is predicted
poorly, whereas the subsequent events have smaller residuals. The more unexpected large
residuals concerns D. R. Congo, which have had several instances of inter-group violence.
This can be related to the fact that the country was categorized as a strong state when
the non-state conflict events occurred, which can explain why the model predicted the
events poorly. The country is not coded as weak until 1998, while the country saw the
first instance of inter-group violence in 1996. When the coding changes in 1998 to a weak
state, the model predicts non-state conflicts more satisfactory. Hence, it is interesting
to note that the models are better able to pick up non-state conflicts within the weak
state capacity context, indicating that the models are to some degree able to pick up the
features of state strength and inter-group violence.
To see whether the six observations classified as influential are effecting the results, I
2All statistics concerning the residuals and influential observations are based on averaged values of
the variables in the dataset, and not the coefficients. This is simply because commands such as dbeta
and countfit are not possible to conduct using mi estimate in Stata. Thus, the results from this section
is based on one averaged dataset, and the uncertainty of the estimates is therefore lost. However, when
conducting the regressions and residual plots on the different datasets, the results are similar, indicating
that the statistics presented here should not be too divergent from the results if more post estimation
options had been available.
3See Appendix D, figure D.1 for the residual plot for model 5. The residual plots for model 1, 3 and
7 show similar results.
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exclude them from the sample, and run the logistic regressions without these observa-
tions. The results are not altered when the influential cases are omitted in the logistic
regressions.
When using count regression models, I am not able to apply a similar logic as with Cook’s
statistic. Hence, I am not able to point out cases that the models predict poorly. How-
ever, I am able to compare model residuals for different count estimation methods, which
enables me to say something about how well the negative binomial regression performs
compared to other count estimation techniques. Figure 7.1 shows a plot of the residuals
from a negative binomial model, zero inflated negative binomial model and zero inflated
poisson model estimated for model 15.4 Small residuals are indicative of a well-fitted
model, meaning values close to zero. It is evident that the three models perform very
similarly for all counts, and that all three differ most from observed values at zero and
one counts. The plots shows that the negative binomial model overpredicts somewhat at
one counts, but the difference between the models are very limited.
4I chose model 15 as it has the lowest log likelihood and AIC. The results were similar for the other
negative binomial regression models.
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Table 7.1: Fit Statistics
Summary Comparisons
NBRM BIC= -6100.536 AIC= 0.449 Prefer Over Evidence
vs ZIP BIC= -6093.165 dif= -7.374 NBRM ZIP Strong
AIC= 0.436 dif= 0.013 ZIP NBRM
vs ZINB BIC= -6087.149 dif= -13.390 NBRM ZINB Very Strong
AIC= 0.438 dif= 0.011 ZINB NBRM
Vuong= 2.674 prob= 0.004 ZINB NBRM P=0.004
Table 7.1 suggests the preferred model and the strength of confidence in this prefer-
ence.5 When comparing the three models using BIC and AIC, the negative binomial is
preferred over both the zero inflated poisson and the zero inflate negative binomial. How-
ever, the Vuong test prefers the zero inflated negative binomial model at a statistically
significant level. Nonetheless, as both the AIC and BIC support a negative binomial
model, and since the predictions are almost identical in figure 7.1, I conclude that the
negative binomial is a suitable mode for my analysis.
7.3 Omitted Variables
Although the models in the analysis include five independent variables with their corre-
sponding interaction terms, I have only included four control variables. Hence, the choice
of control variables have been made at the expense of other possible explanatory factors.
If a relevant variable is left out, this can alter the results as the analysis is biased because
of an specification error due to the omitted variable (Greene 2003). In this section I will
take possible omitted variable bias into account by including four additional variables;
Education, ethnic fractionalization, size of youth population and oil.6
First, several studies have found a pacifying effect of education on armed conflict (see
5I obtained these numbers and fit statistics by using the countfit command in Stata.
6GDP per caita income is among the most robust predictors of civil conflict. The variable is assosciated
with both the onset and duration of civil war (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom
2004; Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). However, I have chosen not to include this
measure as infant mortality rate is viewed as a more accurate proxy for economic development, and also
because both infant mortality rate and education can be said to explain much of the variation a GDP
per capita measure would capture (Hegre et al. forthcoming).
97
e.g. Collier and Hoeﬄer 2004; Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom 2004).7 Thus, education
may decrease the risk of inter-group violence. I therefore control for education, and the
measure used is taken from Hegre et al. (forthcoming), which is orignially from Lutz et al.
(2007). As Hegre et al. (forthcoming), I use a measure of male secondary education, de-
fined as the proportion of males aged between 20 and 24 years with secondary or higher
education of all males within the same age range.
Second, as I have chosen to not include linguistic measures for ethnic diversity in my
analysis, I include an alternative measure for ethnic groupings as a robustness test. Al-
though it is viewed as a less accurate measure than EPR, significance on variables with
a more demographic nature would lend additional support for my findings. I include a
measure on ethnic fractionalization from Fearon (2003), which is defined as the probabil-
ity for two randomly selected individuals in a country being from different ethnic groups.
Third, I include a demographic measure for youth bulges. Several scholars have ad-
dressed the relationship between the proportion of young people and armed conflict (see
e.g. Hegre et al. forthcoming; Collier, Hoeﬄer and So¨derbom 2004; Fearon and Laitin
2003), where the effect of youth bulges on civil conflict has been both confirmed and
rejected. I use an age specific measure taken from Hegre et al. (forthcoming), which is
originally from the United Nations (2007). The variable is measured as the percentage
of the population aged 15 to 24 of all adults aged 15 years and up.
Fourth, I apply a measure for primary commodities. The effect of oil on armed con-
flict has been much debated in the conflict literature. Some studies find that oil or
diamond wealth can be tied to the onset or duration of civil war (see e.g. de Soysa 2002;
Ross 2006; Humphreys 2005; Reynal-Querol 2002; Lujala, Gleditsch and Gilmore 2003),
whereas others have found no such effect (see e.g. Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Regan
and Norton 2005). The measure for oil is taken from Hegre et al. (forthcoming), origi-
nally from the Fearon and Laitin dataset (Fearon and Laitin 2003), coded 1 if the country
obtains one third of its export revenues from oil or gas.
In Appendix D, table D.4 and table D.5 show that the main findings are robust with
the inclusion of additional variables. All the variables have significance and are in the
7Collier (2000) claims that a strong education system decreases the likelihood of insurgency because
it decreases the incentive that potential rebels would have to challenge the state, and Thyne (2006) find
that secondary enrollment and literacy rates decrease the probability of war.
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same direction as the models in table 6.5 and table 6.6. Nonetheless, there are some
divergence. Weak state has lower significance levels throughout in table D.4 compared to
table 6.5. In table D.5 the variable for economic inequality is significant at the ten percent
level in model 9 and 10, which is insignificant in table 6.6. Also, the coefficients for weak
state*economic inequality and poorest group have larger coefficients. The interaction
term for weak state and richest group is now significant on the five percent level, indi-
cating weaker confidence in the results with the inclusion of additional variables. None
of the added variables are significant in the model, except from youth bulges in model
11, 12 and 15, indicating that larger share of a younger population increase the risk of
inter-group violence. This result, however, is somewhat tentative with significance levels
only at the five and ten percent level.
Models 13 to 16 show the same tendencies, with lower significance levels for economic
inequality and richest group, and the coefficients are stronger also here. The interaction
terms for political inequality have similar significance level and direction as models 13 to
16 in table 6.6, and the coefficients are quite similar in strength. None of the additional
variables included are significant. Thus, although with somewhat lower confidence in the
findings, H1 and H1a are still supported, while H1b is rejected also in the robustness
tests for potential omitted variables.
7.4 Alternative Operationalizations and Estimation
Methods
When assessing the degree of robustness of the main findings, it is important to use al-
ternative operationalizations to make sure that the results are consistent. As there is no
alternative measure with equally broad coverage and specificity as the dependent vari-
able used, I focus on an alternative measure for weak state capacity, as state capacity
is my main independent variable, and included in all interaction terms. Also, I use two
additional estimation techniques, zero inflated negative binomial and rare event logistic
regression. If there is an effect of weak state capacity in inter-group violence, the results
should not be altered in substantive ways with alternative operationalizations of state
strength and estimation methods.
I use Polity as an alternative measure for state strength. The Combined Polity Score
is a unified polity scale that ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) for countries such
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as Mauritius between 1989 and 2007, to -10 (strongly autocratic), for countries such as
Swaziland between 1989 and 1992. As the Polity focus on the degree of a specific type
of regime, and not directly on state strength, I have dichotomized the variable to try to
capture those states that can be considered as weak. As the variable on state capacity
taken from the ICRG is based on 20 percent of the variable range (0 to 4, where below
1 is characterized as weak), I apply the same logic with my alternative measure. I follow
the argument on how inconsistent political regimes invite collective action and political
contestation among competing forces, and that this leads to higher level of state inca-
pacity (see e.g. Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). I recode the Polity measure, where -2 to 2 is
coded 1, 0 otherwise. I hereby base the measure on a dichotomization, where one fifth is
considered as weak, ensuring that only the states considered most inconsistent around 0
is included. With this division I am able to follow the same logic as ICRG, where weak
states make up one fifth of the range. I can thereby test the robustness of my findings
with an alternative measure picking up other aspects of state capacity than the ICRG,
with a similar categorization. Thus, for my findings to be consistent, the results should
be fairly similar using a different but theoretically corresponding measure.
Also, as discussed in section 4.2.2, negative binomial regression is not always suited
when dealing with large amount of zeros on the dependent variable. As the amount of
zeros in my data is extensive, the negative binomial model can lead to underprediction
(Long 1997). To try to account for this, I include a zero-augemented model that allows
for the possibility that some units will never obtain a count. In relation to the amount
of zeroes in the data, I also include rare event logistic regression, an estimation method
that corrects for small samples and rare events by generating lower-variance estimates
(King and Zeng 2001).
Table D.6 and table D.7 in Appendix D show the results for estimations with Polity
as an alternative measure for state capacity. The overall picture is that the variables that
are significant using ICRG are also significant when using the Polity measure, and the es-
timates have the same direction. Table D.6 shows that the incidence odds for weak state
capacity pulls in the same direction as anticipated, and are all significant. The interaction
term for weak state and economic inequality in table D.7 is positive and highly significant
in both P9 and P10. In P11 and P12, the interaction for poorest group is insignificant,
while weak state interacted with richest group is positively significant, but only at the
10 percent level, indicating a weaker confidence for the interaction term when using the
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alternative measure. When it comes to political inequality, the interaction terms in P13
to P16 are less robust using Polity. Although in the same direction, the interactions have
lower significance, and the interaction term in model P16 is insignificant. This leaves the
results for political exclusion more uncertain. Thus, the estimates concerning state capac-
ity and economic inequality from my full models in section 6.2 show the same tendencies
and point in the same direction when I use an alternative measure for state capacity.
The results are also overall significant, although with a lower level of significance for the
asymmetric economic inequality measures and the political exclusion measures.
When it comes to alternative estimation methods, table D.8 shows that the effect of
weak state capacity on inter-group violence is still positive and significant, both using
rare event logistic and zero inflated negative binomial regressions. Table D.9 shows the
results for estimations including the interaction terms using rare event logistic regres-
sions. The results support the finding that the combination of economic inequality and
weak state capacity increases the risk of inter-group violence, while the combined effect of
political exclusion and weak state capacity has a negative effect on non-state conflict risk.
However, although the estimates for economic and political inequality are in the same
direction as the main analysis, the findings have lower levels of significance throughout.
While being significant at the 1 percent level using negative binomial regression, weak
state*economic inequality is only significant at the ten percent level using rare event lo-
gistic regression. The interaction between weak state and richest group is insignificant in
both model 3 and 4. This leaves the finding of an interaction effect of economic exclusion
and weak state structure more tentative. Nonetheless, the core findings are quite robust
using alternative estimations, as the direction is the same for all indicators and the re-
sults show some degree of significance. Also, weak state*richest group is insignificant,
but barely so, with significance levels at 10.6 percent in model 3, and 11 percent in model
4. Furthermore, table D.10 report the results of a zero inflated negative binomial regres-
sion with interaction terms included, and I find that also here most of the indicators are
significant and in the same direction as table 6.6. As the estimates for both alternative
operationalization of weak state capacity and alternative estimation methods show sim-
ilar results in direction and significance, I conclude that my findings in section 6.2 are
quite robust to alternative specifications.
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7.5 Summary
The alternative operationalizations and specifications used in this chapter render the
results from my analysis robust and consistent. When using alternative clustering options
to account for dependence in the data, the results were not altered, and the removal
of outliers did not substantially effect the results. When comparing the model fit of
different count estimation techniques, the results were quite similar and satisfactory,
indicating that the negative binomial regression is appropriate. The inclusion of the
additional variables education, ethnic diversity, oil and youth bulges shows that the main
findings are robust. However, the models including interaction terms for weak state and
economic inequality rendered the results with lower certainty. The inclusion of Polity
as an alternative measure and the usage of rare event and zero inflated models show
that the results are overall significant and in the same direction as in the main analysis,
although with lower levels of significance. This is especially the case for the asymmetric
economic inequality measures and political exclusion. Thus, although the results are more
tentative given the changes in significance, I consider the robustness tests as supportive




The main emphasis in this thesis has been to investigate the relationship between weak
state capacity and inter-group violence. I have argued that the strength and quality of
state institutions is important when trying to explain the variation in non-state conflict
occurrences. When central authority is weak and unable to maintain full authority within
the state sphere, groups must provide for their own protection. This situation of self-
governance could create risks between groups, as other groups could become potential
rivals when the state is unable to assure group security. Thus, a weak state sphere creates
opportunities for groups to engage in conflict. Although weak state institutions is a nec-
essary condition for the emergence of inter-group violence, it is not necessarily a sufficient
explanation. I therefore argued that the interaction between weak state capacity and eco-
nomic and political marginalization further increases the risk of inter-group violence, as
such an interplay creates both opportunities and incentives to engage in conflict. Within
many African states, the central authority does not have full authority within the state
sphere. While relying on ethnic politics for support and accommodating groups that are
relevant for survival, the state is unable to incorporate the entire population, leaving
other ethnic groups excluded. Through a process of group comparison, I have argued
that the capture of the state by an ethnic group at the expense of others can facilitate
mobilization and increases incentives to engage in conflict.
In the following I will present some implications and limitations of the thesis, along-
side some ideas for ways to improve the analysis.
103
8.1 The Scope of the Theory
Previous research on non-state violence has mostly consisted of case studies. Although
relating to the same mechanisms, these studies are not directly comparable with the type
of conflict focused on in this thesis, which has been on more informally organized groups.
Most quantitative studies on conflict, on the other hand, have focused on armed conflicts
with the state as one of the belligerents, paying limited attention to the non-state side.
While these contributions are highly relevant for the study of civil conflict, it is not clear
from the theories why the state necessarily has to be a participant in the conflict. Indeed,
arguments concerning incentives and opportunities for violence mostly consider whether
violence will occur or not, and not who might participate in it. When accounting for
grievances within a state, these incentives are usually related to other groups in society.
When theorizing the emergence of conflict, however, the efforts to address these grievances
are related to the state. Despite the fact that the state controls the allocation of resources,
I argued that groups are just as likely to attack other groups, as which ethnic group you
belong to is closely related to whether you receive concessions from the state. Thus, I
have tried to avoid the construction of a theoretical framework that can be applied to
violence in more general terms. Although the theoretical scope presented here has its
limitations, the predictive power of the models are quite satisfactory. Moreover, it is
important to specify more clearly what type of violence one seeks to explain, as conflicts
often open for multiple grievances to be addressed, which are not necessarily explained
by the same mechanisms. In order to account for why conflict occurs, then, it seems
reasonable to focus on a more specific type of conflict. I have therefore used a more
narrow theory relating to the protection and entitlements of groups, seeking to test the
theory on a sample to which the theory logically applies.
8.2 Implications
In conducting the quantitative analysis, there were both rejections and confirmations of
my three hypotheses. Hypothesis H1 was confirmed, which implies that the strength and
capacity of a state is relevant when attempting to explain and predict non-state violence.
A theoretical interpretation of this is that groups engage in conflict with each other as
a consequence of the opportunity structures that a weak state provides. Without the
presence of state authority, groups can more easily mobilize militarily and engage in con-
flict with each other, or are forced to do so. I also find support for hypothesis H1a, that
the combined effect of weak state capacity and economic inequality increases the risk of
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inter-group violence. As a weak state tends to be controlled by a single ethnic group,
and is not able or willing to provide economic and political security for the remaining
ethnic groups, economically excluded groups are more likely to engage in conflict to alter
uneven distribution. As the structure of inequality is group based, mobilization and col-
lective action within excluded groups is more easily achieved through group comparison.
The results do not, however, lend support for hypothesis H1b. This indicates that the
interaction between political exclusion and weak state capacity renders non-state violence
less likely. Although this result can be related to several and overlapping mechanisms, I
have tried to explain the negative relationship through the attributes and features of a
weak state. This negative effect implies that the relative exclusion of groups is important
for non-state violence, and the degree to which controlling the state provides potential
gains. I relate this to two mechanisms. First, if the majority of groups are excluded from
the state apparatus, the relative grievance of exclusion is low. Second, if the capacity of
a state is so limited that it cannot provide for its population, the potential gains, and
thereby incentives, for state inclusion is low. However, with a more capable state able to
accommodate the majority of inhabitants, the relative grievance of exclusion is higher.
Also, a stronger state provides higher incentives and potential gains by inclusion, and
can be more difficult to challenge directly. This implies that group violence caused by
political exclusion is less likely within weaker states.
The interplay between non-state violence and weak state capacity is the central focus
of this thesis, and provides contributions concerning two aspects. First, I focus on a
specific type of violence, and examine the link between inter-group conflict and state ca-
pacity with a quantitative approach. Second, I focus on the combined effect of economic
and political exclusion and weak state capacity, and how this conjunction relates to inter-
group violence. Moreover, the findings can also be relevant for policy implications. If it
is the case that state capacity both by itself and in combination with economic inequality
affect the likelihood of group conflict in Sub-Saharan African states, attempts to improve
bureaucratic quality and more even redistribution of public goods must be made. The
state capture of an ethnic group at the expense of others leave the excluded groups more
vulnerable and insecure, making political representation that reflects the size and needs
of the different ethnic groups essential to hinder non-state conflicts. In addition, to avoid
the outbreak of conflict between groups caused by weak state capacity and exclusion is




This study is relevant for several research traditions. First of all, it is relevant for the
study of violence between factions that does not involve the state. Indeed, this is perhaps
the main contribution of this thesis given the few quantitative studies on the topic. In
addition, it is relevant for the study of horizontal inequalities, where group mobiliza-
tion and in- and out-group categories are relevant for conflict, and it is also relevant
for the literature focusing on opportunity structures that weak state capacity provides.
When looking closer at non-state violence, I made a choice about the size of the sample,
limiting the study to Sub-Saharan Africa. This choice was made based on theoretical
considerations, where the structure and strength of many Sub-Saharan African states
seemed to be most relevant for a weak state capacity framework. For example, in the
complete sample, there are cases of inter-group violence between drug cartels in Mexico
and Columbia, and between motorcycle gangs such as Hells Angels and Rock Machine
in Canada. Although clear examples of inter-group violence, these cases are not directly
relevant nor applicable to the concept of weak state capacity. However, although this
study has only focused on inter-group violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is interesting to
consider whether the approach used here is also applicable to other regions with similar
characteristics, and in Asia, countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bangladesh would
perhaps fit within such a framework. Thus, the relevance and applicability of this study
might not be limited solely to Sub-Saharan Africa, but also to other countries in different
regions with the combined presence of limited capacity and the marginalization of groups.
Although the analysis has presented some relevant trends and implications for the study
of non-state violence, it also has its limitations. Before concluding, I would like to present
and discuss some of them. First of all, a clear limitation of the study is that the excluded
groups and the groups who engage in conflict are not matched. Although I can confirm
that the presence of economic inequality increases the risk of inter-group violence, I cannot
say whether it is the poorest or richest group who engage in conflict, or assess the relative
income and political access available for the groups. With more time and resources, it
would have been fruitful to match the two data sources used on groups, to be able to
draw on more information in the analysis. Second, for further research, it is perhaps
useful to disaggregate the measure on weak state capacity, as a simple dichotomization
of weak and strong state is a crude division. Although this thesis sought to capture only
the weakest states, which was to a large degree accomplished with this dichotomization,
it would have been interesting to see what institutions, specifically, that induced inter-
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group violence. This should contribute to a more accurate assessment of what aspects of
weak state capacity that increase conflict risks between groups. Third, despite the fact
that economic differences tend to change slowly over time, it would have been optimal to
have a dynamic economic inequality measure. The inequality measure used here is based
on inequality levels from 1990, making the analysis static when it comes to economic
aspects of non-state violence. Creating measures that reflect the changes in the economic
status of groups is important for future research on inequality and non-state violence.
Fourth, it would have been constructive to include information on the role of neighboring
states. Given that the groups who engage in fighting are economically excluded, it would
be interesting to assess how and why groups receive funding, and how they are able to
withhold their highly organizational nature. Factors such as foreign support and ties
to the same ethnic group over borders could be a possible advancement of this study.
Also, a related point to this is to map whether the groups fight for inclusion or secession.
With such information it would be possible to assess whether excluded groups fight for
increased relevance or for independence. With more data on non-state violence, and fur-
ther advancement in information available, such studies would be a step forward for this
type of analysis.
8.4 Concluding Remarks
This thesis has provided insights on the relationship between state capacity and non-state
violence, suggesting that weak state structures increase the risk of inter-group conflict.
Moreover, the combined effect of weak state capacity and economic marginalization fur-
ther increases this risk. The results imply that it is important to look at characteristics of
states when studying group violence, and the interaction between specific state structures
and the exclusion of groups. When addressing non-state violence, it is constructive to
not only focus on an individual or distinct type of explanation, but the combined effect
weak state capacity can have with other explanations for civil conflict. Thus, instead of
focusing solely on opportunity or motivation at the expense of the other, the interplay
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Table A.1: Descriptive Statistics: Non-imputed data
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Inter-group Violence, logit 0.066 0.248 0 1 1053
Inter-group Violence, count 0.119 0.536 0 5 1053
Weak State 0.209 0.407 0 1 685
Economic Inequality 0.247 0.490 0 2.445 544
Poorest Group 1.266 0.347 0.898 2.434 544
Richest Group 1.383 0.757 0.958 4.776 544
Civil War 0.212 0.409 0 1 1053
ln(Largest Excluded Group) -1.963 1.631 -8.502 -0.092 495
ln(Excluded Population) -1.52 1.656 -8.502 -0.084 495
ln(Population) 8.777 1.378 5.811 11.994 1053
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 4.457 0.441 2.557 5.232 1053
Relevant Groups 4.563 3.494 0 16 877
Source: UCDP Non-State Conflict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck and Kreutz 2012a), EPR,
Hegre et al. (forthcoming)
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Table A.2: Countries Included in the Analysis
Countries
Angola Benin Botswana
Burkina Faso Burundi Cameroon
Cape Verde Central African Republic Chad
Comoros Congo D.R. Congo















Table B.1: Countries with Completely Missing
Statename Ec. inequality Poorest Richest Excl. group Excl. pop Weak state
Cape Verde X X X X X X
Equatorial Guinea X X X X X X
Swaziland X X X X
Comoros X X X X X X
Mauritius X X X X X X
Benin X
Burkina Faso X X X
CAR X
Burundi X X X X
Tanzania X X X
Rwanda X X X X
Somalia X X X
Djibouti X X X
Eritrea X
Lesotho X X X X
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Figure B.2: Testing the Missing at Random Assumption: Kernel density plot. The red
line represents the imputed values, whereas the black represents the observed values.









Observed and Imputed Values
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Figure B.3: Overimputation: The graphs illustrate the estimates of each observation
against the true values of the observations, where y = x line indicates the line of perfect
prediction, where all the imputations would fall on this line. The 90 percent confidence
intervals shows where the observed values would have been imputed had it been missing
from the dataset, given the imputation model. The dots represent the mean imputation,
and the colored line represent the fraction of missing observations in the pattern of
missingness for that observation.
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Figure B.4: Scatterplot: Missing: The plots illustrate values for imputed and observed,
and imputed and predicted values. The red dots are imputed values, the black are
observed.
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Table C.1: Logistic and Count Regressions: Baseline models, 1989-2011
(Base 1) (Base 2) (Base 3) (Base 4) (Base 5) (Base 6) (Base 7) (Base 8)
Logit Count Logit Count Logit Count Logit Count
Weak State 8.280∗∗ 11.555∗∗∗ 8.465∗∗ 15.591∗∗∗ 11.057∗∗∗ 20.238∗∗∗ 10.899∗∗∗ 22.834∗∗∗
(5.958) (6.155) (5.969) (8.413) (7.897) (11.236) (7.725) (14.010)
Economic Inequality 2.143 3.993 2.157+ 3.757
(0.993) (5.169) (1.006) (3.968)
Poorest Group 10.140∗∗ 20.055∗∗ 9.160∗∗ 15.230∗∗
(8.662) (19.715) (6.872) (13.000)
Richest Group 1.088 1.155 1.113 1.229
(0.358) (0.474) (0.370) (0.496)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 1.009 1.484 0.900 0.970
(0.477) (0.765) (0.405) (0.449)
ln(Excluded Population) 1.522 1.964+ 1.372 1.391
(0.813) (0.755) (0.645) (0.472)
Observations 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007 1007
AIC 436.006 611.584 427.450 594.963 399.573 562.746 394.924 557.010
LL 0 -251.543 -338.355 -251.543 -338.335 -251.543 -388.335 -251.543 -338.335
LL -214.003 -300.792 -209.725 -292.482 -194.787 -275.375 -192.462 -271.505
Exponentiated coefficients; Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table C.2: Count Regressions with All Interactions: Estimated incidence odds for inter-
group violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989-2011
(1) (2) (3) (14)
Weak State 0.043∗∗ 0.493+ 0.048 0.272
(0.048) (0.184) (0.103) (0.338)
Economic Inequality 1.115 1.074
(0.396) (0.365)
Weak State * Ec. inequality 11.514∗∗∗ 10.112∗∗∗
(7.624) (6.294)
Poorest Group 4.982∗ 4.637∗
(3.180) (2.800)
Weak State * Poorest 0.480 0.481
(0.416) (0.401)
Richest Group 0.718 0.650
(0.198) (0.209)
Weak State * Richest 5.420∗∗ 5.924∗
(3.523) (4.235)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 1.608 1.481
(0.631) (0.568)
Weak State * Largest Excl. Group 0.091∗∗∗ 0.149∗
(0.063) (0.113)
ln(Excluded Population) 1.742+ 1.657+
(0.524) (0.450)
Weak State * Excl. Population 0.246∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗
(0.081) (0.111)
Civil War 2.407∗ 2.265∗ 2.013+ 1.897+
(0.898) (0.779) (0.737) (0.655)
ln(Population) 1.269+ 1.270+ 1.400+ 1.383+
(0.167) (0.175) (0.273) (0.268)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 3.595+ 3.590∗ 7.347∗∗ 7.094∗∗
(2.362) (2.186) (5.229) (4.725)
Relevant Groups 1.193∗∗ 1.155∗∗ 1.109+ 1.080
(0.067) (0.056) (0.069) (0.060)
Peace Years 0.858∗∗ 0.845∗∗ 0.844∗∗ 0.830∗∗
(0.050) (0.049) (0.052) (0.050)
Spline 1 0.599∗∗ 0.602∗∗ 0.649∗∗ 0.655∗
(0.099) (0.098) (0.105) (0.109)
Spline 2 16.999+ 14.789 11.234 8.971
(28.107) (25.285) (19.079) (16.046)
Spline 3 0.020 0.026 0.037 0.057
(0.056) (0.076) (0.109) (0.176)
Observations 961 961 961 961
AIC 422.462 427.039 418.395 422.674
LL 0 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929
LL -196.231 -198.519 -192.197 -194.337
Exponentiated coefficients; Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure C.1: All Interactions Included: Estimated incidence odds for inter-group violence















































































Figure C.2: Coefficient Plot: The effect of inequality conditioned on state capacity in
Sub-Saharan Africa, based on model 9, 11, 13 and 15, 1989-2011. The plot shows the
change in log odds for non-state violence in weak and strong states given the value for
political and economic exclusion. All other variables are held constant on their median
value for numeric values, and most common category for factors. The plot is based on
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Table D.1: Logistic and Count Regressions: Clustered on year and unclustered, 1989-2011
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cluster Unclustered Cluster Unclustered Cluster Unclustered Cluster Unclustered
Weak State 4.288∗∗ 4.288∗∗∗ 4.820∗∗∗ 4.820∗∗∗ 3.786∗∗∗ 3.786∗∗∗ 4.361∗∗∗ 4.361∗∗∗
(1.930) (1.871) (2.151) (2.102) (1.114) (1.194) (1.293) (1.370)
Poorest Group 9.790∗∗∗ 9.790∗∗∗ 9.282∗∗∗ 9.282∗∗∗ 8.597∗∗∗ 8.597∗∗∗ 8.303∗∗∗ 8.303∗∗∗
(6.623) (6.692) (6.204) (6.283) (4.025) (4.156) (3.867) (4.075)
Richest Group 1.195 1.195 1.239 1.239 1.278 1.278 1.339 1.339
(0.303) (0.330) (0.307) (0.339) (0.225) (0.262) (0.238) (0.277)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.554 0.554+ 0.575+ 0.575∗
(0.203) (0.187) (0.163) (0.149)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.828 0.828 0.843 0.843
(0.229) (0.202) (0.185) (0.155)
Civil War 4.366∗∗∗ 4.366∗∗∗ 3.942∗∗∗ 3.942∗∗∗ 2.254∗∗ 2.254∗∗ 2.163∗∗ 2.163∗
(1.303) (1.646) (1.107) (1.472) (0.624) (0.698) (0.584) (0.662)
ln(Population) 1.426+ 1.426+ 1.363 1.363 1.466∗∗ 1.466∗ 1.401∗ 1.401∗
(0.305) (0.307) (0.284) (0.285) (0.217) (0.226) (0.195) (0.211)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 5.711+ 5.711+ 4.816+ 4.816 8.684∗∗∗ 8.684∗∗ 7.350∗∗∗ 7.350∗∗
(5.413) (6.016) (4.549) (4.881) (4.771) (6.570) (4.120) (5.445)
Relevant Groups 1.020 1.020 1.016 1.016 1.011 1.011 1.003 1.003
(0.057) (0.068) (0.065) (0.067) (0.034) (0.042) (0.040) (0.043)
Peace Years 0.844∗∗ 0.844∗ 0.833∗∗ 0.833∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ 0.841∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗ 0.830∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.056) (0.051) (0.057) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Spline 1 0.513∗∗∗ 0.513∗∗ 0.519∗∗ 0.519∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.580∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗
(0.104) (0.110) (0.108) (0.111) (0.085) (0.093) (0.092) (0.096)
Spline 2 125.535∗∗ 125.535∗ 112.070∗ 112.070∗ 40.268∗ 40.268∗ 38.087∗ 38.087∗
(230.130) (267.762) (207.881) (238.219) (58.804) (67.557) (57.617) (65.172)
Spline 3 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.001∗ 0.004∗ 0.004+ 0.005∗ 0.005+
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
AIC 282.977 282.977 285.886 285.886 436.758 436.758 440.433 440.433
LL 0 -245.631 -245.631 -245.631 -245.631 -331.929 -331.929 -331.292 -331.292
LL -128.489 -128.489 -129.943 -129.943 -204.379 -204.379 -206.217 -206.217
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.2: Count Regressions with Interactions: Clustered on year and unclustered,
1989-2011
Model 11 Model 12 Model 15 Model 16
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cluster Unclustered Cluster Unclustered Cluster Unclustered Cluster Unclustered
Weak State 3.562 3.562 5.053 5.053 0.273 0.273 1.599 1.599
(4.826) (4.234) (6.779) (5.943) (0.253) (0.261) (0.542) (0.654)
Poorest Group 9.740∗∗∗ 9.740∗∗∗ 10.303∗∗∗ 10.303∗∗∗ 6.183∗∗∗ 6.183∗∗∗ 5.497∗∗∗ 5.497∗∗
(5.926) (5.636) (6.301) (6.085) (3.146) (3.244) (2.828) (2.902)
Weak State * Poorest 0.197∗ 0.197∗ 0.159∗ 0.159∗
(0.161) (0.142) (0.133) (0.115)
Richest Group 0.909 0.909 0.929 0.929 1.245 1.245 1.268 1.268
(0.296) (0.303) (0.315) (0.320) (0.246) (0.280) (0.256) (0.299)
Weak State * Richest 4.840∗ 4.840∗∗ 5.154∗ 5.154∗∗
(3.103) (2.863) (3.406) (3.120)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.648+ 0.648+ 1.433 1.433
(0.164) (0.167) (0.627) (0.617)
Weak State * Largest Excl. Group 0.162∗∗ 0.162∗∗
(0.109) (0.106)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.921 0.921 1.558 1.558
(0.181) (0.167) (0.538) (0.522)
Weak State * Excl. Population 0.341∗∗ 0.341∗∗
(0.118) (0.124)
Civil War 2.222∗∗ 2.222∗ 2.116∗∗ 2.116∗ 2.016∗ 2.016∗ 1.889∗ 1.889∗
(0.623) (0.703) (0.580) (0.667) (0.571) (0.612) (0.513) (0.577)
ln(Population) 1.311 1.311 1.245 1.245 1.529∗ 1.529∗ 1.507∗ 1.507∗
(0.246) (0.242) (0.227) (0.226) (0.258) (0.274) (0.241) (0.271)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 8.388∗∗∗ 8.388∗∗ 7.235∗∗∗ 7.235∗∗ 7.312∗∗ 7.312∗ 7.005∗∗ 7.005∗
(4.551) (6.105) (3.938) (5.127) (4.423) (5.957) (4.308) (5.657)
Relevant Groups 1.035 1.035 1.022 1.022 1.069 1.069 1.047 1.047
(0.039) (0.046) (0.041) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048) (0.051) (0.048)
Peace Years 0.825∗∗∗ 0.825∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.814∗∗∗ 0.858∗∗ 0.858∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗ 0.843∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.043) (0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Spline 1 0.635∗∗ 0.635∗∗ 0.643∗∗ 0.643∗∗ 0.609∗∗∗ 0.609∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ 0.613∗∗
(0.097) (0.105) (0.103) (0.108) (0.084) (0.097) (0.089) (0.099)
Spline 2 12.826 12.826 10.725 10.725 26.134∗ 26.134+ 22.913∗ 22.913+
(22.164) (24.560) (19.102) (21.135) (37.854) (44.174) (32.914) (39.268)
Spline 3 0.032 0.032 0.045 0.045 0.009+ 0.009+ 0.011+ 0.011
(0.097) (0.106) (0.138) (0.151) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
AIC 431.891 431.891 434.245 434.245 423.154 423.154 428.051 428.051
LL 0 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929
LL -199.945 -199.945 -201.123 -201.123 -196.577 -196.577 -199.025 -199.025
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.3: Logistic Regressions: Influential observations removed, 1989-2011
(1) (3) (5) (7)
Weak State 6.904∗∗∗ 8.452∗∗∗ 9.303∗∗∗ 11.613∗∗∗
(3.913) (4.719) (5.765) (7.391)
Economic Inequality 3.233∗ 3.338∗
(1.518) (1.643)
Poorest Group 20.862∗∗ 19.431∗∗
(20.285) (19.927)
Richest Group 1.540 1.644+
(0.406) (0.451)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.318∗ 0.340∗
(0.149) (0.157)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.531∗ 0.574∗
(0.152) (0.153)
Civil War 7.424∗∗∗ 6.773∗∗∗ 4.747∗∗ 4.315∗∗
(3.816) (3.293) (2.290) (1.975)
ln(Population) 1.477∗ 1.411∗ 1.632∗∗ 1.508∗∗
(0.243) (0.233) (0.264) (0.209)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 2.797 2.368 12.353∗ 10.076∗
(2.421) (1.892) (14.331) (10.626)
Relevant Groups 1.128 1.145 1.038 1.056
(0.098) (0.103) (0.079) (0.084)
Peace Years 0.877+ 0.866∗ 0.846∗ 0.831∗
(0.063) (0.063) (0.071) (0.072)
Spline 1 0.334∗∗∗ 0.342∗∗∗ 0.397∗∗ 0.409∗∗
(0.107) (0.103) (0.124) (0.120)
Spline 2 601.191+ 486.638+ 216.549 159.978
(2032.197) (1597.069) (740.393) (530.814)
Spline 3 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
Observations 955 955 955 955
AIC 234.259 238.616 221.428 225.988
LL 0 -229.486 -229.486 -229.486 -229.486
LL -105.129 -107.308 -97.714 -99.994
Exponentiated coefficients; Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.4: Logistic and Count Regressions: Education, ethnic diveristy, youth bulges
and oil added, 1989-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Logit Count Logit Count Logit Count Logit Count
Weak State 2.858+ 2.271+ 3.001+ 2.439∗ 3.080+ 2.563∗ 3.197+ 2.743∗
(1.652) (0.970) (1.758) (1.051) (1.883) (1.192) (1.975) (1.290)
Economic Inequality 4.172 5.307∗ 4.706+ 6.100∗
(3.678) (3.952) (4.270) (4.646)
Poorest Group 15.024∗∗∗ 10.625∗∗∗ 13.960∗∗∗ 10.195∗∗∗
(11.040) (4.588) (10.337) (4.473)
Richest Group 1.601 2.228+ 1.739 2.391+
(0.931) (1.050) (1.011) (1.102)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.661 0.697 0.631 0.689
(0.247) (0.203) (0.218) (0.173)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.947 1.001 0.906 0.955
(0.209) (0.155) (0.181) (0.131)
Civil War 6.459∗∗∗ 3.126∗ 6.175∗∗∗ 3.087∗ 5.558∗∗∗ 2.554∗ 5.264∗∗∗ 2.528∗
(3.130) (1.430) (2.983) (1.379) (2.471) (1.092) (2.300) (1.041)
ln(Population) 1.596 1.771∗ 1.571 1.731∗ 1.470 1.679∗ 1.424 1.613∗
(0.476) (0.445) (0.470) (0.437) (0.413) (0.397) (0.401) (0.378)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 2.850 4.290 2.631 3.833 6.947 9.261∗ 6.372 8.215∗
(3.390) (3.833) (3.099) (3.493) (9.292) (8.419) (8.414) (7.454)
Relevant Groups 1.005 0.991 0.981 0.961 0.955 0.937 0.942 0.920
(0.110) (0.065) (0.099) (0.059) (0.083) (0.050) (0.077) (0.048)
Education 3.794 1.369 4.991 1.780 5.275 3.997 6.409 4.329
(7.877) (2.270) (10.485) (2.858) (9.500) (5.591) (11.593) (5.852)
Ethnic Diversity 2.637 2.263 3.271 2.859 4.466 3.286 5.424 4.063
(3.108) (1.948) (3.960) (2.572) (5.411) (3.297) (6.760) (4.177)
Youth Bulges 1.009 0.997 1.013 1.005 1.180+ 1.133+ 1.183∗ 1.140+
(0.077) (0.059) (0.075) (0.058) (0.106) (0.081) (0.100) (0.078)
Oil 0.099 0.050 0.078 0.039 0.242 0.069 0.195 0.061
(0.242) (0.113) (0.194) (0.089) (0.566) (0.155) (0.453) (0.132)
Peace Years 0.869∗ 0.856∗∗ 0.862∗ 0.848∗∗ 0.852∗ 0.840∗∗ 0.845∗ 0.832∗∗
(0.055) (0.050) (0.055) (0.050) (0.056) (0.048) (0.056) (0.047)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
AIC 297.932 453.314 299.473 454.978 286.125 435.72 288.130 437.793
LL 0 -245.631 -331.929 -245.631 -331.929 -245.631 -331.929 -245.631 -331.929
LL -132.966 -209.657 -133.737 -210.489 -126.062 -199.86 -127.050 -200.900
Exponentiated coefficients; Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
Three cubic splines are included in the analysis, but not reported in the table.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.5: Count Regressions with Interactions: Education, ethnic diveristy, youth bulges
and oil added, 1989-2011
Economic Inequality Political Inequality
(9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16)
Weak State 1.096 1.158 2.830 3.341 0.063∗ 0.544 0.136+ 0.797
(0.541) (0.570) (3.192) (3.772) (0.080) (0.262) (0.158) (0.374)
Economic Inequality 3.283+ 3.771+ 5.941∗ 7.932∗
(2.243) (2.620) (4.688) (6.989)
Weak State * Ec. Inequality 11.236∗∗ 11.472∗∗
(8.692) (8.992)
Poorest Group 10.974∗∗∗ 11.038∗∗∗ 8.017∗∗∗ 7.385∗∗∗
(5.421) (5.422) (3.658) (3.145)
Weak State * Poorest 0.188∗ 0.163∗
(0.139) (0.127)
Richest Group 1.574 1.661 2.248+ 2.520+
(0.723) (0.737) (1.083) (1.278)
Weak State * Richest 4.912∗ 5.261∗
(3.120) (3.509)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.699 0.753 2.181∗ 1.633
(0.224) (0.193) (0.789) (0.547)
Weak State * Largest Excl. Group 0.089∗∗ 0.141∗∗
(0.069) (0.099)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.981 1.020 2.490∗ 1.873∗
(0.174) (0.155) (0.984) (0.528)
Weak State * Excl. Population 0.207∗∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.087) (0.097)
Civil War 3.070∗ 3.042∗ 2.418∗ 2.362∗ 2.763∗ 2.575∗ 2.339∗ 2.241∗
(1.424) (1.387) (1.023) (0.973) (1.187) (1.052) (0.931) (0.843)
ln(Population) 1.508+ 1.481+ 1.419 1.355 1.796∗ 1.897∗ 1.748∗ 1.806∗
(0.317) (0.314) (0.316) (0.299) (0.478) (0.546) (0.432) (0.469)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 5.235∗ 4.677+ 7.562∗ 6.649∗ 4.574 5.584+ 9.282∗ 9.567∗∗
(4.121) (3.704) (6.132) (5.315) (4.451) (5.479) (8.596) (8.253)
Relevant Groups 1.033 1.003 0.984 0.964 1.056 0.990 0.999 0.954
(0.064) (0.059) (0.049) (0.044) (0.054) (0.054) (0.050) (0.050)
Education 2.294 3.087 2.132 2.232 3.076 8.128 5.881 11.091+
(3.577) (4.673) (2.766) (2.859) (4.955) (13.727) (8.352) (16.033)
Ethnic Diversity 2.309 2.842 2.822 3.475 2.192 2.014 2.925 3.018
(2.046) (2.653) (2.815) (3.592) (2.137) (2.086) (3.231) (3.472)
Youth Bulges 1.042 1.049 1.142+ 1.145∗ 1.048 1.069 1.158+ 1.167∗
(0.054) (0.054) (0.078) (0.075) (0.072) (0.071) (0.095) (0.089)
Oil 0.054 0.041 0.108 0.091 0.044 0.020 0.069 0.043
(0.110) (0.084) (0.212) (0.174) (0.097) (0.049) (0.149) (0.096)
Peace Years 0.849∗∗ 0.842∗∗ 0.828∗∗ 0.820∗∗∗ 0.882∗ 0.871∗ 0.865∗∗ 0.855∗∗
(0.048) (0.047) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048) (0.048) (0.046)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
AIC 446.179 447.752 432.160 433.177 431.001 430.611 420.499 421.580
LL 0 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929
LL -205.089 -205.876 -196.080 -196.589 -197.500 -197.306 -191.250 -191.790
Exponentiated coefficients; Robust and clustered standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
Three cubic splines are included in the analysis, but not reported in the table.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.6: Logistic and Count Regressions: Alternative operationalization of state ca-
pacity, 1989-2011
(P1) (P2) (P3) (P4) (P5) (P6) (P7) (P8)
Logit Count Logit Count Logit Count Logit Count
Weak State 3.716∗ 3.147∗∗∗ 3.880∗ 3.454∗∗∗ 4.724∗∗ 4.932∗∗∗ 4.986∗∗ 5.590∗∗∗
(2.105) (1.035) (2.293) (1.169) (2.704) (1.865) (3.041) (2.320)
Economic Inequality 2.359+ 2.650∗ 2.404+ 2.763∗
(1.176) (1.127) (1.271) (1.254)
Poorest Group 13.917∗∗∗ 14.173∗∗∗ 13.395∗∗ 14.408∗∗∗
(11.063) (7.698) (10.990) (8.496)
Richest Group 1.172 1.292 1.193 1.343
(0.339) (0.341) (0.376) (0.377)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.452∗ 0.540∗ 0.481∗ 0.568∗
(0.177) (0.141) (0.170) (0.147)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.710 0.790 0.753 0.822
(0.173) (0.137) (0.173) (0.134)
Civil War 6.022∗∗∗ 3.379∗∗ 5.311∗∗∗ 3.198∗∗ 4.366∗∗∗ 2.009+ 3.791∗∗ 1.886+
(2.554) (1.355) (2.243) (1.197) (1.862) (0.782) (1.645) (0.683)
ln(Population) 1.299 1.336+ 1.265 1.302 1.383 1.430∗ 1.332 1.374∗
(0.232) (0.222) (0.236) (0.221) (0.277) (0.225) (0.265) (0.218)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 3.951 3.361∗ 3.362 3.086∗ 11.563∗ 14.055∗∗∗ 9.913∗ 12.859∗∗∗
(3.482) (1.605) (2.751) (1.485) (12.842) (8.251) (10.201) (7.459)
Relevant Groups 1.124 1.074 1.118 1.067 1.038 1.022 1.035 1.015
(0.113) (0.058) (0.111) (0.062) (0.117) (0.047) (0.109) (0.048)
Peace Years 0.875∗ 0.868∗ 0.861∗ 0.857∗∗ 0.853∗ 0.849∗∗ 0.840∗ 0.839∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.049) (0.062) (0.049) (0.059) (0.044) (0.061) (0.044)
Spline 1 0.433∗∗ 0.507∗∗ 0.436∗∗ 0.503∗∗ 0.512∗∗ 0.609∗∗ 0.509∗∗ 0.598∗∗
(0.124) (0.106) (0.122) (0.106) (0.123) (0.104) (0.120) (0.104)
Spline 2 236.732∗ 56.738∗ 232.325∗ 61.905∗ 78.719+ 17.604+ 89.138+ 21.816+
(623.081) (104.523) (601.928) (114.944) (187.010) (28.907) (208.674) (36.672)
Spline 3 0.000+ 0.003+ 0.000+ 0.003+ 0.002 0.018 0.001+ 0.012
(0.001) (0.009) (0.001) (0.008) (0.007) (0.048) (0.005) (0.035)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
AIC 294.493 452.302 299.804 457.519 280.014 422.394 285.425 427.809
LL 0 -245.631 -331.929 -245.631 -331.929 -245.631 -331.929 -245.631 -331.929
LL -135.247 -213.151 -137.902 -215.760 -127.007 -197.197 -129.713 -199.905
Exponentiated coefficients; Standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.7: Count Regressions with Interactions: Alternative operationalization of state
capacity, 1989-2011
Economic Inequality Political Inequality
(P9) (P10) (P11) (P12) (P13) (P14) (P15) (P16)
Weak State 1.723 1.874+ 1.231 1.260 0.386 1.381 1.509 3.360∗∗
(0.578) (0.611) (1.767) (1.957) (0.302) (0.651) (0.932) (1.351)
Economic Inequality 1.627 1.660 2.480∗ 2.527∗
(0.553) (0.594) (1.023) (1.102)
Weak State * Ec. Inequality 11.515∗∗∗ 11.973∗∗∗
(8.167) (8.756)
Poorest Group 10.801∗∗∗ 10.848∗∗∗ 11.171∗∗∗ 11.290∗∗∗
(5.974) (6.432) (5.693) (6.147)
Weak State * Poorest 0.983 1.043
(1.349) (1.497)
Richest Group 1.008 1.032 1.249 1.269
(0.247) (0.272) (0.336) (0.362)
Weak State * Richest 2.498+ 2.530+
(1.283) (1.305)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.533∗ 0.572∗ 1.057 0.815
(0.155) (0.159) (0.397) (0.297)
Weak State * Largest Excl. Group 0.264∗∗ 0.481+
(0.135) (0.209)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.762 0.825 1.256 1.023
(0.151) (0.147) (0.369) (0.234)
Weak State * Excl. Population 0.433∗ 0.657
(0.153) (0.171)
Civil War 3.179∗∗ 3.039∗∗ 2.051+ 1.925+ 2.970∗∗ 2.679∗∗ 1.967+ 1.817+
(1.362) (1.222) (0.793) (0.697) (1.163) (0.957) (0.722) (0.616)
ln(Population) 1.199 1.174 1.354+ 1.300 1.334+ 1.312 1.464∗ 1.436∗
(0.164) (0.166) (0.225) (0.216) (0.215) (0.217) (0.244) (0.246)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 3.705∗∗ 3.419∗∗ 11.813∗∗∗ 10.607∗∗∗ 3.769∗ 3.881∗∗ 13.595∗∗∗ 13.253∗∗∗
(1.643) (1.513) (6.763) (5.984) (1.991) (1.965) (8.655) (7.989)
Relevant Groups 1.122∗ 1.119∗ 1.041 1.034 1.104+ 1.092 1.042 1.031
(0.052) (0.057) (0.048) (0.050) (0.064) (0.062) (0.053) (0.052)
Peace Years 0.849∗∗ 0.839∗∗ 0.837∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.876∗ 0.866∗∗ 0.858∗∗ 0.848∗∗∗
(0.050) (0.050) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.047) (0.043) (0.042)
Spline 1 0.529∗∗ 0.523∗∗ 0.614∗∗ 0.603∗∗ 0.557∗∗ 0.549∗∗ 0.634∗∗ 0.618∗∗
(0.113) (0.113) (0.107) (0.109) (0.108) (0.103) (0.104) (0.104)
Spline 2 45.057+ 50.308+ 19.331+ 24.082+ 24.044+ 28.654∗ 11.366 14.949+
(89.588) (101.724) (32.570) (42.228) (42.116) (48.483) (18.014) (24.291)
Spline 3 0.004+ 0.004+ 0.015 0.010 0.012 0.009+ 0.036 0.023
(0.014) (0.012) (0.042) (0.030) (0.033) (0.024) (0.096) (0.062)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
AIC 439.136 444.157 422.690 427.793 422.120 447.112 418.483 426.638
LL 0 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929 -331.929
LL -205.568 -208.079 -195.345 -197.896 -207.06 -209.556 -195.242 -198.319
Exponentiated coefficients; Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.8: Alternative Methods: Rare event logistic and zero inflated negative binomial
regression, 1989-2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
RElogit RElogit RElogit RElogit ZINB ZINB ZINB ZINB
Weak State 3.869∗∗ 4.289∗∗ 4.067∗∗ 4.532∗∗ 2.907∗ 3.281∗∗ 2.811∗ 3.735∗∗
(1.979) (2.208) (2.008) (2.303) (1.357) (1.450) (1.138) (1.669)
Economic Inequality 2.301+ 2.382+ 1.439 1.412
(1.103) (1.181) (0.703) (0.814)
Poorest Group 8.194∗∗ 7.878∗∗ 9.470∗∗∗ 7.191∗∗
(6.010) (5.828) (4.645) (4.745)
Richest Group 1.296 1.334 0.672 0.832
(0.358) (0.387) (0.339) (0.703)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.574 0.589 0.610 0.451
(0.227) (0.220) (0.326) (0.272)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.819 0.849 0.853 1.253
(0.197) (0.195) (0.253) (0.324)
Civil War 5.404∗∗∗ 4.942∗∗∗ 3.983∗∗∗ 3.624∗∗ 2.096+ 1.989+ 1.174 1.585
(2.243) (2.008) (1.599) (1.438) (0.846) (0.733) (0.230) (0.648)
ln(Population) 1.318 1.288 1.356+ 1.306 1.311 1.272 1.516∗ 1.509+
(0.224) (0.223) (0.247) (0.230) (0.231) (0.223) (0.290) (0.326)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 1.794 1.544 4.573 3.910 2.116 1.892 8.234∗∗ 6.052∗
(1.646) (1.296) (4.972) (3.932) (1.412) (1.319) (5.914) (4.340)
Relevant Groups 1.080 1.072 1.021 1.017 1.054 1.044 1.019 0.926
(0.100) (0.098) (0.099) (0.092) (0.066) (0.077) (0.075) (0.055)
Peace Years 0.869∗ 0.861∗ 0.848∗ 0.838∗ 0.855∗∗ 0.848∗∗ 0.852∗∗∗ 0.838∗∗
(0.056) (0.057) (0.057) (0.058) (0.049) (0.050) (0.040) (0.052)
Spline 1 0.479∗∗ 0.484∗∗ 0.539∗∗ 0.545∗∗ 0.534∗∗ 0.538∗∗ 0.618∗∗ 0.609∗∗
(0.129) (0.128) (0.126) (0.126) (0.102) (0.102) (0.115) (0.113)
Spline 2 164.506∗ 146.569∗ 84.912∗ 76.332∗ 52.915∗ 49.806∗ 23.988+ 34.080∗
(403.743) (351.502) (189.813) (166.798) (92.316) (89.734) (40.904) (56.520)
Spline 3 0.000+ 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.002+ 0.003∗ 0.003+ 0.010 0.006+
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.010) (0.029) (0.015)
Economic Inequality 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Poorest Group 12.077 1.047
(35.792) (4.139)
Richest Group 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000)




Civil War 0.005 0.074 0.004 0.026
(0.184) (1.345) (0.086) (0.133)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
AIC 447.836 456.395 431.093 429.036
LL 0 -283.314 -286.087 -272.188 -272.188
LL -206.918 -211.197 -196.547 -195.518
Exponentiated coefficients; Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.9: Alternative Methods: Interactions with rare event logistic regression, 1989-
2011
Economic Inequality Political Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weak State 2.312+ 2.587∗ 3.471 4.777 0.114+ 0.830 0.225 1.113
(1.148) (1.246) (5.485) (7.203) (0.145) (0.416) (0.279) (0.634)
Economic Inequality 1.591 1.641 2.104+ 2.044
(0.606) (0.637) (0.949) (0.933)
Weak State * Ec. Inequality 7.939+ 7.671+
(8.936) (8.767)
Poorest Group 8.025∗∗ 8.212∗∗ 5.450∗ 5.041∗
(5.631) (5.704) (3.706) (3.335)
Weak State * Poorest 0.278 0.224
(0.368) (0.290)
Richest Group 1.032 1.045 1.228 1.222
(0.278) (0.295) (0.324) (0.323)
Weak State * Richest 3.563 3.750
(2.798) (3.111)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.552 0.627 1.735 1.437
(0.237) (0.228) (0.788) (0.624)
Weak State * Largest Excl. Group 0.099∗∗ 0.153∗
(0.085) (0.123)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.788 0.884 1.712+ 1.518
(0.203) (0.196) (0.525) (0.394)
Weak State * Excl. Population 0.235∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗
(0.103) (0.130)
Civil War 5.386∗∗∗ 4.937∗∗∗ 4.093∗∗∗ 3.747∗∗∗ 4.574∗∗∗ 3.980∗∗∗ 3.688∗∗∗ 3.225∗∗
(2.210) (1.983) (1.637) (1.494) (1.758) (1.494) (1.431) (1.239)
ln(Population) 1.216 1.188 1.304 1.248 1.314+ 1.310 1.359 1.349
(0.185) (0.188) (0.263) (0.241) (0.214) (0.216) (0.267) (0.258)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 2.301 1.951 4.474 3.853 1.197 1.282 2.902 2.894
(2.238) (1.743) (4.966) (3.944) (1.010) (1.056) (3.107) (2.896)
Relevant Groups 1.121 1.115 1.031 1.025 1.131 1.116 1.076 1.066
(0.097) (0.095) (0.098) (0.089) (0.098) (0.095) (0.104) (0.098)
Peace Years 0.863∗ 0.854∗ 0.848∗ 0.838∗∗ 0.878∗ 0.866∗ 0.864∗ 0.851∗
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.059) (0.058)
Spline 1 0.502∗∗ 0.507∗∗ 0.560∗ 0.567∗ 0.515∗∗ 0.519∗∗ 0.556∗∗ 0.559∗∗
(0.134) (0.133) (0.132) (0.131) (0.123) (0.117) (0.123) (0.119)
Spline 2 89.729+ 80.700+ 52.690+ 46.256+ 88.427∗ 84.882∗ 65.000+ 61.646∗
(223.002) (197.629) (121.635) (104.059) (197.361) (182.157) (138.894) (127.338)
Spline 3 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.001+ 0.001+ 0.002+ 0.002+
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.014) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
Exponentiated coefficients; Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table D.10: Alternative Methods: Interactions with zero inflated negative binomial re-
gression, 1989-2011
Economic Inequality Political Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Weak State 1.345 1.594 3.622 4.756 0.077∗ 0.765 0.190+ 1.222
(0.722) (0.784) (4.342) (6.014) (0.096) (0.234) (0.179) (0.333)
Economic Inequality 0.888 0.923 1.657 1.084
(0.368) (0.397) (1.794) (0.599)
Weak State * Ec. Inequality 8.785∗∗ 8.382∗∗
(6.289) (6.306)
Poorest Group 12.414+ 13.510∗∗∗ 6.035∗∗ 4.726∗∗
(17.643) (7.939) (3.388) (2.813)
Weak State * Poorest 0.164+ 0.135∗∗
(0.167) (0.096)
Richest Group 0.462 0.413+ 0.643 0.614
(0.661) (0.200) (0.273) (0.286)
Weak State * Richest 4.922+ 5.364∗
(4.322) (4.550)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.525 0.568 1.719 1.331
(0.215) (0.574) (0.683) (0.679)
Weak State * Largest Excl. Group 0.084∗∗ 0.150∗∗
(0.070) (0.103)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.779 0.940 1.871∗ 1.765+
(0.181) (0.372) (0.565) (0.601)
Weak State * Excl. Population 0.205∗∗∗ 0.318∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.097)
Civil War 1.894+ 1.819+ 1.242 1.256 1.530 1.259 1.107 1.136
(0.710) (0.619) (0.300) (0.353) (0.467) (0.248) (0.268) (0.277)
ln(Population) 1.190 1.152 1.368 1.356 1.376∗ 1.351+ 1.626∗ 1.598+
(0.172) (0.175) (0.543) (0.298) (0.221) (0.213) (0.381) (0.402)
ln(Infant Mortality Rate) 3.353∗ 2.899+ 8.277 7.870∗∗ 2.639 2.781+ 7.375∗ 7.047∗
(1.996) (1.684) (11.017) (5.374) (1.778) (1.699) (5.923) (5.815)
Relevant Groups 1.111∗ 1.104+ 1.033 0.999 1.148∗ 1.134∗ 1.070 1.032
(0.059) (0.064) (0.162) (0.076) (0.068) (0.064) (0.073) (0.067)
Peace Years 0.843∗∗ 0.835∗∗ 0.841∗∗ 0.829∗∗ 0.879∗ 0.875∗∗ 0.885∗ 0.873∗∗
(0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045) (0.042) (0.044)
Economic Inequality 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Poorest Group 10.937 19.526∗ 4.683 5.247
(32.990) (26.798) (6.806) (7.200)
Richest Group 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Largest Excluded Group) 0.871 0.938 1.437 1.316
(2.399) (4.395) (3.918) (2.231)
ln(Excluded Population) 0.972 1.734 1.094 3.654
(1.702) (2.436) (1.337) (6.453)
Civil War 0.000+ 0.000+ 0.010 0.058∗ 0.027 0.037 0.024 0.042+
(0.000) (0.000) (0.192) (0.076) (0.228) (0.125) (0.103) (0.072)
Observations 961 961 961 961 961 961 961 961
AIC 447.049 450.749 425.940 428.481 422.141 424.093 416.730 417.766
LL 0 -283.314 -286.087 -272.188 -276.332 -283.314 -286.087 -272.188 -276.332
LL -205.524 -207.374 -191.970 -193.241 -193.071 -194.046 -188.365 -188.883
Exponentiated coefficients; Clustered and robust standard errors in parentheses.
AIC, LL 0 and LL are averaged values for the ten imputed datasets.
Three cubic splines are included in the analysis, but not reported in the table.
+ p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Figure D.1: Influential Observations: Cook’s statistic, model 5




-2.07062 -.683379-1.980149-2.006382 -.3349349-1.67 87-2.249 6 -1.60 52 -.8132055-.7117092
-2.302585
-2.302585-2.302585-1.9 2165 -.607 894-1.86670-2.027667
.. - . 6 7-1. 33 4 -.7 439 7. 2 -.4655691- .9045 28895408- . 8 3 2 237118 3
-1.498537
-1.498537
- .3 5 5-1. 3 8- .15 76 37 .0120153- -1. 23 51 32 01-
-2.014451
-.89724-.9 9546-.6 75 72-.78275 2- . 34 . 4-. 655-1. 48 1
-1.144821
-1.144821























0 9 3-. 0 82-.5688069-.689 2 9
-1.132795
- .132795
0 4 593 145 6939
- .14944- .14944- . 7 1 22 5 - . 9 3- . 4 2 -. 81851 99 7 -.1348 44-.13 8 44
-.1348244
0 570 570 7 5 6. 8- . 5 0308 26- .772 6- .. 82 101
-1.738298
9-1. 7 - . 25 29 5. 81.64 739- 3 45- . 453 79 06 2 004 4- . 64 87- . 6- . 6 82- .- .049822- .0 3






















All do-files for tables, figures and regression models can be found on the attached CD.
For the tables and regression models, I have used Stata, while I have applied R for most
figures. All syntax can also be provided upon request: idarud@gmail.com.
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